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THESIS ABSTRACT
The effects of global change in the nature of production 
are most acutely felt at the local level. Local authorities 
have been quick to respond to these changes with a flurry of 
policy measures. An important debate has surfaced as to 
whether local initiatives can indeed mediate global 
restructuring in order to sustain the economic well-being of 
the locality. My thesis is a contribution to this debate.
The organizing hypothesis is that, under certain 
conditions, local activity can help to moderate the 
restructuring process. In particular, a locality is most 
effective when it possesses thick institutional networks 
between public and private actors that supply a wide range of 
services to aid industrial adjustment. Specifically, certain 
types of institutional networks can provide the ^ essential 
infrastructure for learning, which refers to the ability of 
institutions to habitually adapt both these support services 
and their institutional relationships to meet the new 
politico-economic conditions engendered by the restructuring 
process.
My research compares how two proactive localities 
(Nottingham in the East Midlands and Prato in Tuscany), both 
historic centres of textile and clothing production but with 
different institutional architecture, have assisted their 
industry to restructure away from the mass production of low- 
priced goods toward the more flexible production of high value 
products.
Chapter one critically reviews the debate on the role of 
local institutions in economic development. Chapter two then 
discusses how different institutional networks emerge and 
establishes the methodology for recognizing networks, 
measuring thickness and assessing institutional learning 
capacity.
Chapters three and four present an institutional map of 
each locality, identifying the key institutions and the types 
of networks that have developed. Chapters five and six examine 
the evolution of both the support services provided to the 
industry and the institutional relations during the 
restructuring period to assess each locality's institutional 
learning capacity.
Chapter seven looks specifically at the growing, albeit 
recent, influence of the European Union on local institution- 
building in the two cases. Finally, chapter eight directly 
compares the two localities to draw general conclusions 
regarding the role of institutional networks in the industrial 
restructuring process and in economic development more 
generally.
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INTRODUCTION
We are in a period of great social and economic 
transformation. Although many of these changes are global in 
dimension, their consequences are most acutely felt at the 
local level. Accordingly it is subnational governments that 
have been left to contend with the serious spatial effects of 
industrial decline as firms close, unemployment rises and the 
demand for social and collective services increase. 
Subnational governments have responded to these circumstances 
with an explosion of economic development initiatives.
In characteristically academic fashion, a multi-faceted 
debate has emerged questioning both the relevance and the 
effectiveness of subnational activity for mediating the 
effects of global political and economic restructuring. My 
thesis is a contribution to this debate. I intend to 
demonstrate that, under certain conditions, local authorities 
can play a significant role in the promotion of economic 
development generally, and the restructuring process, more 
specifically. The purpose of this thesis, however, is not to 
deny the overwhelming importance of national and international 
circumstances for moulding local fortunes but rather to affirm 
that local conditions matter as well. Uneven development is 
certainly not reducible to local activity but— and this is the 
crucial point— neither is it separate from it. Space does 
exist, although the size of that space varies considerably,
for influential local initiative.
Briefly, my central hypothesis is that the conditions 
which best support a locality's ability to manage industrial 
restructuring are if it possesses (or is able to build) thick 
institutional networks linking up public and private resources 
at multiple levels of interaction and if those networks have 
a learning capacity whereby institutional relationships and 
policies adapt to meet changing politico-economic conditions. 
This institutional capacity is shaped and conditioned by the 
structure of the State and the territorial and functional 
division of power and resources, the structure of the 
industrial sector and its boundedness to the political 
administration, and the manner in which the locality is 
effected by and can take advantage of the policy environment 
of the European Union
To test these ideas, my thesis compares the activities of 
two localities, Prato in Tuscany and Nottingham in the East 
Midlands, both historic centres of textile and clothing 
production, an industry which has long been in the throes of 
industrial restructuring. For over the past decade, the local 
authorities in both cases have vigorously tried to assist the 
industrial adjustment process with a wide range of locally- 
generated services and support mechanisms. The cities' 
institutional architecture, however, is quite different. 
Through a comparative analysis of both cases, I hope to 
demonstrate that a locality with strong and interactive 
linkages between the public and private sectors at multiple 
levels of interaction can, indeed, mediate the restructuring
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process, while a locality without such mechanisms will find it 
much more difficult.
The thesis is comprised of eight chapters. Chapter one 
discusses the global changes in progress and demonstrates why 
they have led to the (re)emergence of the region/locality as 
an important locus of economic development activity. 
Paralleling these political and economic transformations, 
there has been a similar shift in economic development models 
employed by economists and policy-makers. In particular, there 
has been the growing emphasis on the importance of local or 
endogenous factors for understanding uneven development. 
Finally, the last part of chapter one then critically assesses 
the debate concerning the role of local institutions in 
economic development. I conclude that the learning economy 
approach, which stresses the importance of dense institutional 
networks, is the most robust method for evaluating local 
attempts at economic governance.
Chapter two identifies different types of institutional 
networks which can emerge and hypothesizes which may best 
support a local learning capacity. In particular, the 
structural characteristic of density (the number of local 
institutions and the degree to which they are networked) is 
proposed as the determining variable of learning capacity. I 
then look at the constraints on and opportunities for local 
capacity building which emerge from the broader policy 
environment; in particular what effects the state structure, 
the economic structure and the growing influence of the 
European Union have had on the development of local networks
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and local learning capacity. Finally, the methodology of the 
study is outlined. A comparative case study approach is used 
because of its ability to highlight the importance of the 
institutional context and integrate a variety of data sources. 
In depth interviews with local policy-making elites using a 
semi-structured questionnaire provides the centre of the 
study. Institutional networks are evaluated through the use of 
social network analysis, a statistical technique which can 
reveal network structure, measure network density and identify 
the distribution of power among the various actors.
Additionally, a range of variables for measuring local 
learning capacity are also set forth.
Chapters three and four look at the wider policy
environments of Prato and Nottingham. Chapter three 
demonstrates that Prato possesses dense, integrated 
institutional networks that emerged from overlapping functions 
among levels of government and weak powers in the field of 
economic development. Lacking such powers, local authorities 
have had to rely on the aid of private sector associations to 
accomplish development objectives. Complementing this 
institutional architecture, the political decentralization of 
power to the regions in Italy is paralleled by the economic 
decentralization of the industry to locally-dependent
industrially districts; a situation which also has encouraged 
the build-up of local institutional capacity in the field of 
economic development.
Chapter four shows the development of very different 
types of networks in Nottingham. The presence of central
12
government departments rather than an autonomous region and a 
trend toward the growing centralization of power in Britain 
has promoted the development of multiple, disconnected issue- 
based networks with a national rather than local orientation. 
The increasing centralization of political power, however, is 
at odds with growing signs of some economic decentralization 
of the textile industry, a circumstance which can only hinder 
local support of industrial restructuring.
Chapters five and six examine how policy support and 
network relationships has evolved over the past 15 years. In 
Prato (chapter five), learning is clearly evident. Networks 
move from working in bilateral to multilateral fora in 
response to the economic crisis and expand to include a wider 
range of actors, who can provide new resources required to 
meet the changing needs of successful industrial production. 
Policy support increases in both number and scope, again 
adapting output to meet changing industrial requirements.
In Nottingham (chapter 6), alternatively, innovative 
policy measures designed to strengthen the trend toward 
economic decentralization and help the industry adapt to 
changing international demand were, over time, gutted of both 
content and institutional support. The inability to create 
institutional networks to support industrial restructuring, 
and the continuing decline of local resources resulting from 
Central policies, led to a scaling down of the scope of their 
local initiatives, from wide-reaching strategies to support 
restructuring to a minimal strategy of providing low cost 
workspaces to local firms. Only the later usurpation of the
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policy leadership role by the county authorities allowed for 
the preservation of some vestiges of local learning and 
continued support for industrial restructuring.
Chapter seven looks at the growing role of the European 
Union on local capacity. Although there is evidence that the 
European Union has strengthened, somewhat, the role of local 
authorities in the development process, the research also 
suggests that areas with strong local networks are better able 
to exploit the opportunities presented by an increasingly 
European policy environment.
Finally, chapter eight draws general theoretical 
conclusions that emerge from the findings of this thesis. 
Overall, the evidence seems to support the hypothesis that 
dense institutional networks enhance local learning capacity 
and are more effective at moderating industrial restructuring. 
Furthermore, the findings indicate that when the local policy 
process is dominated by cental state departments, promoting 
vertically-structured intergovernmental networks, then 
learning capacity and subnational public/private interaction 
are clearly impeded. On a more theoretical level, the research 
suggests that economic development is a socially and 
institutionally embedded process. Thus state and market forces 
are shaped by local and regional conditions; calling into 
question the validity of the state/market dichotomy as an 
appropriate organizing framework for understanding 
development.
Before moving onto the thesis itself, I would like to 
first express my gratitude to all the people who have helped
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and supported me throughout the course of my efforts. I am 
most indebted to Robert Leonardi, who has been supervisor, 
mentor and friend. He has patiently read and reread numerous 
chapter revisions, encouraged me to develop my ideas, and 
spent long hours discussing all the ins and outs of regional 
development. For it was my work with Bob before arriving at 
LSE, and during the Ph.D. odyssey, which originally kindled 
and later maintained my interest in local economic 
development. As difficult as it has been sitting on the 
theoretical fence, constantly explaining to interested 
observers that, truly, I am not an economist, I would not have 
had it any other way.
For their financial support, I am grateful to the 
Suntory-Toyata Centre for Economics and Related Disciplines 
(STICERD), the ORS and the Central Research Fund at the 
University of London, which funded my research trip to Italy.
I thank wholeheartedly the numerous people who have 
helped me in a wide variety of ways: Prof. Robert Bennett, 
Louise Crewe, Gabi Dei Ottati, Keith Dowding, Prof. Patrick 
Dunleavy, Steve Godfrey, Jurgen Grote, Daphne Josselin, Maria 
LaFalce, Howard Machin, Barbara Piergallina, Fabrizio 
Pizzanelli, Marco Romagnoli, Peter Totterdill and the 
participants of the LSE Political Institutions seminar. I owe 
a special thanks to the support of Professors Raffaella 
Nanetti, Kevin Morgan and Gareth Rees who have always been 
available to read any of my work, answer any of my question, 
and just provide overall encouragement when things felt bleak.
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Finally, to Vittorio Bufacchi for his enduring support 
through the peaks and troughs, good times and bad times. If he 
had not been there, I doubt whether this thesis would have 
ever become a reality. He has made all the difference.
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1. WHAT'S LOCAL ABOUT LOCAL ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT?1
INTRODUCTION
Evidence of socioeconomic transformation is all around us. 
Widespread economic restructuring, spiralling unemployment, 
urban and regional deprivation, and mounting crime rates all 
provide damning testimony of the magnitude and suffering 
wrought by these changes. Compounding the plight of declining 
regions, there has been a general trend of state retrenchment 
from the economy, leaving subnational authorities to struggle 
with the expensive, painful consequences of decline. 
Accordingly, subnational authorities have replied with a 
myriad of initiatives intended to moderate the problems of 
economic restructuring.
Despite the good intentions of local authorities, one 
must keep in mind that economic development policies initiated
1 I use local in the broad sense to include any subnational 
grouping. Within this chapter, I will use region, local, and 
subnational somewhat interchangeably. The ambiguity is deliberate 
because what constitutes the appropriate level for development 
will vary across areas, thus at a theoretical level, the most 
important concept is that the area in question is subnational. 
Later on in the thesis, when I refer to specific authorities and 
the territory under their jurisdiction, then the terms local and 
regional will take on a more concrete meaning corresponding to 
political boundaries.
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at the local level may not be a determining influence on 
outcomes but rather may be epiphenomenal to the activities of 
wider social, economic and political forces (Dunleavy, 1980). 
My intention, however, is not to dispute the significance of 
national and international circumstances, for they are indeed 
crucial variables influencing local economic fortunes, but 
rather to demonstrate that local conditions can be equally 
important components of local prosperity or decline.
This chapter assesses, at the theoretical level, the 
potential of local activity to make a contribution to economic 
success. Section I examines the economic and political 
transformations in progress and their influence on local 
development activity. Section II briefly outlines the 
evolution of local economic development models. The growing 
recognition of the institutional context of development is 
highlighted. Finally, section III then critically surveys the 
literature on local institutions and development. The learning 
economy approach will be shown to be the most suitable for a 
comparative analysis of how localities respond to industrial 
restructuring.
I. GLOBAL CHANGE: THE REDISCOVERY OF THE LOCAL
Both political and economic variables have pushed the locality 
to embrace an increasingly more prominent role in economic 
development2. The political components include the hollowing
2 This division is a stylistic tool used for clarity of 
argument. Clearly, in the real world, the two processes feed off 
each other, and only ideology allows us to identify the driver
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out of the state, the decline of regional policy, and
increased interregional competition in the field of economic 
development. The economic factors centre on fundamental but 
uneven changes in the production process, with special 
reference to the globalization of the economy. As shall be 
demonstrated, although these factors may support a
local/regional renaissance, they also, simultaneously, 
establish new constraints on subnational activities.
On the political stage, the internationalization of 
economic processes (see below) has weakened the ability of the 
state to effectively regulate the economy within its own 
borders. Jessop points out N[T]his loss of autonomy creates in 
turn both the need for supranational coordination and the
space for subnational resurgence"(Jessop, 1994: 264).
Consequently, states have reallocated powers and functions 
down to other actors (such as other levels of government, the 
private sector, or quangos) or up to international forums such 
as the European Union (EU). This, in turn, has encouraged a 
growing relationship between the EU and the regions which has 
thrust subnational authorities onto new economic and political 
playing fields. The initiation of partnership arrangements 
between the EU, the member-state and the regional government 
in the implementation of the Structural Funds3, the newly 
formed Committee of Regions, the increased importance of the
of the process.
3 The partnership contract, which is a legally binding 
contract under EU law, is between the EU, the national government 
and the subnational authorities for the design and implementation 
of EU regional policy.
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goal of social and economic cohesion, and the growing number 
of unofficial regional and local offices being set up in 
Brussels are all evidence of the this new role.
Paradoxically, although the increasing power of the EU 
promises, on one hand, new allies, resources and greater 
policy space, it threatens, on the other hand, a more complex 
legal and regulatory environment which will put new 
constraints on subnational activity. In addition, the 
succeeding pressures on subnational governments for greater 
policy intervention have not necessarily corresponded with 
increased financial and administrative capabilities. Although 
they have gained added responsibilities, they have not 
necessarily obtained the resources necessary to successfully 
carry them out.
These changes in the state have been paralleled by 
changes in state policy— especially spatial development 
policy. After the 1973 energy crisis, which signalled the end 
of the uninterrupted growth period since the end of the second 
World War, increased attention to national macroeconomic 
policy meant a decreasing concentration on regional policies 
in most Western European states (Swyngedouw, 1989). As a 
result many economic peripheries feared an increased gap 
between stronger and weaker regions (Rokkan and Urwin, 1983). 
The long term response to this trend has been an increase in 
subnational government policy activity in the field of 
economic development, especially as subnational authorities 
have been forced to shoulder responsibility for the host of 
problems that have emerged from the industrial restructuring
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that continues to dominate the European landscape.
Finally, the overall increase of subnational policy 
activity in the area of economic development has pressured 
other local authorities into undertaking similar initiatives. 
As certain regions and localities become more active in 
response to changes, it spurs other regions to become more 
involved through the demonstration effect. Equally, 
competition between regions for investment and employment 
drives regions to invest in and promote their different 
packages of labour skills, labour costs, business 
environments, and physical and social infrastructure.
Although increased competition may help fuel the search 
for new and innovative solutions to deep-rooted social and 
economic problems, it is also likely to contribute to those 
problems. In particular, policies undertaken by local 
governments to attract big firm investment often result in a 
negatively-slanted prisoners' dilemma (King, 1990). The 
outcome of the dilemma is that if one local government offers 
a package of incentives, all must offer comparable incentives 
or face the prospects of having their businesses relocate. 
However, if all offer incentive packages they are back to 
square one and businesses locate where they choose but the 
local economies will have been weakened as a result because of 
the costs (increased spending, decreased business tax revenue) 
of planning and implementing the policies (ibid.).
On the economic dimension, a strong case has been made 
for the (re)emergence of the locality by observers of economic 
production processes. The transformation of production, in
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particular the move from mass production toward more flexible 
production methods, has reinforced the region or locality as 
a key locus of socio-economic governance (Storper, 1994a, 
Sabel, 1989, Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991, 1989, Scott, 1988,
Aydalot and Keeble, 1988, Piore and Sabel, 1984).
The argument runs as follows. Increasingly fragmented 
and internationalizing markets, rapidly changing demand and 
the shortening of production and product cycles favour firms, 
often small firms, which employ more flexible production 
methods rather than those used in mass production processes.4 
Greater flexibility can be achieved in two fundamental ways5, 
either through the horizontal integration of spatially- 
concentrated small firms or through the flattening out of 
vertically-integrated corporations. The conspicuous 
development of horizontally-integrated, spatially concentrated 
small firm-based production systems (the most articulated 
versions are known as industrial districts) in Italy, Germany, 
Denmark, Austria, France and the U.S. has integrated the 
region as a consolidated system of production, hence 
strengthening its potential as a key economic actor (Sabel, 
1989) .
Equally, the flattening out of vertical corporations both 
locally, through the increased use of sub-contracting, and
4 Mass production refers to the use of product-specific 
machinery worked by unskilled or semi-skilled labour to produce 
standardized goods for a price-driven, undifferentiated 
marketplace. Prices are kept low through the establishment of 
economies of scale.
5 Clearly this is a gross oversimplification of the 
multiple, diversely articulated forms of flexible production. It 
is used for conceptual purposes only.
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globally, through the establishment of production units in 
third countries has also fuelled the local/regional 
renaissance. Stronger producer-subcontractor and producer-user 
networks fortify the local economic fabric by simultaneously 
weaving the firms more deeply into both a common territorial 
space and the international marketplace (Sabel, 1989). 
Concurrently, the increasing decentralisation of larger firms 
and the unremitting search for process and product innovation 
can blur the former distinction between core (headquarters) 
and periphery units (i.e. branch plants) implying greater 
autonomy for periphery firms. Where these firms were once seen 
only as vassals of central control, some now represent 
potential centres of innovation in their own right which can 
effectively engage the local milieu (Schoenberger, 1994).
As compelling as this localisation thesis may be, we must 
recognize that although mass production has been successfully 
challenged by more flexible production techniques, reports of 
its death have been greatly exaggerated. Rather, what is 
emerging are patchworked, unevenly dispersed patterns of 
coexisting production processes. As emphasized above, uneven 
development is only partially explained by differing local 
circumstances which is, paradoxically, validated by the 
success of industrial districts which emerged in rather unique 
circumstances and, as a result, have proven difficult models 
to export (See Section III-B.).
Although the emergence of localities is indeed a real and 
important trend, it can only be interpreted within the context 
of a changing, globalizing political economy. These changes
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include (Amin and Thrift, 1994a: 2-5): i) the global
centralization of the financial system and the resulting 
dominance of finance over production; ii) the importance of 
knowledge and expertise as a factor of production; iii) the 
transnationalization of technology and the increasing speed of 
the redundancy of new technology; iv) the rise of global 
oligopolies; v) the rise of transnational economic diplomacy, 
effectively globalizing state power along with production, 
finance and knowledge; vi) the globalization of communication 
and immigration flows leading to the rise of global culture 
flows and the delinking of identities and symbols from 
territory; and vii) the result of all of the above is the 
development of global geographies; the breakdown of borders 
and the rebuilding of such in a manner which is different from 
what had come before.
The recognition of the significance of the global does 
not diminish the importance of the local (ibid.). The local is 
embedded in the global, however, thus the degree to which it 
can mediate this relationship shapes its ability to mould its 
economic development trajectory. The relationship between 
globalization and local action is not one in which the 
presence of one negates the relevance of the other. Instead, 
the interaction of these processes is the foundation of the 
way in which a locality conceptualizes itself. Amin and Thrift 
(1994a) write:
Globalization, thus, represents a redefinition of places 
as juxtapositions of intersecting, overlapping, and 
unconnected global flows and historical fixities. It 
characterizes localities as territories living with 
different bits and pieces of transnational division of 
labour as well as their own inherited industrial
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practices; as territories composed of immigrant 
communities evoking imagined homelands, middle-class 
dwellers soothed by 'authenticity' of distant exotic 
cultures, and working-class communities evoking a sense 
of place rooted in local traditions; and as territories 
selectively drawing upon rooted or imagined stories and 
myths to mobilize or subvert a common sense of regional 
identity (across real local social and economic 
divisions), in order to 'capture' the global (e.g. 
investment) or resist it (e.g. regionalism) (p. 10).
The question remains, however, can local activity can 
successfully maintain and/or secure adequate economic well­
being within the global (ibid.)? The answer depends on both 
the way the locality is inserted into the global, and the 
functionality of its political, economic and social 
institutions. This thesis will explore this question by 
comparing the attempt of two localities to help their textile 
industries adapt to these global economic changes.
This section has indicated that recent economic and 
political trends have opened up space for effective local 
economic governance, although the amount of space depends on 
the interaction of local conditions with national and 
international activities. Paralleling these political and 
economic changes, or perhaps partially in response to them, 
the main models of economic development have similarly 
evolved. The next section looks at this evolution of local 
economic development (LED) models in order to identify, in 
more precise terms, the role played by the locality in the 
governance of the economy.
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II. CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF LOCAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
CHANGING CONCEPTIONS OF LOCAL ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE
As this section will outline the governance mechanisms 
implicit in the main models of economic development, it will 
first be useful to define economic governance. Economic 
governance is broadly conceptualized as "the full range of 
institutional possibilities for deriving collective decisions 
in an economy (Hollingsworth and Lindberg 1985: 221)." More 
specifically, economic governance refers to the range of 
activities of social, political and economic agents and the 
patterns which emerge from those activities that serve to 
guide, control or manage the economy (Kooiman, 1993). The main 
models for understanding economic governance are identified by 
the key regulatory institutions of each model; community, 
market, the state (or hierarchy) and, more recently, networks 
or associational governance (See Schmitter, 1990, Streeck and 
Schmitter, 1985 for an extended discussion of these models). 
In actual analysis, none of these models function in isolation 
from one another, and often find themselves in conflict with 
each other.
A brief review of the literature on economic development 
models will show that as our assumptions concerning the motor 
of development changes, so does our understanding of 
governance, especially local governance, and the balance 
achieved among the different regulatory mechanisms. The 
literature can be subdivided into two top-down, bottom-up and
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mixed approaches to development6.
From the post-war period until the early seventies, the 
top-down model, rooted in neo-classical economic theory, 
dominated the thinking on LED. Within this approach, the 
spontaneously equilibrating market was assumed to play the 
primary role in economic governance. This model rested on the 
supposition that the world was bifurcated into core and 
periphery regions. Capital and labour, the key factors of 
production, were assumed to be mobile and would flow between 
core and periphery. The differing costs of capital and labour 
between core and periphery would close the gap by equalizing 
factor prices since capital moves from regions where it is 
abundant to regions where it is scarce and labour flows from 
where employment is scarce to where it is abundant (i.e. the 
Hecksher-Ohlin model of factor-price equalization). Regional 
variation was seen simply as the outcome of different regional 
comparative advantages which were self-correcting over time 
(Scott and Storper, 1992). The free market would foster 
development; thus public policy should only be used sparingly 
to compensate for externalities and market failure.
Within this paradigm, however, a debate soon emerged 
around whether the flows of these factors of production 
actually did decrease the gap between poorer and richer
6 These are general categories. Within each, there is a rich 
and varied literature. As the purpose of this section is to 
indicate that many of the classical assumptions concerning 
development have been challenged, this general division is more 
than sufficient. Section III which examines the most recent 
aspects of debate over the past ten years provides the primary 
literature review.
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regions7. Proponents of the cumulative growth model (Myrdal, 
1957, Hirschman, 1958) argued instead that both labour and 
capital flowed to regions of abundance because economies of 
scale and agglomeration effects enhanced a region's export 
potential. Backwash factors, as outlined by Myrdal (1957), 
exacerbate disparities because the prosperity of core areas 
serve as a lure for skilled workers, business leaders, 
educated individuals and venture capital that abandon the 
peripheral regions from which they originated, causing a 
brain, skill and capital drain on the periphery. Additionally, 
the economic efficiency of core regions enables them to sell 
their products in the periphery at competitive prices, further 
weakening the periphery's economic structure. As a result of 
these dynamics, the periphery can only develop in one of two 
ways. Backwash effects can be counterbalanced by spread facts 
whereby core regions tend to spread into periphery regions 
which often have natural resources or some other comparative 
advantage which can stimulate some investment. When spread 
effects are greater than backwash effects, development will 
occur. A second phenomenon outlined by Hirschman (1958) is the 
growth pole effect whereby growth in urban areas trickles down 
into more rural areas as population and industry spread beyond 
city borders. In either case, although there are certain 
equilibrating forces within the market, they are only partial 
at best, indicating a greater role for the state in solving 
development problems.
7 This model had a third variant; the dependency model which 
argued the core actively underdeveloped the periphery (See Scott 
and Storper, 1992, Gunder Frank, 1974).
28
Given these general assumptions concerning mobile factors 
of production, traditional local economic development policy 
was oriented to meet two objectives: to insure price
competition and reduce production costs for firms, usually 
through the provision of infrastructure and incentives for 
industrial relocation--referred to as regional policy. To 
accomplish these goals, the state would offer subsidies to 
protect industry from international competition, use fiscal 
and tax incentives to encourage investment in the periphery, 
and increased income transfers to individuals and households 
to augment local consumption (Cappellin, 1993, p.62). In 
particular, to attract industry to the peripheral regions, tax 
abatements, loan packages, and infrastructure and land 
development were offered as a means of reducing production 
costs (Mier and Fitzgerald, 1991). As a result, these models 
focused primarily on identifying the macro causes of regional 
growth and development, rather than asking to what extent 
local activity and local institutions can actually shape that 
development (ibid.). Instead, the main political actor was the 
central state, hence the label top-down approaches.
Over the years, top-down approaches have been shown to be 
flawed in a number of ways. Specifically, they had
overestimated the ability of poorer areas to attract 
investment even with substantial incentive packages,
encouraged a welfare dependence mentality, and had
inadvertently endowed a sizable portion of economic activity 
into the hands of a centralized public sector bureaucracy 
which effectively redirected entrepreneurial skills from
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investing in self-sustaining development to milking the public 
cow (Cappellin, 1993, p.7). Additionally, unanticipated trends 
in the 1970s, de-industrialization, industrial decline, the 
dual plague of high inflation and high unemployment, and 
general scientific evidence,8 have challenged (although not 
invalidated) the top-down approach.
In response to the flaws in the top-down model, bottom-up 
approaches, which start with different assumptions regarding 
the important inputs of development, came to the fore of the 
debate during the 1970s and 80s. Specifically, top-down 
approaches are believed to overlook three key components of 
the local economy that have significant implications for 
development: the organizational structure of the economy, the 
organization of territory, and the role played by subnational 
institutions (ibid.). Consequently, the bottom-up or 
endogenous models of development begin with an assumption 
completely contrary to the traditional theory; that the 
significant factors of regional development are, in fact, 
immobile. These factors include infrastructure, labour skills, 
sectoral structures, technical and organizational know-how, 
urbanized economies and local institutional arrangements 
(ibid. ) .
Endogenous development is oriented toward helping local 
and regional economies exploit, to their own advantage, the 
changes currently occurring in productive organization and
8 Studies by the European Union (CEC, 1991b), for example, 
have concluded that these traditional policies had generally 
failed, and that regional disparities within Europe had not been 
substantially reduced.
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communication technology (section I)9. Bottom-up development 
seeks to integrate "all aspects of life within a territory 
defined by its culture, resources, landscape and climate" 
(Nelson, 1993: 52). Thus it acknowledges that development is 
a multi-dimensional concept not reducible simply to economic 
factors but must include social, political, cultural, 
historical and institutional considerations to be understood 
properly. Economic development is embedded in social and 
political processes which have specific geographical and 
institutional implications (Granovetter, 1985). Development
from below concentrates on factors which influence the 
adoption of new production processes and product innovation 
rather than on prices of various production inputs. It is not 
about building industries per se but modernizing the technical 
and organizational capacity of the economy. Garofoli (1992) 
notes:
Endogenous development means in effect: a) the capacity 
to transform the social-economic system; b) the ability 
to react to external challenges; c) the promotion of 
social learning; d) the ability to introduce specific 
forms of social regulation at a local level which favour 
the aforementioned points. Endogenous development is, in 
other words, the ability to innovate at a local level 
(p.7) .
Consequently, disparities result from the differing speed in 
which a locality can adopt innovation. Costs of adjustment 
will be determined by the economic, social, political and 
cultural obstacles to adopting new technologies and 
innovation.
Endogenous development suggests a different range of
9 As pointed out earlier, the emergence of these new 
development models parallels the debate on global transformation.
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policies than those advocated by the more traditional 
theories. Appropriate measures include research and 
development investment, technical and managerial training 
provision, the supply of quality business services, incentives 
to create networks among firms and organizations as well as 
among local public and private actors, and environmental and 
urban policies to build an attractive business environment. 
However, the choice of policy is determined by local need and 
tailored to exploit local capacities and advantages. Such 
policies, however, are more likely to be successful in states 
which have a greater degree of decentralization and local 
fiscal autonomy.
Decentralization implies that a higher degree of 
coordination among various levels of government is also 
required. Although this model stresses the activities of 
local actors, it recognizes that they work in national and 
international frameworks which shape and constrain local 
capacity. Local policies are only one part of the overall 
picture and must be complemented by appropriate policies at 
both the national and European levels.
Unlike the earlier models, growth in this model is not 
directly about size (i.e. economies of scale), the 
manufacturing industry and land development (although these 
are not ignored). Rather it is about developing internal 
advantages10 whatever they may be and managing social and 
economic change. Economic governance is no longer envisaged as
10 Recent work, for example, points to the development and 
care of a cultural and environmental heritage as one possible 
strategy (Konsola, 1993).
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simply some market-state balance with heavy emphasis on the 
market, but rather, this model acknowledges that these forces 
can be mediated by subnational institutions in ways that 
affect a locality's development potential, either positively 
or negatively. Hence endogenous development broadens our 
understanding of economic governance to include the regulatory 
activities of local as well as national and international 
actors.
However, as stressed throughout, local initiatives alone, 
although important, are in and of themselves inadequate to the 
task of economic development. Especially in areas that do not 
possess key skills, technologies, innovative capacity, and an 
entrepreneurial culture, some of the older policies such as 
the attraction of inward investment which can bring in some of 
these resources, is still an important policy measure. As has 
been stressed, the locality is embedded in the global, making 
both endogenous and exogenous policies important tools of 
balanced development. Recently, in the 1990s, the debate has 
embraced this mixed model of development. The emphasis, 
however, remains on the invisible factors of development; 
enhancing innovation potential, building institutional 
capacity and constructing public/private networks to exchange 
ideas of best practice (Morgan, 1994 ). The most effective 
policy mixes (endogenous/exogenous) to achieve this will 
depend on how the local economy is structured and inserted 
into the global economy, and the arrangements of local 
institutions.
In sum, I have shown that the debate regarding economic
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development has shifted from an over-concentration on market- 
state governance mechanisms to a wider conception of 
development which allots a key role to subnational 
institutions as important mediating factors which can shape 
the development process. However, we still do not have a clear 
picture of the exact role of subnational institutions; how in 
fact can they mould local economic fortunes. The next step, 
then, is to critically review the debate which has surfaced 
over the last ten years over the role subnational institutions 
play in the development process.
III. SUBNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: THE
DEBATE
After first defining what is meant by institutions, this 
section will then assess four general approaches11 to the 
study of institutions and development: a) regulation theory, 
b) flexible specialization, c) the local milieu, and d) the 
learning economy. The learning economy approach will be shown 
to be the most useful analytical tool for a comparative study 
of subnational institutions and economic development.
Institutions refer to the organizations involved in
11 Some might argue that there is a fifth school referred to 
as the California school of external economies (Storper, 1994a) 
and includes the work of Scott (1988), Storper and Christopherson 
(1987). These scholars explained regional development through the 
role of transaction costs, agglomeration economies, the division 
of labour and input-output linkages and only in their later works 
did they insert institutions as an important explanatory 
variable. Since institutions were added as an afterthought, when 
their own explanations proved only partial, these works have been 
excluded.
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economic governance and the rules of the game that structure 
relations between those organizations (North, 1990, Hall, 
1986). Those rules are articulated formally and informally. 
Informal rules evolve from the culture, traditions, and social 
behavioral codes that provide a fluid connection between the 
past, present, and future. Alternatively, formal rules are 
elaborated through contracts, agreements, Constitutions, laws 
as well as any other established, legally-binding arrangements 
among participants. Since subnational institutions mediate the 
impact of both the state and the market on individuals, they 
represent the meso-level or intermediate form of governance.
By providing stable rules and procedures that facilitate 
exchange and direct the flow of information (hence reducing 
uncertainty), institutions provide the framework in which 
individuals and organizations can achieve, and mutually 
benefit from, joint or collective action12. We should not 
assume, however, that stability is equivalent to efficiency or 
generalized prosperity (although it might be). Rather, 
stability is the result of the given bargaining strength of 
the participants at any given point in time in which no 
organization wants to allocate resources to changing the rules 
of the game, as it is the bargaining strength of actors that 
shaped the institutions in the first place (North, 1990). It 
follows then that economic dynamism or backwardness is a 
function of the way in which institutions develop and change, 
and, implicitly, of the way in which resources (and power) are
12 Alternatively, institutions can also prevent the 
achievement of collective action. This will be elaborated in more 
detail in chapter two.
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distributed both locally and between the local, national and 
global.
A lively, multidisciplinary literature has examined, in 
various ways, the linkages between institutional architecture 
and local economic performance. The first approach evaluated 
is the Parisian regulation school, which offers a meta-theory 
of global economic and institutional change with relevant 
insights for understanding these interactions at the 
subnational level.
Ill-A. Regulation Theory
A theoretical link uniting economic processes, socio­
political institutions and spatial patterns has been 
articulated at a general level by the Parisian regulationist 
school13 (Boyer, 1988a, 1988b, 1990, Lipietz, 1987, Aglietta, 
1979). According to these scholars, the dominant organization 
of economic production (regime of accumulation), which is 
global in scale, is stabilized over the medium-term by a 
complex web of sociopolitical institutions which is 
articulated at the level of the nation-state (mode of social 
regulation or MSR). Since the MSR provides the necessary norms 
and institutions that support the reproduction of the regime 
of accumulation, through its ability to mediate, in the 
medium-term, the crises inherent in capitalist processes, 
economic growth and development are stimulated when a
13 There are a number of separate schools within Regulation 
theory. See Jessop (1990) for a comprehensive review.
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particular regime of accumulation is united with a compatible 
MSR. Over time, the crises will eventually overpower the MSR, 
leading to the breakdown of the old system and hindering 
growth and development generally. Growth will be engendered 
anew when a new organization of production and a new system of 
regulation are successfully joined14.
Regulation theory may mistakenly give the impression that 
change is revolutionary since it moves dramatically between 
distinct historical periods. However, as regulationists 
themselves portray, although change causes great upheaval, the 
new structures and institutions emerge from within old 
structures; thus continuity is also a fundamental part of the 
new system of regulation (Peck and Tickell, 1992). In other 
words, the new system is forged from the old and is thus 
historically and geographically contingent on that which came 
before.
Accordingly, the coupling of a particular organization of 
production with a system of regulation has explicit spatial 
(and temporal) characteristics. Lipietz ( 1987 ), in particular, 
identifies the nation-state as the stage on which these 
processes converge. He notes "...in reality, struggle and 
institutionalized compromise tend to arise within the 
framework of individual nations..."(p.21-22 cited in Peck and
14 Historically, there have been four regimes of capitalist 
accumulation and corresponding MSRs: 1) extensive accumulation
managed by old regime regulation; 2) intensive accumulation 
without mass consumption (Taylorism) governed by competitive 
regulation; 3) intensive accumulation with mass consumption 
(Fordism) regulated by the welfare state; and 4) currently, post­
fordism is argued to be surfacing, although its corresponding MSR 
is not fully developed (or at least has not been recognized as 
such) .
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Tickell, 1992 : 351 ).15 Each state possesses its own specific 
mix of assets and liabilities that have emerged from factors 
such as the allotment of natural resources, the timing and 
nature of development, economic structure, and inherited 
social practices. Consequently, the institutional architecture 
of regulatory systems varies across nation-states; each with 
specific regulatory instruments, functions and forms. A quick 
glance at the international fortunes of nations suggests that 
certain systems of regulation are much more fundtional than 
others. Put more precisely, successful development has 
distinct geographical and institutional implications.
By focusing on the nation-state level, however, the 
question of uneven development within nation-states is 
completely overlooked. More recent work by Peck and Tickell 
(1992) tries to extend this analytical framework to cover 
uneven development within nation-states as well. They suggest 
that if national spatial variation of regulation is a vital 
component of global capitalism, it follows that regional 
variation is similarly important to national economic and 
social organisation. Like the nation-state, regional systems, 
which have their own mix of assets and liabilities, are also 
shaped by their historical-institutional context and, of 
current salience, by the ability of their systems of 
regulation to adapt to (or mediate) the new conditions 
emerging from global restructuring. Also analogous to nation­
states, certain regions will have systems of social regulation
15 Lipietz, Alain (1987) Mirages and Miracles: The Crises
of Global Fordism, London: New Left Books.
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that promote development; others will have dysfunctional 
systems that inhibit it. Ergo, we should expect to see diverse 
regional systems of governance which interact directly with 
national systems; this interaction then further increases the 
variation between regions and, ultimately, between states.16
Currently, these scholars suggest that we are in a period 
of transition to post-fordist productive methods. Through 
careful study, enough evidence has been gathered to indicate 
that production methods are evolving more flexible structures. 
The organizational implications of this transformation include 
a decentralization of hierarchical corporations, an increase 
of networking and joint ventures both between producers and 
users and producers and their subcontractors, the integration 
of research and development directly into production, high 
quality products at reasonable costs, and sufficient training 
to provide broad, flexible skills (See Boyer, 1990 for a 
fuller explanation). Although certain institutional changes in 
the economic arena have been recognized, the corresponding 
MSR (institutional changes in the social and political 
spheres), has yet to be identified (Peck and Tickell, 1992).
Regulation theory highlights a number of important 
aspects for understanding economic development. It 
demonstrates clearly the important relationship between 
economic growth and the reproduction of the sociopolitical 
system. Hence, its viewpoint is a holistic one which 
implicitly recognizes the multi-dimensional character of
16 When looking at Europe, the activities of the European 
Union adds yet another layer of complexity to this interactive 
process.
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development. Additionally, some of the more recent work, 
particularly Peck and Tickell, have made important initial 
links between the global economic trends and local responses, 
driving home the earlier argument that local development is a 
function of both local institutions and the insertion of the 
local into the global. Finally, it stresses the importance of 
contingency— in other words the way a locality adapts is 
shaped by past as well as current institutions and thus is 
inseparable from spatial influences. Ergo any analysis of 
institutions requires an appropriate time frame and 
geographical focus.
This theory is also subject to a number of shortcomings. 
We must ask if the different national and regional patterns of 
economic growth are truly theoretically compatible with the 
concept of a single international regime of accumulation and 
regulation (Hirst and Zeitlin, 1991, pp.20-21)? Although
fordism is internationally prevalent, it has always coexisted 
with alternative methods of accumulation and regulation both 
across and within countries. The case of Italy with fordist 
factories in the north and small firms in industrial district 
in the centre clearly puts that assumption to the test.
Additionally, although it acknowledges the importance of 
the institutional environment generally, it is still, in some 
ways, underarticulated within the theoretical framework. More 
specifically, institutions mediate crises in capitalism until 
finally, they are overwhelmed and break down; but is this true 
of all institutions? Why do they weather some crises but not 
others? Do institutions simultaneously break down across the
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board? This is not intuitively obvious. Rather, one might 
suspect that some institutions or institutional arrangements 
can adapt or react to crises in different ways, hence the 
unevenness of the economic landscape within and between 
countries and the presence of multiple methods of productive 
organization and social regulation present at all times. Which 
leads us to another question--is it the marriage between 
specific institutional arrangements and production methods 
that matters or is it the ability of institutions to adapt to 
changes in production that is the crucial variable? If 
learning rather than structure is the important variable, then 
the exact configuration of the institutional support system 
could easily differ between spaces even if the method of 
production were similar. In other words, as I will argue in 
III-D, the diversity of productive systems and institutional 
arrangements is better explained by their varying abilities to 
learn and adapt to crises and economic change than by 
identifying a particular development path shaped by the 
coupling of a particular organization of production with its 
corresponding MSR.
Finally, regulation theory down plays (although it does 
not overlook) the political nature of institutional networks. 
Power is considered to be predominately a function of class 
relations. Although class relations may be an integral 
component of political conflict, neither issues of power nor 
conflict are reducible solely to class. Rather, within 
institutional networks, conflict is demarcated by the internal 
tensions between maintaining the collective benefits of the
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network and each organization's jockeying for best position 
and the external power relations between various types of 
networks.
III-B. Flexible Specialization
Through careful study of alternative development models found 
in Italy, Germany, and Japan, Piore and Sabel (1984) 
introduced a new17 and challenging concept to the debate on 
regional development; flexible specialization. Whereas the 
regulation school presents a meta-theory of global change, 
flexible specialization is a theory of industrial efficiency; 
a new technological paradigm challenging the accepted model of 
industrial organization (mass production) in classic Kuhnian 
style. Within this paradigm, productive efficiency emerges 
from a broadly-skilled workforce using widely applicable 
technology which can produce a variety of semi-customized for 
differentiated, quality-driven markets; goods which can be 
quickly modified to meet changing demand. The model from which 
the theory was built was the industrial district18; hence 
flexible specialization provides a supportive framework for 
the localization thesis.
17 New, at least, to the english-speaking world. Some of 
these ideas were already well-developed in Italy through the 
works of Bagnasco (1977), Becattini (1979), and Fua' and Zacchia 
(1983 ) .
18 Although the thesis is based on the dynamics of 
industrial districts, Piore and Sabel did also argue that 
flattened out corporations, or the tight producer-subcontracting 
networks found in Japan were alternative faces of flexible 
specialization.
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Industrial districts generally arise around traditional, 
labour-intensive manufacturing sectors, such as textiles, 
ceramics or furniture, because the production process of these 
sectors easily subdivides into multiple phases which permits 
small firms to specialize in a single phase of production 
(Scarpitti, 1991a). This specialization allows the system as 
a whole to invest in new technologies, physically placed in 
several small firms, that are widely applicable to different 
products and processes. The territorial concentration of 
these specialized firms, often several thousand of them within 
the same community, fosters extensive subcontracting networks 
which horizontally integrate the various phases of production 
process, allowing these small firms to successfully follow a 
just-in-time small-batch work strategy that supports the 
production of a wide variety of differentiated goods. Because 
they adapt easily to changes in demand, this system is 
flexible which is the competitive advantage behind their 
success (Brusco, 1982, p.179). Thus this productive 
organization has been termed flexible specialization.
Flexible specialization challenged the heretofore 
dominant model of economic organization--mass production. 
Neither mass production nor flexible specialization, however, 
is viewed as intrinsically better than the other. Instead, 
which is more efficient depends on the more general 
institutional context both at the level of the firm and 
locality and the national and international economy (Hirst and 
Zeitlin, 1991, p.3). In other words, efficiency is not the 
outcome of the productive organization but of the
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institutional context in which that productive organization is 
placed. Therefore, institutional variation encourages a 
diversity of outcomes which explains why mass-production and 
flexible specialization systems differ between, and co-exist 
within, the major industrialized states. Thus, no particular 
industrial structure was inevitable but contingent on choices 
and historical influences.
Although flexible specialization has gained general 
acceptance as a viable alternative to mass production19 
(Storper, 1994a), its overemphasis on localism has made it 
particularly vulnerable to criticism. Its heavy focus on 
industrial districts now seems like hopeful optimism, based 
more on one country's experience (Italy), rather than general 
international trends. The specific cultural and historical 
factors surrounding the districts, the Italian legal system 
which supported micro-firms but arguably hindered their 
expansion, the limited range of industrial sectors affected, 
and the growing international trends toward integration, 
alliance creation and transnational networking of large (and 
increasingly more powerful and more centralized) corporations 
all call into question the reproducibility of industrial 
districts in other areas. The rediscovery of place and locally 
articulated economies, as suggested by this industrial 
district-based thesis, will be of value in only a limited 
number of localities; those which already possess the 
prerequisite basic structures (Amin, 1994). Furthermore, many
19 Taking into account, of course, multiple ways of 
organizing and defining these concepts, not the more narrow 
categories established by Piore and Sabel (see III-D below).
44
Italian districts are undergoing serious restructuring, as an 
increase in mergers and acquisitions, minority shareholdings, 
contractual agreements, and joint ventures are creating 
larger, better resourced and more powerful firms and altering 
the relations of power between companies (Bianchi and 
Gualtieri, 1990).
Hence, it is not localness that matters but how the 
locality is inserted into the global, and the ability of 
institutions to manage this tense, often hostile relationship. 
Other local areas, especially urban areas such as London or 
Turin, have also seen a renaissance of their economic fortunes 
as a result of their insertion into global networks, rather 
than from their spatial closure (Amin and Malmberg, 1994). 
Local success stories are not limited to flexible 
specialization, nor are seemingly networked localities always 
economically dynamic. Flexible specialization, although 
important, is still only able to explain the success of 
certain regions, not present a general case for regional 
success.
Although these criticisms are serious ones, the flexible 
specialization thesis has made some significant contributions 
to our understanding of local development. Although they were 
perhaps too localist in outlook, it would also be wrong to 
deny that something is afoot in the evolution of global 
capitalism that has clear regional and local implications--the 
debate itself has spread throughout disciplines and has
45
reached the highest institutional level20 (Storper, 1994a).
Equally, their identification of alternative development
trajectories which acknowledged the vitality of small firms
and their placing of market forces in a socio-political
context in a non-ideological way have stood old conceptions of
development on their head.
Finally, they identified, in a tangible way, the actual
contribution made by local institutional networks to economic
performance. On one hand, institutional networks provide an
important range of social and business services which support
these flexible, decentralized structures (now broadly-
defined). Institutional networks are particularly adept at
integrating the resources and competences dispersed throughout
the community allowing for the tailorization of a wide range
of public services which support business growth, meet
training needs, and stimulate technological transfer, for all
firms but especially for small firms, which rarely have the
internal capacity to develop these skills and services for
themselves. On the other hand, and working on a more abstract
level, their focus on the activities of local institutional
networks can broaden our understanding of economic governance
and the local political activity which support successful
economies. Hirst and Zeitlin (1991) explain:
Politics in this sense is broader then the policies of 
public agencies; it involves the creation of a regional 
or sectoral 'public sphere' in which firms, labour 
interests, officials and politicians can interact and co­
operate. Such a 'public sphere' is essential if ' co­
20 For example, the proposals by the UK Labour party on 
devolution, and the creation of the Committee of Regions in the 
EU.
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operation and competition are to be constructively 
balanced in the interaction of firms, and if co­
ordination and conflict are to be constructively balanced 
in the relationship of management and labour. These 
balances are crucial if economic fluctuations and 
technical changes are to be handled effectively, if 
continuity and innovation are to be given their 
respective roles (pp. 44-45).
Piore and Sabel's conceptualization of institutional 
networks as both service providers and vital components of 
economic governance is an important contribution for our 
understanding of regional development in a changing world 
economy. However, it did not go far enough--it did not attempt 
to distinguish dynamic networks from non-dynamic networks 
which appear to be both flexible and specialized (Storper, 
1994a). Equally, how can we explain regions which were 
flexibly specialized but have since disintegrated?21 In other 
words, Piore and Sabel failed to recognize, that networked or 
not, local or not, not all institutions are able to learn and 
adapt to changing conditions. Paradoxically and significantly, 
those institutions which once supported the local economy, 
may, under different circumstances, serve to hinder its 
growth22. In other words, not all institutional networks are 
the same.
Additionally, Piore and Sabel also underplay the 
political aspect of networks. At a superficial level, they 
seem to suggest that the extensive support provided to local
21See, for example, Glassmeir (1994) and Grabher (1993) for 
good examples of districts or networked economies in Switzerland 
and Germany which are struggling to readjust and have been 
impeded from doing so by their once supportive local 
institutions.
22For an example, see Grabher (1993).
businesses, much of it provided by the public sector and hence 
emerges from local policy processes, always meets local needs 
at all times. Rather, the support which is generated from 
institutional networks is the product of both learning and 
interinstitutional bargaining, hence may reflect the needs of 
the more powerful. Thus, since power is integral to networked 
relations and policy outcomes, institutional networks alone 
cannot explain the seemingly perfect fit between local policy 
and local needs; we need a better understanding of learning 
(how policy and institutional relations adapt to changing 
conditions) and power (to understand why in the dynamic 
regions, policy may be directed to meet general needs, rather 
than those of just the powerful).
III-C: The Milieu or Innovative Environment
The milieu or innovative environment approach emerged from 
work done by the GREMI group (Groupement Europeen des Mileux 
Innovateurs), which assesses the impact of high technology and 
technological innovation on local and regional development 
(Aydalot and Keeble 1988, Perrin, 1988, Maillat and Vasserot, 
1988). In particular, these scholars are concerned with the 
source of innovation and how innovative behaviour can be 
maintained over the long term.
The milieu refers to the general environmental context in 
which innovation takes place; hence acknowledging the 
embeddedness of economic activities within socio-political 
processes. More specifically, a milieu, which provides a
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nursery for innovative activity, comprises:
The historical evolution and characteristics of 
particular areas, their social and economic organisation, 
their collective behaviour, the degree of consensus which 
characterizes local society and economy, these are the 
major components of innovative behaviour. Taking the 
local environment as the starting point for the analysis 
of the spatial impact of new technologies focuses 
attention on local industrial networks and linkages, on 
the internal capacity of the environment to generate 
industrial development (Aydalot and Keeble, 1988, pp. 9- 
10) .
Since innovation is a collective, social phenomenon, then the 
primary source of innovation is the local environment rather 
than the firm. Once an innovative environment is constructed, 
it maintains the continual innovation that firms require to 
compete successfully. The concept of a milieu clearly 
resonates with Piore and Sabel's notion of an industrial 
district as an institutional context. Unlike Piore and Sable, 
however, multiple types of innovative environments have been 
identified including those which could be classified as 
dysfunctional (See Aydalot, 1988 and Perrin, 1988).
The policy implications of this work are two-fold. On one 
hand, the revival of regions in decline depends on their 
ability to assimilate and use new technologies (Maillat and 
Vasserot, 1988). On the other hand, policy should attempt to 
combine knowledge and resources available in the environment 
to stimulate functional synergies amongst the actors (Perrin, 
1988). In other words, policy should promote institutional 
networks among firms and between public and private actors in 
a way that enhances the overall knowledge basis of the region.
The most notable contribution of this research has been 
only partially articulated by these scholars. By recognizing
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that the local environment shapes how knowledge and creativity 
are generated, transmitted and interpreted, suggests that 
learning— how institutions learn and adapt--is a key component 
of development.
The problem with this work lies primarily in its 
circularity (Storper, 1994a). While innovation is the result 
of a milieu, a milieu is also the result of innovation and 
innovative practices. When and under what conditions do 
innovations and innovative practices actually become a milieu? 
A secondary problem emerges from their focus on high
technology. On one hand, there is no common definition of high 
technology. On the other hand, does this mean milieus do not 
form in so-called low technology industry? How then can we 
explain the Italian industrial districts which clearly
represent innovative milieus but most of them centre on low- 
technology sectors such as textiles, shoes, and furniture. If, 
as I indicated above, the important lessons to be gleaned from 
the study of the milieu is that institutions learn, the focus 
on high technology as a key stimulus of innovation (especially 
since it cannot be adequately defined) sets an arbitrary and 
unnecessary limit to the interpretation of the results and an 
application of this framework. Finally, political processes 
and the power component within network relations are ignored
in this approach. The implicit suggestion is that the milieu
should be reflected in the political processes as well, but 
how and in what way? The focus on the local environment rather 
than the firm suggests that politics and policy support must 
matter, but, aside from the odd suggestion, their insights
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stop there.
Summing up this section thus far, all three approaches 
have stressed the importance of the institutional context as 
an intermediate form of economic governance and have 
identified networks as the main feature of the institutional 
architecture, especially for the governance of emerging new 
organizations of production. None of these theories, however, 
have offered a complete explanation as to how institutions 
actually manage the ongoing issues of industrial adjustment 
or, perhaps more importantly, why, in times of economic crises 
and structural change which threaten institutional 
arrangements, some regions and localities adapt better than 
others? These questions are best addressed by our final 
approach, the theory of a learning economy. Furthermore, none 
have an elaborated notion of power and conflict management 
within institutional networks. Learning and power may conflict 
at times, especially during periods of industrial 
restructuring when change threatens the underlying power 
structures. Power in networks will be discussed in chapter 2.
III-D. The Learning Economy
All these renowned scholars have insisted that institutional 
networks are integral components of dynamic economies. Why 
have I challenged them, insisting that although networks are 
important, learning is more important? This question is best 
addressed through an example.
Networks, especially dense networks, can produce
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institutional 'lock in', a condition which Grabher (1993) 
recognized as responsible for stunting the momentum of the 
Ruhr Valley--a once dynamic coal and steel region. Lock-in 
occurs when strong, cohesive ties among the core actors, a 
well-developed common language and systematically-established 
rules of the game trap the participants into a certain world 
view (through its constant reproduction and reinforcement) 
that shapes their perceptions of innovation opportunities, 
technological applications and appropriate support structures. 
In the case of the Ruhr, as the coal and steel industry 
declined, both the firms and the local institutions responded 
by doing more of what they usually do rather than moving 
toward new technologies and new processes. Hence, lock-in 
affected both interfirm relations and the equally strong, 
equally cohesive institutional networks that supported them. 
Thus, "...the symbiotic relations between the politico- 
administrative system and industry obstructed a timely 
reorganization of the Ruhr and paralysed political innovation 
(Grabher, 1993, p. 264)."
Although strong institutional networks once sustained the 
economy of the Ruhr, they were thwarting development under new 
structural conditions.23 Strong network ties inhibited the 
development of looser, wider links with other institutions 
that could offer important opportunities for the exchange of 
information and experiences. Since weaker network ties cross
23 The story, however, does not end here. The Ruhr Valley 
appears to be remoulding itself by enlarging the networks and 
expanding its productive mandate farther afield into new 
technologies. We must watch it unfold before solid conclusions 
can be made.
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group and issue boundaries, they cross-fertilize ideas and 
innovations, and coordinate among various needs.
The example of the Ruhr valley demonstrates that the 
focus on networks alone is insufficient for understanding 
economic development, especially in areas managing industrial 
restructuring. Rather, institutions must be adaptable rather 
than adapted (ibid.). The strong ties of the Ruhr valley 
networks resulted from, what was at the time, an appropriate 
adaptation to economic and social conditions. However, that 
structure did not prove adaptable when change occurred. For 
networks to be adaptable they must be able to learn; to change 
with changing conditions.
Ideas concerning the learning economy have been put forth 
by Storper (1994a, 1994b), Lundvall (1994), and Sabel (1993). 
This approach can be summed up as: within an economy,
"knowledge24 is the most strategic resource and learning the 
most important process" (Lundvall, 1994, p.l). Trust, dialogue 
and communication--key components of learning and hence of 
long-term economic performance--are empowered (or inhibited) 
by the sociopolitical processes that contextualize human 
behaviour (ibid.).
Storper (1994b) outlines the key components of the
24 Knowledge refers primarily to tacit knowledge, which is 
learned only by experience, rather than to the standardized and 
codified variety that is easily transferable. Tacit knowledge can 
be understood as "We know more than we can tell", (DG XIII, 1993 , 
p.4) hence can only be diffused through personal exchange and 
mobility. Learning provides a competitive edge to a company or 
an economy by its ability to generate (at least temporarily) non- 
substitutable inputs--especially labour and human relation 
(Storper, 1994b).
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learning economy25. First, the notion of learning has certain 
implications for the organization of productive systems and 
regional economies. On one hand, since learning may often 
require that changes be made, then organizations must be able 
to move resources around fairly easily--hence they must be 
flexible if they are to exploit the benefits of learning. On 
the other hand, some aspects of the learning process require 
that some participants are highly specialized in certain areas 
or tasks. This combination of flexibility and specialization26 
is best achieved in a networked organization and thus learning 
economies and learning institutions tend to develop this 
architecture. There is no common network form. Rather how the 
network is shaped depends on the system of production, the 
industry, and the design of national-subnational institutions. 
Clearly, this resonates with the conclusions of the other 
three approaches.
Looking deeper into the learning process, when multiple 
organizations are involved in combined learning (subnational 
authorities, business and trade associations, universities and 
other education or research related agencies, firms, and so 
on), the ability to share tacit knowledge and understanding, 
which is not measurable and only partially communicable, 
requires that the interpretation is mutually consistent. In 
other words, knowledge is relational and understanding cannot 
be completely disassociated from the relationships in which it
25 Hence, this section paraphrases from Storper (1994b).
26 Note that this notion of flexible specialization is 
similar too, although much broader than, that posed by Piore and 
Sabel.
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is shared. Such relationships must be kept up over time and be
able to weather personnel changes, organizational
restructuring, the coming in of new agents and other
potentially disruptive occurrences which could hinder the
reproducibility of consensus and shared perceptions27; hence
the importance of norms, conventions, and rules of the game
which provide the glue that cements these relations. These
conventions emerge from "rounds of action and interaction
among... agents, leading to taken-for-granted regularities in
what they expect from each other and what they do"(Storper,
1994b, p.20b). As network relations develop, they become
assets in and of themselves. The learning economy, however, is
not based on institutional networks per se but on those with
an inbuilt capacity to learn and adapt to changing
circumstances.
The learning economy also has specific implications for
public policy. In particular:
The challenge to policy is thus to establish and maintain 
not one, but two economic dynamics: the technological
trajectory i.e. the mastery of specific spaces in the 
economy characterized by technological spillovers and 
complementarities [stimulating technological learning], 
and the trajectory of conventions, which link and re-link 
agents to each other in a coordinated fashion 
[maintaining institutional learning].(p. 21)
At the local level, policy should encourage the continuous
upgrading of important sectors as well as trying to
distinguish local industry through indigenous forms of
27 Shared perceptions is not equivalent to either shared 
opinions or shared preferences. Rather, it refers to an 
understanding of the rules of the game governing transactions and 
a common language with which disagreements, conflicts, and 
diverse desires can be managed.
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learning for differentiation. Hence local policy and policy
processes must learn and adapt as well.
Although the learning approach provides the most robust
method for assessing the ability of a locality to adapt to
economic change, it is not without flaws. Like the milieu
school, this approach is also guilty of a certain circularity
of argument; learning economies have learning institutions
thus you need learning institutions to have learning
economies. However, there are ways of circumventing this
problem. Storper (1994b) notes:
The circular relation between public institutions and the 
institutionalized learning economy requires that the 
parties to public institutions somehow be convinced of 
the utility of having a public institution help in
supporting the conventions and relations which make up 
the institutionalized learning economy. That is they must 
share a convention of the utility of the public 
institution in some specific domain before it can get 
started. Talk between the parties may be one approach 
(emphasis in original, pp. 28-29).
Talk refers to dialogue. Not the simple transfer of
information but a real attempt to achieve mutual
understanding. Talk is ultimately the necessary prelude to
confidence or trust; the real mechanisms which allow for the 
development of precedents, conventions and collective 
activity. Although financial incentives may function in the 
short term to get actors to the table, the lifespan of talk 
would then be equivalent to the life of the incentive if no 
common understanding and conventions were concurrently 
established.
As well as the circularity problem, the learning approach 
must cope with certain tensions that emerge from two important
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paradoxes--the global-local nexus and the learning/monitoring
dichotomy. First, the context specificity required for
successful network relations strengthens the trend toward the
localization of activity while, simultaneously, the
globalization (and bureaucratization) of capital leads to the
diffusion of globally common (rather than locally-derived)
rules of behaviour. The outcome of these competing tensions is
a patchwork of localization and globalization. Although
recognizing this paradox presents certain analytical
difficulties, it offers a more accurate conceptualization of
the global/local relationship (and its significance for
development) than the other three approaches.
Second, learning often frustrates the stability of
relations needed for the proper monitoring of common
contracts, agreements, projects and so on (Sabel, 1993).
Change subverts the established rules of the game.
Nevertheless, if networks are to be development-sustaining,
then they must be able to continually revise their activities
and allotted duties in accordance with both changing
circumstances and the understanding that evolves from shared
experiences. Sabel (1993) notes that the Japanese system has
found ways out of this quagmire:
the agreed rules do not fix the parties' actions but 
rather define how they will act to revise their joint 
goals (and their standards for evaluating goals), then 
there can be no conventional monitoring. Because the 
behaviour of one party can influence the goals of the 
others, it is meaningless for either to define, let 
alone, measure, a partner's performance in reference to 
an anterior agreement (p. 21).
In other words, learning requires discursive and 
reflexive institutions. Through dialogue and participation,
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agents learn to redefine themselves and their goals within 
shared boundaries (Phillips, 1994). In particular, 
institutions must fuse two types of discourse (Sabel, 1993): 
l)the discussion of what to do with the dialogue regarding 
what is being done; and 2)the debate concerning standards for 
apportioning gains and losses and apportionment generally. 
Using these mechanisms, dialogue becomes an integral tool for 
defining and redefining common goals, ends, objectives and 
ultimately identities. These same principles can be used in 
both smaller and larger collaborative ventures; thus serving 
as an important way of moving between them. Networks, as 
conduits of regional/local rules and practices, must serve to 
pass on these type of norms and build a consensus surrounding 
development goals which include the recognition of these 
invisible factors.
The learning economy approach concentrates primarily on 
how firms learn to innovate and only secondarily on the 
institutional support that maintains that innovation. This 
thesis, alternatively, isolates out the role of the 
institutional architecture with a focus on the policies and 
services used to support industrial restructuring. If we are 
to focus on the institutional learning capacities of the 
political processes, than the learning economy approach must 
be criticized for its underplaying of the role of power and 
coalition building that marks the activities of networks; 
especially in the policy process. Learning in this environment 
is a function of past policy attempts (and the involved 
actor's interpretation of their successes and failures), the
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capacities of institutions to design new activities, and on 
the changing ideas and shifting alliances and balance of 
powers among the actors (Skocpol and Finegold, 1990). 
Learning, in this thesis, then focuses on the policy support 
process and refers to two separate but interdependent 
phenomena: 1) policy learning whereby policy and support
services are adapted to meet changing circumstances; and 2) 
institutional learning where actors learn to adapt their 
relationships to the changing circumstances and a changing 
balance of power that are fostered during periods of economic 
and social transformation.
This chapter has demonstrated that institutional networks 
are an important factor shaping a locality's ability to 
respond to economic and structural change. I have suggested 
that those networks best able to manage those changes are 
those with a learning capacity. What are the characteristics 
of learning networks? How do networks balance the tensions 
between the needs of learning and the imperatives of political 
haggling, particular during periods of transformation? How can 
we measure learning? Chapter two addresses these issues.
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2. HAPPING INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS AND 
MEASURING INSTITUTIONAL LEARNING: A
RESEARCH STRATEGY
INTRODUCTION
Relying primarily on the literature of regional and local 
economic development, chapter one established that, under 
certain conditions, local institutions can have an important 
impact on local economic development generally, and industrial 
restructuring in particular. Specifically, institutional 
networks were identified as a pivotal component of dynamic 
local economic governance which implicitly recognizes that 
specialized resources are increasingly dispersed among various 
institutional sectors. To effectively govern the economy, 
these institutional resources must be coordinated and 
integrated through regular processes of exchange. The way 
these resources are distributed, and how and the degree to 
which, they are brought together will vary across localities. 
Furthermore, as emphasized in chapter one, the integrating of 
these resources through institutional networks is inherently 
a political process, and are thus stamped by the peculiarities 
of the local political system.
To be able to identify institutional networks and assess 
their learning capacity, we must first have a theoretical
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understanding of the different types of networks which can 
form and how they emerge, endure and change. This is discussed 
in section I, which will also establish the main research 
hypothesis of the thesis. Section II discusses structural 
constraints on local institutional capacity that emerge from 
the national and international environment. A number of 
secondary hypotheses will be elaborated. Finally, section III 
comprises the methodological section of this thesis; designing 
a research strategy for investigating the relationship between 
local institutions and industrial restructuring.
I. UNDERSTANDING NETWORKS: THE ROLE OF POWER AND EXCHANGE
A theory of networks must address several important questions: 
1) what are networks, how do they differ, and which are most 
effective for promoting learning and economic development? 2) 
what is power in networks? and 3) how and why do different 
network structures emerge, endure and change? Each will be 
addressed in turn.
I-A. Categorizing Networks
Networks consist of all institutions that are linked around a 
certain relationship, territory or policy domain, and thus 
constitute all interlinked institutions within defined 
boundaries (Aldrich and Whetten, 1981). Networks are assumed 
to be greater than the sum of their links, and this structure 
can either constrain or facilitate the activities of the
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involved organizations. "The patterning of linkages can be 
used to account for some aspects of behaviour of those 
involved"(Mitchell, 1969 cited in Knoke, 1990, p.9).28 If
networks are differentiated by their interorganizational 
relationships, then different networks will be structurally 
different. Therefore, the study of networks is the study of 
structures (Dowding, 1994). There are three structural 
characteristics, that are not mutually exclusive, which can be 
used to categorize networks; territorial scope, dominant 
actors (Saward, 1992), and density or thickness.
Leonardi (1995) distinguishes three types of territorial 
networks; 1) intraregional which is among local and regional 
actors; 2) interregional which are those networks between 
actors within a national territory; and 3) transregional which 
are between actors in different countries. Intraregional 
networks provide the foundation of learning networks because 
they integrate all area resources, especially knowledge. 
Learning networks must first have a comprehensive 
understanding of their locality before they can tap into, 
interpret and integrate knowledge from other sources. Once 
strong intraregional networks are firmly in place, 
interregional networks can then be important for accessing 
national funding sources, pooling resources for national and 
European lobbying efforts, and information sharing about 
common problems and potential solutions. Transregional
28 Mitchell, J. Clyde, 1969. Social Networks in Urban 
Situations: Analysis of Personal Relationships in Central African 
Towns. Manchester, England; Institute for Social Research of 
University of Zambia.
62
networks provides a similar function but at the European 
level.
Networks can also be categorized by the dominant actors; 
governmental, sectoral, or functional29. Dominant actors are 
assumed to hold the key resources and stronger bargaining 
positions. In a governmental network, the key actors are 
government agencies. These networks tend to take a vertical 
structure which has particular consequences for network 
relations (See section II). Sectoral networks emerge around 
sectoral actors such as an industry, a service, or a 
profession. Finally, functional networks comprise a 
combination of governmental and sectoral actors. Sectoral and 
functional networks will tend to be horizontally integrated 
rather than vertically structured (section II). Functional 
networks represent the essential support structure for 
development-sustaining activity because they integrate the 
multiple types of resources required for successful 
development. Table 2.1 below summarizes these two categories.
Table 2.1
Dominant Actor and Territorial Networks
TERRITORY Intraregional Interregional Transregional
DOMINANT ACTOR
Governmental Intraregional
Governmental
Interregional
Governmental
Transregional
Governmental
Sectoral Intraregional
Sectoral
Interregional
Sectoral
Transregional
Sectoral
Functional Intraregional
Functional
Interregional
Functional
Transregional
Functional
29 This is a revision of Leonardi (1995).
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The discussion thus far suggests that the most effective 
institutional networks are those which centre on intraregional 
functional networks. Not only do these networks integrate all 
(or at least most) area resources but provide a central 
mechanism for linking into and integrating resources from 
other external networks, and providing an important conduit 
for new information, innovative policy responses, new trading 
partners, and additional resources. If these locally-based 
networks are not first in place, than non-local actors may 
have proportionately greater control on the direction that 
development takes irrespective of the needs and preferences of 
the community.
The last, and arguably most important, structural 
characteristic of networks is their density or thickness. 
Institutional thickness refers to "the combination of factors 
including inter-institutional interaction and synergy, 
collective representation by many bodies, a common industrial 
purpose, and shared cultural norms"(Amin and Thrift, 1994a, 
p.15). In practical terms, thickness refers to the number of 
institutions and the process by which this range of 
institutions are networked. A thick network contains a 
multiplicity of networked institutions at various levels of 
interaction (local, regional, national, European, 
international) that share a common understanding of belonging 
to a collective enterprise with well-defined established 
structures of power and coalition building (ibid.). Local 
institutional density is shaped by the way in which resources 
are distributed both territorially and functionally and how
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those resources are integrated. Hence, they are historically 
and geographically contingent on the way resources have been 
structurally allocated and on the particular political 
processes that combine those resources in the specific 
locality in question. Hence, although thickness refers to a 
range of intersecting networks, it is not possible without 
intraregional functional networks to act as core and conduit.
Density, however, is not simply about the generation of 
more and varied institutions, because that alone is 
insufficient to cope with economic problems (Grabher, 1993). 
To promote real improvement, a variety of institutions, 
working in different areas, must be linked together. 
Furthermore, these institutions must also be redundant, which 
is the generation of more connectivity and information 
exchange than is needed at any one point in time. Redundancy 
leads to the creation of multiple layers of support; for 
example supplying all categories of firms with innovative 
capacity and thus guaranteeing that fewer firms fall through 
the safety nets (Cooke and Morgan, 1993).
Thickness also refers to the dispersion of multiple 
leadership roles within both political and economic 
activities. During periods of change, such as industrial 
restructuring, institutional relationships may come under 
threat which can destabilize the network, while, 
simultaneously, to effectively moderate the local 
repercussions of those changes, the networks may have to 
respond to the crisis collectively. To moderate the tensions 
between institutional learning relations required to adapt
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both policy and institutional relationships to changing 
conditions and the restructuring of power relations that those 
changes may engender requires effective leadership. Effective 
local leadership must (Bennett, et. al., 1994, pp.292-3): 1) 
satisfy all groups who have a stake in what is occurring; 2) 
create a strategic vision and disseminate it convincingly to 
all those involved; 3) allow space for independent actions of 
those involved that adhere to the general strategic vision. 
Defined in this way, leadership, hence thickness, requires the 
decentralization of power and responsibility and a high level 
of involvement of the participants.
Institutional thickness, because it provides (in the best 
case scenario) institutional persistence, the continual 
deepening of shared tacit and standard knowledge, flexibility 
and adaptability, innovative capacity, common bonds of trust 
and reciprocity, and, more rarely, a sense of common identity, 
is the foundation of a learning economy (Amin and Thrift, 
1994a). In other words, thick institutional networks are 
learning institutional networks. Which leads us to the major 
hypothesis underpinning this thesis:
Hypothesis 1: Localities better able to adapt to structural
adjustment possess dense, intraregional 
functional institutional networks. These 
networks will not only provide an effective 
range of local services to the industry, but 
will be able to integrate resources from 
national and international sources as well. 
More precisely, these networks will have a 
learning capacity which allows them to adapt 
both their institutional relations and their 
policy/service output in response to the 
political and economic changes engendered by 
the restructuring process.
There is some debate, however, as to whether the linkages
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between institutions within networks should be weak or strong. 
The strength of linkages is a function of the number of ties 
any two institutions share. The stronger the tie, the greater 
the number of agents to which they will both be linked 
(Granovetter, 1973). Characteristically, "Weak ties are more 
likely to link members of different small groups than are 
strong ones, which tend to be concentrated within particular 
groups"(ibid., p. 1376, emphasis in original). In particular, 
institutional lock-in discussed in chapter one is often used 
to show the dangers of strong ties. Similarly, corruption or 
malfeasance can be a product of strong ties(ibid.). For 
example, the illegal Wall Street insider trading scams were 
only possible because they were pursued by a very small, 
tightly-bound network of bond traders.
This thesis assumes that neither strong nor loose ties 
are intrinsically better than the other. Rather, what is 
required is some combination of both. As strong ties encourage 
the growth of trust, innovation and the development of 
collective rather than fragmented modes of representation, 
they make an important contribution to learning and 
development. In particular, strong ties allow for the 
deepening of knowledge among actors regarding common 
processes. However, the danger of both cognitive lock-in and 
malfeasance are very real and thus these types of ties require 
counterbalancing with equally important wider, weaker links. 
The further building of wider but looser ties can be an 
important way for gaining access to new knowledge and the 
cross-fertilization of ideas. Hence, weak ties encourage the
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Figure 2.1: A Theoretical Model of Institutional Thickness
breadth of knowledge— allowing a locality to tap into a wider 
body of knowledge than permitted simply by strong ties. A 
diagram of an institutionally thick network structure, 
comprised of strong and loose ties, is demonstrated in Figure
1. Strong ties connect the central intraregional functional 
network (actors 1-6). This network, in turn, is connected 
through looser ties to a range of other local and non-local 
actors; bringing a wider range of ideas and resources which 
are then interpreted and adapted to local conditions through 
the central local network. Clearly, within the network, an 
actor's power or position is strengthened by his/her ability 
to tap into external as well as internal resources. Actor 
three, for example, has a more limited resource base than one
or five which serve as important conduits into other policy 
domains. Hence, power is an important component for 
understanding how different networks function.
J-B. Power in Networks
Within networks, what is power and how is it wielded? 
Metcalfe (1981) suggests a definition of power that is well- 
suited to a study of networks. Power Mis the ability to attain 
higher levels of collective performance" (p.504).30 An actor 
has four ways to exercise power to encourage collective 
performances persuasion, threats, reward or a 'throffer' which 
is some combination of threats and rewards (Dowding, 1991, 
p.68).31 All these instruments of power operate within a 
bargaining context. It follows, therefore, that who is 
powerful emerges most clearly from the results of a bargaining 
and negotiation process among actors. Thus power to increase 
collective performance is about bargaining. Each actor has a 
number of potential bargaining resources at her disposal 
including: information provision, legitimate authority,
unconditional incentives (where an individual must pay the
30 The concept of power is a widely-debated issue within 
political science. The standard definition of power is getting 
another to do something they would not have otherwise done. I 
have chosen an alternative definition because it emphasizes the 
problems of collective action. As this thesis is primarily 
concerned with how actors manage to work together to achieve 
common aims, this is a more suitable definition.
31 In cases where none of these techniques have been used, 
and actors were able to act collectively based on similar 
preferences, then power was not exercised and the actors who 
benefitted were lucky (Dowding, 1991).
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price or reap the benefit whether or not she does what the 
other wants, i.e. the law), conditional incentives (where an 
individual's action invokes the other actor's promised 
response, either reward or punishment), (Harsanyi, 1969 
discussed in Dowding, 1991, p. 70-7232) stubbornness, 
reputation, and overcoming problems of collective action where 
a group cannot mobilize itself to act, (ibid., pp. 145-146) 
and knowledge.
Within networks that surround economic development 
issues, control over or access to sources of knowledge and 
information is a particularly important dimension of power for 
two reasons. On one hand, since economic development can be 
interpreted to be a public good and of general interest to 
most participants, the most effective political tool is 
persuasion; enticing rather than coercing an actor's 
contribution (Peterson, 1981). Ergo, since persuasion allows 
an actor to enter voluntarily into collective action, it is 
the most powerful tool to achieve collective performance. 
Information and knowledge are the most effective resources for 
persuasion; illustrating why actor five is more powerful than 
actor 3 (figure 2.1) because of her greater access to 
knowledge and information. On the other hand, the diffusion of 
new ideas and new information can lead to new patterns of 
behaviour (Haas, 1992). Hence, actors have clear incentives to
32 Harsanyi, J.C. (1969) "Measurement of Social Power, 
Opportunity Costs, and the Theory of Two-person Bargaining 
Games," in Bell, P., Edwards, D.V. and Wagner, R.H. (eds.) (1969) 
Political Power: A Reader. London: Collier Macmillan, pp. 226-38.
70
increase their access to these resources, especially as it can 
influence others to accept their interpretation of common 
problems and solutions.
Power relations within networks centre on, although they 
are not reducible to, the process of exchange (Marin, 1990). 
Networks can form over a variety of exchanges: money,
information, authority, and sentiment among others. Exchange 
refers to Ha relational process where possibilities for 
action, linked to the possession of mutually valued resources, 
are exchanged between complex organizations" (Parri, 1989, 
p.200), hence obtaining collective action. Exchange occurs at 
both a functional level, between state agencies and private 
actors, and at a territorial level between levels of 
government. For example, a state agency allows the influence 
of another organization on the policy process in exchange for 
that organization's resources. Both actors are offering 
something of value in a bargaining framework. Exchange, like 
power, is grounded in a bargaining and negotiation framework. 
In fact, "the process of negotiation is itself a vital part of 
the institution-building process"(Amin and Thrift, 1994b, p. 
15, emphasis in original) within networks.
Negotiation is also a fundamental part of coalition 
building. Shifting coalitions influence which policies are 
pursued, which lessons are learnt, and how those lessons are 
interpreted. When power shifts within a coalition, what 
happens to the functioning of institutional networks?
J-C. How Networks Emerge, Endure and Change
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This system of exchange has been labelled a power dependence 
framework (Rhodes, 1985, 1988, Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). In 
this framework, actors and organizations spend resources to 
achieve objectives. However, no organization is completely 
autonomous but depends, to varying degrees, on the resources 
exchanged with other organizations.33 An organization's social 
position, strategies and objectives will determine which 
resources will be exchanged and with whom. The result of these 
exchanges is asymmetrical interdependency amongst the involved 
organizations. Different patterns of resource exchanges and 
asymmetries will emerge across sectors and localities, which 
influence the type of network structures that develop (if they 
develop at all).
Within the power-dependence framework, these networks are 
used to interpret different structures of interest 
intermediation between government and organized interests in 
particular policy areas (Rhodes, 1988, Rhodes and Marsh, 1992, 
Peterson, 1993). However, within the local economic 
development literature, as discussed in chapter one, networks 
are more complex; they do not refer only to interest 
intermediation (although that is a crucial function) but 
concern an entire milieu of relations and activities that are 
not ordinarily covered by a study of political decision-
33 This loss of some degree of autonomy signals that the 
process of political exchange should not be understood in the 
same light as exchange within the free market model. Instead, 
exchange represents an institutional design that helps 
competitive, functionally interdependent agents manage the 
uncertainties of complex, mutually contingent strategic 
interactions and to collectively provide a variety of public 
goods in multiple policy areas (Marin, 1990).
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making. For example, these networks are necessary for 
coordinating public sector policies and private sector 
initiatives for the good of the community as a whole; 
effectively putting independent private sector initiatives 
into the public sphere.
Although exchange may be a rationally-driven process, 
rational action is shaped by the local context. Exchange is 
not separate from an organization's (and its home location's) 
own self-definition. History and geography shape the way 
resources have been distributed. Resource choices have been 
conditioned by local norms, values, conventions, and rules of 
behaviour. In fact, mutually reinforcing self-perceptions may 
distort actors' collective judgements concerning the value of 
certain resources• Thus they may not enter into exchange 
relations because they do not recognize certain resources as 
useful, not because those resources were not readily 
available. The differing merit attributed to the participation 
of trade unions across regions is an example of how exchange 
relations diverge.
Differing distributions of resources as well as various 
socially-constructed exchange choices explains why multiple 
network structures may emerge between policy areas within a 
locality or between localities in the same policy areas. Who 
has the resources (between and within the public and private 
sectors) and how these resources are distributed territorially 
shape the territorial scope and dominant actors within the 
network. For example, if resources are centralized in national 
actors as is often the case in highly unitary states, than
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firms, workers and their representatives are more likely to 
exchange with national agencies than with their local 
counterparts. Network density among actors is patterned by the 
degree to which resources are concentrated or dispersed among 
many actors and the real or perceived importance of those 
resources for the daily functioning of the actors. As 
conditions change, the value attributed to different resources 
may also change. Where exchanges are multiple, regular, 
varied, considered valuable, and there are few alternative 
suppliers the network will be very thick and the actors highly 
interdependent34. Alternatively, where exchanges are singular, 
more ad hoc, of limited value to the organization's 
objectives, and there are multiple suppliers, the network will 
be thin rather than thick and thus the agents more autonomous.
Once established on the basis of exchange, networks will 
endure over the long term; they are not short-term events 
intended to reap quick gains.35 Three factors can cause 
networks to change. First, network reorganization can be 
stimulated by changes in external conditions and system
34 Small dense networks can also be established around a 
single dominant actor who has such a disproportionate amount of 
resources that this actor can pick and choose her partners. For 
example, the state has been known to play this role in situations 
of authoritarian corporatism (Schmitter, 1974).
35 Some scholars argue instead that networks can be 
established around single projects (See Bennett and Krebs, 1994). 
The point of reference, however, is not the network but the 
project. Thus exchange in this situation is to meet a common 
short-term collective goal (the project) rather than to establish 
relations to meet and manage long-term strategies. While 
successful collective action among institutions may lead, 
fortuitously, to enduring networks and may be used as a specific 
strategy to do so, it does not necessarily lead to network 
creation.
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parameters which result in the redistribution of power and 
resources internal and external to the network. These 
conditions include shifts in socioeconomic and political 
conditions, technological change, changes in governing 
coalitions (i.e. key elections), new policy and funding 
decisions, the impact of other subsystems, and personnel 
turnover.36 Ironically, the success of specific networks or 
network subsets can encourage the formation of latent 
constituencies or collective action by others who have been 
harmed by the success of the network. This new activity can 
then force network change from the outside (Dowding, 1994). 
Network transformation can also result from internal strategy 
changes by network actors which deliberately or accidently 
restructure network power relations. For example, a group may 
use its resources to try and organize new groups or mobilize 
latent supporters to increase its power position. Third, new 
ideas that emerge from the learning process can promote change 
because new policies or procedures may require a different 
range of resources. In all three cases, however, change is 
neither easy nor painless, as actors which have lost, will 
fight to maintain their position and influence.
Adapting our general understanding of network dynamics to 
this thesis, we can deduce that industrial restructuring, 
which represents a fundamental change in system parameters,
36 Stable system parameters were introduced by Jenkins-Smith 
and Sabatier (1993) in their theory of advocacy coalitions. I 
have reapplied them here to the study of networks. Since they 
argue that advocacy coalitions can be determined through a 
network approach, I do not believe they would disagree with this 
application.
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presents a threat to whatever institutional arrangements are 
in place in both the economy and the polity. The ability of an 
economy to adapt to these changes can be enhanced or hindered 
by the political response to these changes, as the case of the 
Ruhr discussed in chapter one so clearly demonstrates.
I have hypothesized that those localities with thick 
institutional networks will be better able to successfully 
weather the storm of economic restructuring because they are 
able to learn which entails the ability to adapt institutional 
arrangements and industrial support initiatives to meet these 
new systemic conditions. During a crisis, however, such as 
that brought on by industrial restructuring, fixed interests 
are challenged. While this can lead to certain organizations 
resisting change and the loss of power and security that 
change entails (which may hinder learning), it also opens, at 
least theoretically, an important window of opportunity for 
effective institutional restructuring, especially in areas 
that lack the appropriate institutional infrastructure, 
because entrenched interests may have been weakened. Building 
new institutions often first requires the weakening or 
eradicating of old institutions (Storper, 1994b). Hence, if a 
locality can use this window of opportunity to build up its 
institutional capacity, it too may be able to ride the storm 
out and put in place an institutional structure better able to 
provide effective local economic governance in a changing 
global economy.
The definition of learning as both institutional and 
policy adaption suggests a two-stage approach to the study of
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institutional networks and industrial restructuring. The first 
stage is an investigation of national and international 
conditions which shape the local policy environment and the 
development local institutional capacity. Of particular 
importance, as suggested in chapter one, are the structure of 
the state and the organization of the economy. The second 
stage is to identify the local institutional architecture 
which has evolved and measure local learning capacity through 
an investigation of how policy and institutional relations 
have evolved.
Sections II and III correspond to this the two-pronged 
approach outlined above. In particular, section II assesses 
the structural constraints on local institutional capacity- 
building while section III then establishes the methodology 
for measuring network density and evaluating institutional 
learning capacity.
II. ASSESSING THE STRUCTURAL CONSTRAINTS ON LOCAL
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
Local institution building and institutional learning capacity 
are bounded and conditioned by national and international 
political and economic structures. Of particular importance 
are the constitutional design of the State, the structure of 
the economy, and more recently, the expansion of the European 
Union's (EU) political and regulatory activities. These 
factors set the parameters of local discretion, thus shaping 
a locality's potential to design and adapt both new policies 
and institutional relations to manage industrial
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restructuring. The local policy process, hence the local 
learning process, is inseparable from (although not reducible 
to) these structural conditions. An analysis of institutions 
must first start with a discussion of structures and the 
degree to which they constrain the growth and capacity of 
local institutions in the area of local economic governance. 
Each will be examined in turn.
II—A, State Structure and Local Institutional Capacity
The analysis of state structure is intended to assess the 
capacity of local authorities. The institutional capacity of 
local authorities is shaped, on one hand, by the territorial 
or constitutional divisions of powers and responsibilities 
between levels of government and, on the other hand, by the 
relationship between elected representatives and 
administration officials.
The territorial division of powers within the state 
demarcates the resources and the scope for autonomous 
political action of subnational authorities and patterns the 
nature of relations among levels of government. Different 
territorial state structures will have a different impact on 
subnational political activities (Anderson, 1992). Thus, when 
we compare across countries, we are examining the effect of 
different distributions of power between tiers of government 
that result from the territorial structure.
In particular, how a higher tier of government defines 
both economic problems and solutions may circumscribe the
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options of subnational authorities by limiting the boundaries 
of acceptable activities and circumscribing learning 
potential. Even subnational government's ability to forge 
cooperative networks can depend on the favourable attitude of 
central government37 (ibid.). Compounding the natural 
asymmetry of these relations, higher levels of government 
remain vital sources for financial, legal, and other 
resources.
Within centralized states, there is less space for
autonomous action on the part of subnational authorities and
intergovernmental networks tend to take on a vertical
character. This impedes local institutional capacity in two
ways. First, vertical structures discourage the build up of
trust required for effective cooperation between participants-
-levels of government in this case. Putnam, Leonardi and
Nanetti (1993) stress:
A vertical network, no matter how dense and no matter how 
important to its participants, cannot sustain social 
trust and cooperation. Vertical flows of information are 
often less reliable than horizontal flows, in part 
because the subordinate husbands information as a hedge 
against exploitation. More important, sanctions that 
support norms of reciprocity against the threat of 
opportunism are less likely to be imposed upwards and 
less likely to be acceded to, if imposed (p. 174).
Consequently, networks which are completely vertical in 
character, whereby resources flow primarily in one direction, 
put stringent constraints on local resources and the scope for
37 Similarly, vertical, hierarchically-structured relations 
between subnational business and trade associations and their 
peak organization can put comparable constraints on the ability 
of these actors to participate in regional collective strategies 
(Anderson, 1992).
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independent policy activity. Second, although vertical
networks can impose cooperation between the centre and its
constituents, they discourage, if not block outright,
independent horizontal cooperation among the various local
actors (ibid.). Van de Ven (1975) notes:
[V]ertical patterns are usually highly structured by 
clearly defined contracts, charters, laws, administrative 
policies and procedures. They are usually 
bureaucratically organized with rational planning, 
specified goals, prescribed means, and clear authority 
and sanctioning patterns. As a result, horizontal 
integration, particularly at the local level, is 
difficult to achieve (cited in Aldrich and Whetten, 1981, 
p.389).38
In particular, thickness requires that economic actors 
are represented by broad-based business and trade associations 
which can effectively engage in local political and regulatory 
activities. Area based groups are more likely to form if local 
authorities can act competently in the area of economic 
development and if local authorities are responsive to group 
activity (Peterson, 1981). Subnational authorities which are 
weaker and thus less responsive to the private sector will 
deter the creation of these local institutions, which are an 
integral part of institutional thickness.
Thus within centralized states, the hierarchical 
structure of government agencies can inhibit the growth of 
local institutional networks. The more local authorities 
depend on higher levels of government for resources, the more 
likely will development policy be dominated by 
intergovernmental rather than functional networks. This leads
38 Van de Ven, Andrew H. (1975) 'Design for Evaluating 
Inter-Agency Networks Among Texas Early Childhood Organizations,' 
Working Paper, College of Business, Kent State University, p. 12.
80
to hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 2: Local institutional networks and institutional
learning capacity will be underdeveloped in 
centralized states. Conversely, they will be 
more likely in regionalized or federal states.
A secondary consideration for understanding the 
institutional capacity of public authorities concerns the
capabilities of the political class their skills, motivation
and training, and the institutional relationships that develop 
between elected politicians and the officials in the public 
administration. Generally, the effectiveness of the policy 
process depends on the way functions are allocated between the 
two groups and the efficient functioning of the administration 
(Cassese and Torchia, 1993). The way power is shared between 
them affects the access of outside organizations into policy 
formation and thus, shapes how networks develop. Furthermore, 
how public officials are selected— whether professional or 
political criteria is used for appointments— can strongly 
influence their efficiency, their effectiveness, their 
motivation, and their openness to new ideas. When assessing 
the institutional capacity of local authorities, these factors 
must also be considered.
JI-B. Industrial Structure and Local Institutional Capacity
The structure of the local industry (whether its comprised of 
small or large firms, whether its a diversified or a 
monocultural economy, whether firms are autonomous or branch 
plants taking direction from outside the area, whether they
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are networked within the region or outside the region) 
influences the resources of economic actors and determines the 
boundedness39 of the industry. Boundedness refers to the 
extent of correspondence between the local economy (the local 
labour market and the industrial structure) and the public 
administration. In other words, boundedness represents the 
degree to which the economy is decentralized. The more an 
industry is bounded, the greater the possibility that local 
action can be influential. In fact, empirical evidence 
suggests that economic centralization can undermine the 
policies and politics of subnational authorities (M€ny and 
Wright, 1985).
Admittedly, the growing importance of global links and 
global decentralization for the competitiveness of firms and 
sectors and the spread factor of industries (the outproduction 
of components and ancillary services), seems to negate the 
idea of a truly bounded local economy. Additionally, a 
concentration of certain subcontracting firms, for example, 
may indeed be physically bounded within a particular locality 
but dependent on relations with firms located elsewhere. Hence 
we need a way to measure boundedness that can account for 
multiple types of interindustry relations and geographies, yet 
can distinguish types of structures which are more likely to 
respond to and/or be an active part of local governance 
activity.
39 The relationship between boundedness and local 
institutional capacity was introduced by Bennett and McCoshan 
(1993). It will be adapted somewhat for the purposes of this 
thesis• See below.
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I propose that economic boundedness or decentralization 
can be assessed in accordance with two criteria; 1) whether 
key economic decisions are taken endogenously (within the 
locality) or exogenously (outside the locality); and 2) the 
degree of hierarchy within interfirm relations and the extent 
of interdependence among firms which can be conceptualized as 
the industrial governance structure and subdivided into 
hierarchies (vertically-integrated, small firms dependent) and 
networks (horizontally-integrated, interdependent). Combining 
these determinants of boundedness, there are four general 
structural outcomes which are illustrated in table 2.2; core, 
core-ring (including the subset of branch plant economies), 
ring, and ring-core40.
All core represents hierarchically-structured, 
vertically-integrated large firms with high internal economies 
of scale and scope but low external economies. Firms will have 
few local linkages and no necessary connection to territory41. 
Similarly, core-ring structures, where a lead firm retains a 
ring of dependent subcontractors vulnerable to the whims and 
needs of the core firms, represent centralized power 
configurations and are less responsive to local institutions.
40 These four categories were borrowed from an article by 
Storper and Harrison (1989) which outlined a map of regional 
production systems. Their conceptualization was more 
sophisticated, identifying four input-output systems, which I 
have reclassified as the locus of decision-making, and four 
governance structures. We both have the same goals as the purpose 
is to identify the structure of production so that policy can be 
appropriately designed. My discussion of the four productive 
systems summarizes their argument.
41 There are, of course, exceptions to this rule. These are 
general categories and do not fit in all cases.
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The hierarchical governance structure results in intense 
competition between subcontractors and a squeezing of their 
profit margins. The decision-making location of the core-ring 
can be endogenous or exogenous depending on the location of 
the core. Given that these firms tend to think globally, even 
if physically placed within the territory, they can be 
considered nonbounded systems with only a superficial 
relationship to the local economy.
Table 2.2
Measuring Boundedness: A Typology of Industrial Structures
Governance
Structure
Location of Economic 
Decisions
Endogenous Exogenous
Hierarchy Core
Core-ring
Branch
plants42
core-ring
Networked all ring 
ring-core
ring-core
All ring is an agglomeration of horizontally-integrated 
networked small firms without any lead firm and is the only 
structure which is completely bounded. This structure is 
marked by an absence of hierarchy and has high external 
economies of scale and scope, making it particularly dependent 
on local modes of regulation. The ring-core production is a 
partially bounded system. Although the ring-core configuration 
centres on large firms, the system has a high degree of 
internal and external economies of scale and scope. The large
42 As pointed out in chapter one, there is growing evidence 
that certain branch plants may be able to take decisions 
independently as vertical structures flatten out. This should be 
taken into account when looking at individual cases.
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firms are strongly dependent upon the smaller, local 
suppliers. Although the arrangement is hierarchical in 
appearance as the large firms take the leadership role, they 
can not dominate absolutely because the core cannot function 
without the ring, which gives the ring firms more autonomy and 
bargaining resources. Like the core-ring, the decision-making 
structure can be exogenous if the core is located elsewhere, 
but the productive system is more sensitive to local activity 
given the higher degrees of interdependence.
Where decision-making structures are endogenous to the 
locality and governance structures are networked, local
activity can be most effective. This leads to hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 3: Institutional thickness and learning capacity
is more likely to develop in localities in
which the local productive system is 
completely decentralized and bounded 
(endogenous decision-making power and a 
networked governance structure). Conversely, 
they are least likely to develop when the
local productive system is nonbounded 
(exogenous decision-making power and a 
hierarchical governance structure).
Let us now look at the last important structural influence on 
local institutional capacity; the European Union.
JI-C. The European Union and Local Institutional Capacity
The last and most recent structural component that influences 
local institutional capacity is the growth of the European 
Union (EU) as a source of development funding, policy ideas, 
political alliances and a new regulatory environment. Because 
the European Union distributes resources, apportions markets
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and arbitrates among various interests at a European level, it 
can enhance subnational governments' resource base and the 
strategies they can pursue (Anderson, 1992). As a result, many 
regions and localities, especially those who have been 
identified by the EU as eligible for regional aid, have come 
to view the EU as an ally in the battle for development 
funding and creative policy making. Additionally, because of 
the European Union's growing powers in an increasing number of 
policy areas, lobbying endeavours provide a way for local 
governments to circumvent or roll back central government and 
European policies that undermine or constrain their 
activities. The Commission, in particular, has generally 
proven to be very open to organized interests, especially 
subnational government.
One of the general strategies of the European Commission 
is to build up the institutional capacity of subnational 
authorities as a means to meet the objective of economic and 
social cohesion within the European Union43. In fact, European 
regional policy has been reformed specifically to do so 
(chapter seven). Since EU regional policy revolves around a 
partnership contract between the EU, the national government 
and subnational authorities in the design, financing and 
monitoring of EU development funds, the subnational authority 
is brought in as a full partner in the development process and 
may use this position to leverage in private sector 
participation and influence the design and funding allocation
43 To achieve economic and social cohesion means closing the 
living standards gap between the wealthier and less advantaged 
regions of the Union.
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of substantial development monies. Additionally, a number of 
separate EU programmes require joint applications from local 
authorities in several EU countries. Hence, the EU can be an 
important source for network building and often provides extra 
funding for such endeavours. This leads to hypothesis four.
Hypothesis 4: No matter the institutional starting point,
localities involved in European funding will 
begin to build institutional networks on all 
levels (intra, trans, and interregional) to 
increase their access to the European funding 
and policy design.
However, given the importance of thick institutional networks 
for integrating external resources into local institutional 
arrangements, those localities which already possess thick 
local networks will be able to take better advantage of what 
Europe has to offer; creating effective synergies between 
European monies and local action. This leads to the last 
hypothesis:
Hypothesis 5: Areas which are institutionally thick will be
better able to maximise the opportunities 
presented by the EU and Europe more generally.
This section has outlined the influence of key political 
and economic structures on local institutional capacity. The 
next section lays out the appropriate methodological framework 
for a study of local institutions and industrial 
restructuring.
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III. POWER AND LEARNING IN INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS: THE
METHODOLOGY
Summing up the chapter so far, the central hypothesis of the
thesis is that localities may be able to mediate the effects
of industrial restructuring if:
they possess (or are able to build) thick
institutional networks linking up public and private 
resources at multiple levels of interaction and if
those networks have a learning capacity whereby
institutional relationships and policies adapt to 
meet changing politico-economic conditions.
This institutional capacity is shaped and conditioned by:
the structure of the State and the territorial and 
functional division of power and resources
the structure of the industrial sector and its 
boundedness to the political administration
the manner in which the locality is effected by and 
can take advantage of the policy environment of the 
European Union
A comparative case study44 approach is the most robust 
methodology for comparing local institutional responses to 
socioeconomic upheaval because of its unique capacity to 
manage a large and varied body of data including interviews, 
documents, statistics, and surveys (Yin, 1989). Since case 
studies offer the researcher a deeper look into complex social 
and political phenomena, they have strong explanatory powers 
(ibid). Of particular importance to this research, the 
qualitative nature of case studies allows the researcher to
44 Yin (1989) defines a case study as ”an empirical inquiry 
thati investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real- 
life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context 
are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of 
evidence are used” (p. 23, emphasis in original).
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view the interaction of context with the intentional, 
purposive choices and strategies of the individual actors 
(Hakim, 1987, Rose, 1991),
This section is subdivided into two parts. III-A 
discusses the advantages and disadvantages of the case study 
approach and then explains the choice of cases. III-B then 
outlines the methodology for operationalizing and measuring 
the main concepts used in this study; networks, thickness and 
learning.
JI-A. The Case Study Approach and the Choice of Cases
The study is based on a cross-national binary comparison 
of two localities. Binary comparisons are able to highlight 
importance of the context or the institutional factors, as key 
explanatory variables (Dogan and Pelassey, 1990) making it an 
effective tool for the study of institutions. Since the 
researcher is investigating the same topic in different 
contexts, it allows for greater theoretical sophistication 
because the comparison encourages the reconceptualization of 
the research questions themselves and helps to refine the key 
operational devices and concepts being investigated (ibid.). 
When dealing with devices as elusive as networks and learning, 
this is of particular value. Additionally, cross-national 
comparisons also make it easier to ascertain the more 
important determinants of policy and distinguish what problems 
and solutions are peculiar to the locality and which are 
common across countries thus providing an important source for
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informing policy in other areas (Hall, 1986).
When using binary comparisons, the researcher must guard 
against two risks (Dogan and Pelassey, 1990). First, the 
subject may be more appropriate to one case rather than the 
other. For this research, although institutional thickness is 
arguably more appropriate to the Italian case (see below), the 
role of networks and the importance of institutional change as 
part of the local response to industrial restructuring is 
common to both, hence the comparison is a valid one for both 
cases. Second, it can be extremely difficult to extract 
general truths from the specifics of the individual contexts. 
Case studies, however, should be generalizable to theoretical 
propositions rather than to specific populations or universes 
(Yin, 1989). Although this difficulty can not be completely 
overcome, in this study it is alleviated by the existence of 
certain shared contextual variables including global changes 
in the textile industry and the increasing influence of Europe 
on national and local activity. Hence, given certain shared 
contexts, general theoretical conclusions can be offered. 
Furthermore, since this thesis is evaluating the merit of 
certain theories of regional development, the case studies do 
provide an important way to test generalizable theoretical 
propositions•
The choice of cases was determined by four criteria. 
First, both localities had to be dependent on a common 
industrial sector in the throes of restructuring. The sector 
chosen was the textile and clothing industry which has been 
recognized since the 1970s as an industry in crisis within
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Europe. Despite evidence that industrial decline within the 
textile and clothing industry can be reversed, many national 
governments have not attempted to do so, leaving the job to 
subnational authorities. Furthermore, many European textile 
and clothing firms are particularly vulnerable to the 
increased competition that will be loosed as the internal 
market is realized, the multi-fibre agreement is phased out, 
and trade ties with EFTA, Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean 
countries are strengthened (CEC, 1991c). If European firms are 
to survive, they must adapt to changes in the international 
fashion market which is becoming increasingly fragmented as 
individual tastes rather than designer-created trends drive 
demand (Rosen45 cited in Zeitlin and Totterdill, 1990). In 
practical terms this means that firms must overcome their 
reliance on mass production methods and the production of 
simple products with unchanging technologies and minimal 
capital inputs. To compete, firms require more flexible 
production methods that favour just-in-time small batch 
strategies and must produce higher-cost, quality-driven goods 
for more sophisticated markets.46
The second criteria is that the local authorities must be 
pursuing policies to assist the industry restructure over a 
substantial period of time— at least a decade— in order to 
evaluate the learning capacity of institutions. Third, the
45 Rosen, M. (1984) 'A Study of Market Segmentation and 
Target Marketing', Hollings Apparel Industry Review. May.
46 This does not preclude the necessity of diversification 
for some areas— to move away from an overdependence on one 
industry.
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cases must be from different countries in order to gauge the 
effects of state structures. Finally, both areas had to be 
eligible for the same type of European assistance, in order to 
effectively assess the effects of the European Union on 
institution building.
Two cases fit the bill, Prato in Tuscany, and Nottingham 
in the East Midlands. Both are historic centres for textile 
and clothing production and the industry still represents a 
substantial proportion of manufacturing production and 
employment. Although both Great Britain and Italy are unitary 
states (as compared to federal states), Italy is regionalized 
while England is not, allowing us to test for differences in 
state structure.47 In both localities, over the past ten years 
or more, the local governments have taken steps to help the 
industry weather the economic crisis. Finally, both are 
Objective 2 areas according to the EU and thus eligible to 
receive funding from and participate in the same sets of EU 
programmes and policies.
Finally, each case was in a different stage of 
institutional development when the local initiatives were 
first generated. The Italian case, the textile district in 
Prato, has long been considered the prototype of an industrial 
district, and whose economic crisis has led to a general
47 Great Britain is actually made up of four countries: 
Wales, Scotland, England, and Northern Ireland. Although there 
are specific Ministries for three of the four areas (England is 
not included), the central government has the power to 
reconfigure local government structures at will. There are no 
specific rights, powers or functions that are constitutionally 
guaranteed. Thus for purposes of this study Great Britain is a 
unitary state. Henceforth, I will discuss England, because that 
is the more accurate reference to describe the case studied.
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questioning of the district model. Believed to be an archetype 
of institutional thickness, it presents a rich test case of 
the learning hypothesis. The second case, Nottingham, charts 
one local government's attempts to restructure its struggling 
textile industry to survive in an increasingly hostile 
environment. Many of these policies were aimed at 
strengthening the institutional infrastructure, hence 
institution building has been an important component of 
Nottingham's overall strategy. A comparison of these two cases 
will illuminate the institutional conditions necessary to 
promote and sustain flexible productive structures when the 
industry is under threat, and give us a greater understanding 
of the role of institutional thickness and learning, in 
different phases of development in the industrial 
restructuring process.
The heart of the study comprises semi-structured in depth 
personal interviews with subnational government officials, 
development agencies, university and research institutions, 
vocational training providers, trade and employer 
associations, textile service centres, chambers of commerce 
and other area institutions involved in the development 
process. Around twenty interviews were conducted in each 
locality. Generally, elite interviewing provides an important 
way for testing hypotheses as well as gathering qualitative 
information and informed insights in a relatively unstudied 
area (Pridham, 1987).
In each case, the choice of actors was determined by 
three methods: (i) identification in documentation which
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includes names that appeared frequently in newspapers, 
development plans, council meeting minutes or other relevant 
material; (ii) reputational identification which were those 
identified during the interview process or in preliminary 
information gathering interviews; and (iii) positional 
identification which are those agents who might be included in 
the process because they are part of a general policy domain 
or hold a particular position within the community.
The choice of cases has been discussed. The next task is 
to establish an agenda for operationalizing and measuring the 
key concepts; networks, thickness and learning.
JJJ-B. Operationalization and Measurement
To understand the role of institutions in the development 
process requires a two-stage strategy. The first stage is to 
map the institutional infrastructure by identifying the key 
actors, examine their roles, functions, and missions, and 
distinguish their interrelationships (or networks). Social 
network analysis (SNA), which provides efficient statistical 
tools for identifying the structure of the network, measuring 
network density, and recognizing the distribution of local 
power is used to evaluate the networks in both cases. A 
number of different software programmes are available to 
conduct SNA. This thesis employs UCINET (Borgatti, et. al, 
1992).
The information to perform SNA comes from the semi­
structured interviews. (Appendix A presents a copy of the
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questionnaire.) Respondents were asked with whom they 
interacted with on a regular basis to exchange information and 
advice in areas of common interests. Although this approach 
was generally successful, it did encounter some problems. In 
particular, within a relatively well-defined community, a lack 
of regular meetings does not indicate the absence of reliable 
linkages. As one respondent noted, "I have no regular meetings 
with county officers or members. But ...I keep in contact with 
the people I need to speak with."48 Such a response would be 
interpreted as an existing linkage. In small cities, people 
know each other and degree of information exchange is hard to 
accurately measure. One respondent noted, "I tend to meet 
people I need to speak to at least once and probably twice a 
week. • • Its more informal. We now tend to have a meeting 
when we actually need one rather than to have one every month 
because we have one every month.H49 As a result, many
respondents had difficulty interpreting the meaning of regular 
exchange. To overcome this, a second question was asked
(either in addition to or in place of the regularity
question): With whom they most often undertook joint
activities with? Although it does not demonstrate regularity 
of linkages as such, this question provided information on 
important relationships outside any specific policy issues or 
questions. Adding to the difficulty of measurement, there
is always a strong amount of overlap amongst the key leaders 
in the various organizations and numerous opportunities for
48 Interview 41.
49 Interview 41.
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many of these people to mix at social functions in the 
community. One respondent noted, "Operating within the County, 
one is always attending things where one meets these people 
socially as well as for business."50 Despite these problems, 
the information supplied through these two questions were 
sufficient to create an adjacency matrix; a statistical tool 
which measures the presence or absence of linkages among the 
institutions within the community; in other words it draws the 
network. The patterns of linkages which emerges describe the 
position or role of each organization within the general 
community and portray the nature of the relationships among 
these positions (Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982, p.17). As well as 
mapping networks, these statistical tools can also provide 
insights into local relationships.
Using the adjacency matrix, SNA can measure the degree of 
institutional thickness (density calculations), suggest the 
extent to which power is centralized within certain actors 
(centralization measures), and identify network structures 
(structural equivalence measures), and finally graph the 
network structure to assess the potential of these networks 
for promoting innovation, information exchange and collective 
action. Density measures the connectedness or disconnectedness 
of the entire network whereby zero refers to no connections 
between any actor and one means that all actors are linked to 
all other actors. Density demonstrates the strength of ties 
and can be used as a partial measurement for thickness. The 
higher the density, the tighter and the thicker is the
50 Interview 31.
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network. Thickness, however, has qualitative as well as 
quantitative characteristics. These elements were also 
explored during the interviews and data gathering efforts in 
each case study. The density measure allows us to measure the 
quantitative aspects of thickness in a way that makes the 
networks directly comparable. The qualitative aspects of 
thickness are also considered.
Complementing the density measure is the measure of 
centralization. Density refers to network cohesion while 
centralization refers to the degree to which this cohesion is 
organized around specific prominent points; those actors with 
the greatest number of linkages (Scott, 1992). Actor 
centrality indicates the degree of involvement a particular 
actor has in all network relations; the more central, the more 
involved. Centrality is a useful but partial indicator of 
power; the more resources an institution can tap into, the 
stronger will be their bargaining resources (Figure 2.1). 
However, only an analysis of outcomes can assure us that this 
measurement of power is correct. Centrality can also 
demonstrate the vertical or horizontal structure of the 
networks. Finally, structural equivalence distinguishes common 
social positions based on equivalent activities with respect 
to relational linkages (Scott, 1992). In other words, this 
technique identifies which actors have similar positions 
within the network. This thesis uses the CONCOR technique of 
structural equivalence because it "produces a classification 
of network actors into discrete, mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive categories"(Knoke and Kuklinski, 1982, p.73) based
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on the nature of their interorganizational relationships.
Chapters three and four analyze in depth the 
institutional map of Prato and Nottingham, respectively. Each 
chapter first examines the effects of state and industrial 
structures on local institutional capacity51, maps the local 
institutions involved in the industry, and then presents the 
results of SNA to initially assess the institutional networks 
found in each case. Chapters five and six then look at the 
initiatives supporting the textile industry and the 
institutional relations involved in their development over 
time to assess the learning capacity of the different 
institutional structures; the qualitative aspects of thickness 
and power.
The last task set for this chapter is to establish 
criteria for assessing that learning capacity. The criteria 
must recognize the dual nature of learning which is, to 
reiterate, the ability to adapt both policy and institutional 
arrangements to new conditions. Even under crisis conditions, 
such as industrial restructuring, institutions still have 
clear incentives to pursue learning. On one hand, information 
can demonstrate problems and gaps in existing policies, 
enhance their understanding of where such gaps come from, and 
garner support for their policy positions. On the other hand, 
information and knowledge increase an institution's resources, 
thus its bargaining strength which is of tantamount importance 
when institutional relations are themselves under substantial
51 The effect of the EU is assessed separately in chapter 
seven•
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pressures to change (Sabatier, 1993).
The following indicators, which acknowledge the multi­
faceted nature of a learning economy as discussed in chapter 
1, are used for evaluating the learning potential of 
institutions•
The presence of multiple fora for dialogue which 
cover both strategic issues as well as more specific 
policy areas. These fora include conferences, 
advisory committees, technical advisory committees, 
temporary groups, or interagency committees 
(Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1993). Chapter one 
showed that dialogue was a fundamental component of 
learning.
In response to economic crisis, the networks will 
increase their weak ties. Advice will be sought in 
new areas and networks will expand to bring in new 
actors. In other words, institutional relationships 
will change to meet changing needs.
There will new policies, new policy tools and policy 
experimentation. In particular, these new policies 
will focus on institution-building and promoting 
innovation among institutions and firms.
There is general agreement as to what constitutes 
acceptable concepts, methods, data, and theories 
concerning the policy problem (Jenkins-Smith and 
Sabatier, 1993). In other word, there is general 
consensus defining the problem, although there may 
be disagreement as to the exact solution.
Although learning must take place in the political 
sphere, there must be sufficient channels between 
policy actors and individual firms so that the firms 
inform the process and partake in the fruits of the 
learning effort. The presence of these channels is 
a crucial component of a learning economy as it 
provides the link between political processes and 
economic activity. Without that link, even the most 
sophisticated institutional architecture would be 
unable to promote development. Hence it is this link 
which provides the foundation for the theoretical 
framework of the learning economy.
This chapter has identified different types of networks 
and laid out a research strategy for evaluating the role of
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institutional networks in the industrial restructuring 
process. We turn now to chapters three and four which offer 
institutional maps of each locality and assess the extent of 
network development.
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3. THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT IN PRATO: CONSTRAINTS 
ON LOCAL CAPACITY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter draws an institutional map of Prato to identify and 
assess the policy environment of the local system of economic 
governance. It is divided into three sections, each providing an 
analysis of key institutional structures: the state, the economy 
and the networks which integrate them.
I. STATE STRUCTURE52
As outlined in chapter 2, certain institutional arrangements 
constrain the development of local capacity and local networks. 
To reiterate these are: 1) the division of power between
different levels of the state and the intergovernmental 
relations that emerge from that division; and ii) the nature of 
the political elite--their skills, motivation, and training and 
the relationships between elected representatives and the public 
administration.
52 This discussion of the Italian local government system 
refers to the pre-1990 reforms because most of the initiatives 
covered in this thesis occurred between 1975 to 1990.
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To examine these issues, this section will be subdivided 
into three parts moving from a consideration of national 
institutional characteristics to the specifics of the Prato case 
study. I-A assesses the system of intergovernmental relations 
and how organizational, policy and financial powers and 
resources are allocated. The second section, I-B, looks at the 
quality of the political class. Finally, I-C, outlines Prato's 
circumstances.
I-A. DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN 
ITALY
In Italy, there are three levels of subnational government: 
municipality (8,100), province (95), and region (20)53. Since 
the post-war period, Italy has moved from a highly centralized 
system to a mixed model (neither unitary nor federal). This 
movement has been incremental and piecemeal, based on political 
compromise rather than any guiding ideal as to how best to 
structure subnational government (Leonardi, et al. 1987). 
Despite a constitutional provision for them, most regions were 
not established until 197054. Subsequent reforms have been
53 Also augmenting the diversity among Italian local government 
has been the dispersion of other subnational institutions including 
(but not limited to) mountain communities, local health units, 
neighbourhood councils, and comprensori (catchment areas created by 
regional law to ease region-wide development and planning). What 
these units do changes from region to region.
54 Five regions, Valle D'Aosta, Friuli-Venezia-Giulia, 
Trentino-Alto Adige, Sicily and Sardinia, have special status and 
greater constitutional powers. These regions were set up between
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necessary to manage the problems of introducing a new political 
tier. Consequently, the local government system is more a by­
product of regional reform than a specific structure set up to 
meet local needs.
Although the over 8,000 municipalities are vastly diverse 
in size, their powers are theoretically uniform across the 
country. In practice, the vast size differences, coupled with 
the strength of an administrative law tradition, have encouraged 
the growth of a marked heterogeneity among municipalities 
regarding service provision, political performance and
efficiency.
Comparing the effects of this administrative law tradition
with the British local government system, Dente (1985) noted
that the British are primarily concerned with discretion or
autonomy. According to Dente (1985), this consideration creates:
a situation in which the actors (the local authorities) are 
free how to act, and can be restricted only in respect of
what they do, of the content of their actions (for
instance, by an ultra vires clause or through financial 
instruments.) As against this, the Italian situation is 
characterized by the introduction of strict limitations on 
the modes of action of local authorities (on the how)
without this having clear consequences on the content of 
their decisions (emphasis in original, p. 127).
Therefore, within the Italian context, policy discretion is a 
highly ambiguous concept. There are two reasons for this 
ambiguity (Dente, 1985, pp.135-36). On one hand, it is difficult 
to follow policies without the consent of the centre which has
1948 and 1963 in recognition of their strong cultural and regional 
identity.
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overlapping responsibilities in the same field. On the other 
hand, it is possible to pursue policies that run counter to 
national interests if they were legally adopted. As a result, 
larger and better endowed subnational governments have been able 
to be more innovative, often pursuing policies that appear to be 
outside their legal competences while smaller, lesser endowed 
administrations often have been unable to furnish the basic 
services they are required by law to provide. Thus, the 
uncertainty regarding local government activity allows for a 
high degree of flexibility within intergovernmental relations, 
offering municipalities (which can accumulate adequate 
resources) some space for policy freedom and innovation.
This flexibility has been enhanced by the way in which 
powers and functions have been distributed among various levels 
of government. Table 3.1 below shows the legal distribution of 
functions among the three other levels of government. In most 
policy areas (except traditional), functions are shared among 
various levels of government.55
55 Provinces have not been included because they play a 
secondary role compared to other levels of government. Whereas the 
province still holds the prefect or state representative, the 
creation of the region has significantly reduced the prefect's role 
as well as many of the province's functions which are limited to 
psychiatric hospitals, provincial roads and secondary education 
from 14 to pre-university (not including teachers).
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Table 3.1
Distribution of Functions by Level of Government in Italy
Policy Area National Regional Local
Government Government Gov.
TRADITIONAL
Justice, Police, Public
Admin xxxxx
Foreign Affairs, Defence
Emergencies xxxx
Monetary system, Int'l
Currency xxxxx
Foreign Trade, Customs xxxxx
Central Finance, Public
Debt xxxxx
Statistics, Media,
Communications xxxxx
x
ECONOMY
Agriculture, Forestry x
Handicrafts
Industry xxxx
Commerce, Trade, Markets xx
Tourism
Credit, Banking, Insur. xxxxx
Employment, Industrial
Relations xxxxx
Economic Planning xxx
xxxx
xxxx
x
xx
xxxx
xx
SOCIETY
Education
Health
Social Services 
Social Insurance 
Manpower Services 
Culture, Leisure
xxxx
xxxxx
x
x
xxxx
xxx
xxxx
xxx
TERRITORY
Town & Country Planning 
Housing
Public Works x
Public Transport xx
Roads xx
Water
Mining & Energy xxxxx
Environmental Management x
xxx
xx
xxx
x
x
xxxxx
xxx
Source: Hebbert and Machin (1984)
x
x
X
X
X
X X
X
X X
xxx
X
X X
X X
X
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This strong overlap of functions is a central issue for 
understanding the Italian local government system. Sanantonio 
(1987) notes:
. . . [F]unctions are carried out by all the bodies at the 
same time and in the same area, competing, overlapping and 
interacting with each other, creating flexible networks for 
policy-making implementation. ...The rigid elements within 
it, such as formal responsibilities and hierarchical 
powers, tend not to be absolute, but combine with the more 
flexible ones, such as widespread participation in policy­
making processes and broad sharing of responsibilities (p. 
114) .
Since no level of government has exclusive responsibility for 
any function, interdependence and integration, thus flexibility, 
demarcate intergovernmental relations (ibid. pp.114-115). 
However, often the law includes highly detailed descriptions 
regarding the function, the appropriate level, the service 
content, how it is to be delivered. As a result, different 
policy areas are balanced to the advantage of different levels 
of government depending on the legislation (ibid. pp.115-116).
The consequences of this overlapping system are three-fold. 
First, the unclear distribution of functions among levels of 
government has led to a flexible, integrated system of 
intergovernmental relations which generally allows local 
authorities some policy space provided they have the resources 
to pursue them. Second, this overlap has lead to the building of 
intergovernmental policy networks within specific policy areas 
which have established stable rules of the game among the 
participants thus providing the necessary environment for 
proactive policy-making and collaboration in areas of common
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concern. Finally, the requirements of constant bargaining among 
levels of government means that regular dialogue is present, 
thus providing the foundation, at least, of a learning 
environment. Let us turn to see how this situation has 
influenced Italian local government in the area of economic 
development.
Looking again at Table 3.1, powers for governing the 
economy are shared predominately among the region and the 
centre. Briefly, the region's constitutional powers include: 
agriculture, forestry, tourism, health, water, artisans, 
economic planning, manpower services and commerce, trade and 
markets. Since the region shares its economic planning function 
with the centre, the potential for central interference and 
control is high. Alternatively, the municipality has minimal 
economic powers covering crafts, tourism, and commerce, trade 
and markets, all of which are shared with the region. While 
certain regions may devolve some of their powers to the 
municipalities, the degree to which this has occurred varies 
greatly across the country. No level of subnational government 
has any formal role in industrial policy, employment, or credit 
and banking (Hebbert and Machin, 1984).
Alternative constraints on local policy powers emerge from 
the system of local government finance. Italian subnational 
government has minimal power to tax56 and thus relies almost
56 Once able to set taxes, local government authorities lost 
this power in the first regional reform (1970). In 1970, local 
government taxes made up 56.8% of municipal revenues, by 1974 this
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completely on the central government transfers for its 
finances.57 In 1989, 73% of local expenditures came from public 
transfers (Fraschini, 1992, p.81). Although strictly controlled, 
the funds come, however, in the form of a block grant which 
gives the local government a great deal of discretion on how 
that money can be spent. Although they do have a great deal of 
spending power, from the local government's point of view this 
dependence on central transfers and the uncertainty that this 
instills has made it very difficult to prepare the three year 
spending programmes and investment budgets that is required of 
them by law (Leonardi, et al., 1987).
Because of the constitutional and financial constraints on 
their formal economic powers, local government has had to follow 
indirect strategies for pursuing development and has thus relied 
heavily on its powers in the social and territorial policy 
domains. Economic development, therefore, has been fostered 
indirectly through the provision of social services (day care, 
cafeterias, transport), the strengthening of infrastructure, the 
promotion of technical and professional vocational training, and 
the use of urban plans, commercial licensing, and industrial and 
commercial zoning (Freschi, 1992, Romagnoli, 1992). In fact,
had decreased substantially to 18% and has more or less remained at 
this level (in 1989 it was 17.5%). Local governments take in these 
small yields by charging fees or taxes for posters, advertisements, 
solid waste collection, dog licenses, and temporary resident taxes 
and a few others (Fraschini, 1992).
57 In certain areas, however, the region is responsible for 
distributing state funds which can give the region some discretion 
over local spending (Sanantonio, 1987, p.122).
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many have successfully utilized their planning powers to guide 
growth and prevent congestion, overcrowding and skyrocketing 
land prices thus helping to keep housing and workshop costs down 
and allowing both business expansion and home ownership 
(Nanetti, 1988, Brusco and Righi, 1989).
By employing a pragmatic approach to economic planning, 
Italian subnational government has fashioned an endogenous model 
of development (Nanetti, 1988). As well as providing the above- 
mentioned services, this model is also based on the provision of 
advanced business services (servizi reali) to small and medium­
sized firms (SME's), which help these firms to contain the costs 
of innovation, secure new markets, assist in the restructuring 
of productive capacity, and expand production activities through 
the promotion of cultural, environmental and archaeological 
resources. These policies are characterized by both a 
specificity to the local economy and their small scale which 
allows for a multiplicity of initiatives. Additionally, Italian 
subnational authorities have developed residual powers and have 
been able to extend their roles in strategic sectors such as 
business credit and finance by working in partnership with local 
institutions (i.e. the Chamber of Commerce).58
In short, the Italian system of subnational government can
58 For example, subnational authorities have been able to 
provide business credit through two indirect strategies; 1) by 
serving as guarantors between credit institutions and businesses, 
and 2) by creating public-private holding companies in which they 
hold the lion's share of the capital (Nanetti, 1988, pp.102- 
114) .
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be understood as:
a complicated institutional tangle in which it is easier to 
identify forms of co-operation, co-management and joint 
endeavors than clear and sharp divisions of exclusive 
responsibility (Sanantonio, 1987, p.129).
Thus the political institutional landscape is marked by 
overlapping, crisscrossing networks both across levels of 
government and between government and civic society. Although 
this institutional tangle does provide policy space, stable 
rules of the game, and habits of cooperation, which are 
important tools of policy-making, the absence of direct economic 
powers have required that local authorities be creative, relying 
instead on other indirect functions and manipulating these 
intertwined networks to pursue development. Nevertheless, 
specific legal constraints on their ability to enter certain 
policy fields and an almost complete dependence on the centre 
for its financial resources set clear constraints on the local 
policy process and thus many policies have been indirect and 
partial in order to conform to legal and financial requirements. 
Let us turn now to examine the nature and quality of the 
political elite and their influence on economic development.
I-B. THE LOCAL POLITICAL CLASS: THE DOMINANCE OF POLITICAL 
PARTIES
Italian subnational government was elected according to a system 
of proportional representation. Since Italy is a multi-party 
system, local government is usually run by some type of
coalition.59 Once elected, a ruling council is chosen from the 
elected representatives, who in turn choose a leader (mayor for 
the municipalities60, president for the regions). Each member of 
the ruling council, called an "assessore", becomes a minister 
responsible for one of the various departments. Thus power lies 
with the elected officials.
The Italian elite system has three characteristic features: 
a legalistic, inefficient bureaucracy, mass parties, and a high 
degree of politicalization. This system, run almost completely 
by the political parties has been labelled 'Partitocrazia' or 
partyocracy. The interests of professional groups are 
subordinated to partisan politics which is the reverse of the 
British system (chapter 4), where these groups often capture 
local government departments. Thus the main channels of access 
to external resources are political, through the party system. 
In fact, bureaucratic posts are distributed via party channels 
as a form of patronage. While there is an exam system for 
allotting civil service positions, it is very time-consuming and 
highly academic in content encouraging the use of informal 
appointment procedures to avoid the delays and inadequacies of 
the official system (Furlong, 1994).
Personnel recruitment is a key issue for making sense of
59 Recent changes in national electoral laws, and an expressed 
intention to transform regional electoral laws, may be moving Italy 
toward a more bipolar party system. It is, however, too early to 
make any definitive conclusions.
60 A law passed in early 1993 has reformed this system so that 
mayors are now directly elected.
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the Italian bureaucracy and has four important consequences for
the functioning of the Italian public sector (Cassese, 1993.)
First, too many civi,l servants61 are appointed using
inappropriate selection criteria. Second, civil servants lack
motivation which is attributable to the hierarchical structure
which discourages initiative (Spotts and Wieser, 1986), the
nature of the public sector pay system which has very small wage
differentials62, and absolute job security. Third, the public
sector provides a secure salary and pension, thus many try to
find secondary work in the parallel economy. Finally, a large
number of civil servants are recruited from law (50% have a law
degree) thus a legal mindset rather than an economic or planning
mentality structures public sector activity.
This legalistic mindset has had particularly negative
consequences on the policy process. Hine (1993) notes:
But the strict legalism of the system, together with the 
cautious and conservative mentality of recruits to it, have 
ensured that senior civil servants are fastidious guardians 
of a rigid dividing line between policy and administration. 
They have chosen not to become involved in the policy 
process, and have been resistant to the development of a 
managerial and entrepreneurial outlook (p. 242).
As a result, relationships with civic society are not part of 
the job of the public administration as it is in most European 
countries but rests solely in the hands of the political parties
61 The problem is not the size per se but the inadequate 
distribution of human resources. The south is overstaffed while the 
north is understaffed.
62 The proportion of highest to lowest salary is 1 to 3 while 
in the UK it is 1 to 6 (Cassese, 1993).
(Furlong, 1994).
This bureaucratic inefficiency has profound consequences 
for local initiatives. For example, decision-making takes three 
times as long than it does in the private sector. For example, 
permission for a construction project generally takes up to 
three years. This sluggishness can block, and ultimately 
undermine, important development projects. Additionally, 
European monies are regularly forfeited because government 
agencies have been unable to develop project proposals within EU 
deadlines (Spotts and Wieser, 1986). The transfer of national 
and European money to the local level can also take an 
enormously long time, blocking the initiation of important 
projects. Thus, even the most efficient of all subnational 
governments is subject to tremendous delays and, as a result, 
many things do not get accomplished.
Consequently, the inefficiency and hostility of the public 
sector has elevated the role of the parties and local MPs 
because of their ability to transfer resources and circumvent 
bureaucratic channels (Dente, 1985). The use of parties and MPs 
as interlocutors with the centre suggests that resource 
transfers between centre and localities often goes beyond the 
legal rules (ibid.).
Work by Sidney Tarrow (1974) has demonstrated that local 
mayors play fundamental roles as political brokers. His study 
found that 73% of all mayors polled felt they could ask the help 
of deputies from other parties and expect some satisfaction. In
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fact, the more involved a mayor is with her own party, the
greater the likelihood that they could successfully request
assistance from other parties (p. 46-47). Tarrow notes:
For, in order to get for his community the kinds of 
resources a French mayor [or British official] seeks within 
the structures of ordinary administration, the Italian 
local official must manipulate a broad range and shifting 
panoply of contacts both within and outside of his party (p 
46) .
Therefore, while local authorities are highly politicized, they 
are also pragmatic in their approach to dealing with the 
opposition.
The importance of political parties for understanding 
economic development policy does not emerge simply from their 
role in the transferring of needed resources. Rather, different 
parties have had differing impacts both ideologically and 
organizationally on the quality of the local elite and their 
involvement in economic development. In particular, the parties 
of the left (PDS)63, with its selective recruitment procedures, 
tight party discipline, and desire to demonstrate its governing 
capacity through local arenas, is widely believed to provide 
good local governance (Brusco, 1982, Putnam, Leonardi, and 
Nanetti, 1993). Spotts and Wieser (1986) note "The party built 
up a reputation for being on the whole responsive, honest and 
efficient"(p. 54). Additionally, since the PDS has permitted,
for historical and organizational reasons, a broader range of
63 In 1990, the PCI (Partito Comunista Italiano), the Communist 
Party, changed its name to the PDS (Partito Democratico della 
Sinistra) or Democratic Party of the Left. For the sake of 
consistency, PDS will be used throughout.
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alliances at the local level, it has more room for imagination 
and initiative (Tarrow, 1974, p.4).
PDS-run cities, in particular, are known to provide a high 
standard of public services, have high expenditure levels, 
encourage high levels of citizen involvement64, and offer higher 
wages for municipal employment (Dente, 1985: 139). These
characteristics provide important organizational resources for 
economic governance including an organized party structure which 
provides a well-trained, disciplined political elite65, a well- 
developed social and physical infrastructure, and a responsive, 
participatory public. However, despite higher pay levels, the 
partisan nature of the civil service recruitment remains high. 
"On the regional, provincial, and communal levels where they 
[the PDS] are in control, they direct the process with equal 
partisanship though perhaps less corruption"(Spotts and Wieser, 
1986, p. 149). Even if the local administration is somewhat 
better than those found in other areas, it still remains more a 
liability than an asset for efficient policy efforts.
Within the sphere of economic development, for political 
and ideological reasons, the PDS has consistently supported 
small firm development at both national and local levels (Brusco 
and Pezzini, 1990). Thus, the network of PDS local authorities
64 For example, 73% of centre-left cities established 
neighbourhood councils while only 40% of Christian Democrat (DC) 
cities did (Dente, 1985, p.139).
65 Tarrow (1974) discovered that 76% of PDS mayors had previous 
partisan experience while 29% of PSI mayors (Italian Socialist 
Party) and 30% of DC mayors had similar experience.
115
has provided an interesting portfolio of policy initiatives, 
easily transferred through party channels, which has supported 
development. The endogenous model of development discussed has 
been particularly strong in leftist localities. Let us turn to 
look at the specifics relevant to a study of Prato.
J-C. PRATO
Prato is a small city in the Tuscany region with a population of 
165,000 (1989). In 1991, together with 6 other communes66, it
became a province in recognition of the self-contained nature of 
the local economy and the local labour market (Sforzi, 1990). 
At the time of this research, the province had not been fully 
instituted but certain key functions, such as vocational 
training, had been delegated to an Intercommunal Association 
until the Province is officially established in 1995.
The Region of Tuscany has a general policy of devolving 
powers and working with local authorities, thus allowing them to 
tailor their policies to meet local needs. "To support the 
conditions of the industrial district, we let the municipality 
put the projects together and the region 
participates... financially and only financially."67 Thus, 
Tuscany's main role is as funding body and as a channel to other
66 The other communes in the Province are Vernio, Cantagallo, 
Vaiano, Montemurlo, Carmignano, and Poggio a Caiano. Prato is the 
largest and often acts as the province spokesperson.
67 Interview 1.
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sources of funding such as the centre or the EU.68 A recent 
study by Merloni et al. (1988) found that, indeed, a large share 
of economic development activity was conducted at the municipal 
rather than regional level in Tuscany. For example, in the area 
of fairs and exhibitions, the municipalities were responsible 
for 45.4% of all related activity while the region accounted for 
36.4%69 In the area of services to industry, the Tuscan 
municipalities were responsible for 31.3% or one third of 
activity.70 Consequently, within the regional context, Prato has 
a good deal of policy autonomy. All the respondents interviewed 
agreed that local-regional relations were collaborative and they 
expressed overall satisfaction with the extent and nature of the 
relationship.
Central-local relations, alternatively, have not been 
satisfactory. In fact, the most notable feature regarding the 
central government is its absence. As discussed above, this is 
not reducible simply to the fact that the city is run by the 
Left and the central government is centrist. Part of the 
explanation comes from Prato's long history of self-sufficiency. 
Given the strength of its economy and social structure and its 
age-old competition with the city of Florence, Prato has always
68 Interview 1.
69 Compare this to Lombardy where the region accounted for
78.6% while only 14.3% of activities were pursued by
municipalities.
70 Compare this to Sicily where municipalities were responsible
for only 10.5% of all services to industry.
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had a go it alone attitude (Mormile, 1993). Secure in itself, 
the city never fostered strong relations with the centre.
The economic crisis that hit in the 80s signalled the end 
of its self-sufficiency (ibid.). However, the few attempts to 
tap into the centre to gain assistance dealing with the crisis 
were not successful. "They came for a bit, made promises, looked 
around, but nothing ever came out of it."71 Central-local 
relations remain infrequent and underdeveloped with the only 
regular role coming through the partnership agreement required 
for EU Structural Funds72.
The last important issue is that of Prato's political 
colour. Tuscany and Prato are part of the Italian red zone, 
regions characterized by the electoral majority of the PDS, thus 
political continuity or monoculture is a key feature of the 
political landscape.73 Prato is a Left-run city and has been so 
since the post war-period. Table 3.2 shows the electoral record 
for the local council in Prato from 1946 to 1990. The dominance 
of the PDS is immediately evident. Although it has often 
governed in coalition with other parties especially the 
Socialist Party, the PDS has always held the mayorship.
Like a typical Leftist city, Prato's activities have 
established " a vast network of social services and implemented
71 Interview 2 .
72 The region, however, remains the main interlocutor between 
the municipality and the EU.
73 Emilia-Romagna and Umbria are the other two regions which 
comprise the red zone.
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MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS IN PRATO 1946-1990 
Cpercentage of votes by party}
PC I/PDS PSI DC PSD I PR I PL I MSI OTHER
1946 4 0 . 0 6 2 3 . 4 0 29.  98 3 . 2 0 2 . 3 6 1 . 1 0
1951 3 7 . 4 4 4 4 . 0 7 37.  76 5 . 25 1 .41 1 .37 1 . 39 0 . 7 9
1956 3 9 . 4 4 4 3 . 3 7 37.  79 3 . 9 3 1 .56 0. 6B 3 . 2 3
1960
CDC\J 42.  49 3 7 . 0 2 3 . 3 9 1 .01 0 . 99 2 . 6 2
1964 4 5.  BB 9 . 2 2 31 . 32 3 . 75 4 . 83 2.  75 2 .25
1970 4 6 . 7 5 7 . 5 8 3 0 . 51 5 . 5 1 0 . 9 5 2 . 4 9 3 . 4 8 2 . 7 3
1975 4 9 . 7 8 9 . 9 7
oCDC\l 3 . 4 6 1 . 74 1 .14 3.  18 2 . 6 9
1990 4 9 . 4 2 4 4 . 5 0 29.  30 2 . 67 1 . 94 1 .10 2 . 6 9 1 .38
1985 4 7 . 5 0 4 3 . 2 0 2 8 . 6 3 1 . 12 2 . 6 1 0 . 9 5 3 . 1B 2 . 8 1
1990 4 2 . 4 0 4 7 . 4 0 26.  10 1 . 00 2 .40 0 . 9 0 2 . 5 0 7 . 6 0
SOURCE: Part 1nr C1992: 333
Table 3.2
a dialogue with all economic associations continuing to reach, 
despite its evident weakening in the past few years, a political 
consensus"(Partini, 1992 , p. 23). The strength of the PDS in
Prato derives from four conditions (ibid.): 1) history and
tradition; 2) solid roots of both political and economic 
associationalism which has supported a shared experience of 
conflict and cooperation; 3) a strong party organization; and 4) 
the ability to integrate immigrants, mostly from southern Italy, 
into the local system (the population doubled between 1951 and 
1981). Consequently, the elected political elite in Prato should 
be of top calibre. The local public administration,
unfortunately, retains true Italian form; sluggish and 
inefficient. One observer noted "The public [sector] is slow to 
do."74
To sum up, Prato has certain institutional resources 
including collaborative regional-local relations in many policy 
fields with established, stable rules of the game, some autonomy 
in spending powers, a well-trained political elite ideologically 
predisposed to economic interventionism and community consensus 
regarding local economic governance, all of which provide a 
solid foundation for a learning economy. Constraints on local 
capacity emerge from an almost complete dependence on central 
financial transfers, undeveloped relations with the central 
government, and an inefficient, obstructive public sector.
II. INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
This section looks at the structure of the economic 
institutional environment and the degree to which it is bounded 
(the extent of correspondence between the local economy and 
administrative boundaries), and locally dependent. This section 
will be subdivided into two parts. II-A outlines the 
institutional structure of Prato, known as the industrial 
district, and assesses the degree of boundedness and local 
dependency present in Prato's economy. II-B then looks at the 
crisis and the problems of structural adjustment the locality
74 Interview 11.
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faces and what effect this may have on boundedness and the 
future of the local system of economic governance.
II-A. BOUNDEDNESS AND LOCAL DEPENDENCY
Tuscany is one of the most 
important textile regions in 
Italy, providing a home for 
17% of all Italian textile
Tuocnrv 
8 3 5 2 0  1 7 *
Italian Textile Firms by Region, 1981
Lombardy 
1 7 2 8 9 0  3 5 *
firms (see Figure 3.1).
Within Tuscany, the Prato 
textile industry district,
North 
27085 6*
PI eanont 
72590 15*
Emi I(a-Romagnn 
39602 0*
vanato 
51017 11*
South 
4 1 2 3 7  8 *
W orth In c lu d e .  Vol 0 'A o s ta , T r e n t ln o ,  F r i u l i ,  U m bria end M arc h e.
which specializes in carded Figure 3.1 
woollen yarns and fabrics, is
of critical importance. In 1981 Prato provided 32% of the 
employment of the entire Italian wool industry.75
Looking at the province of Prato76, table 3.3 shows the 
distribution of firms and workers in the textile-clothing 
industry. The weight of the textile industry in the local 
economy is substantial. Although the industry has undergone a 
crisis over the past decade, it still employs around 86% of the 
manufacturing workforce and 39% of the entire labour force.
75 Data from the Italian Wool Association cited in Bellandi and 
Romaganoli (1994).
76 The industrial system corresponds more accurately to the 
province not the city.
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TABLE 3.3
TEXTILE AND MANUFACTURING FIRMS AND EMPLOYEES 
IN THE PROVINCE OF PRATO, 1961-1991
Year
Textiles Total
Manufacturing
Textiles Total Labour 
Force
Firms Labour Firms Labour % of 
Man. 
Firms
% of 
Man. 
Labor
Total
Labour
Force
% Tex. 
of all 
Labour
1961 6338 38303 7447 42496 85 90 51297 74
1971 8740 42163 9818 46898 89 89 67494 62
1981 11503 50216 13015 56661 88 88 95471 52
1991 7362 36336 8649 42028 85 86 92794 39
1991/
1981
-4141 -13880 -4374 -14633 -2677
1991/
1981
(%)
-36 -27.64 -33.55 -25.83 -2.8
Source: Bellandi and Romagnoli (1993: 186), elaboration by author.
The organization of the Prato textile system is 
representative of the unique economic structure of the Third 
Italy (See Bagnasco, 1977). The distinguishing characteristics 
of this economic structure is that small and micro firms rather 
than large firms are important agents of industrialization and 
economic dynamism. In Tuscany, 4 0.2% of all firms were 
registered as craft firms in 1 99177 (Grote, 1992 , p.139). Table 
3.4 examines textile employment by plant size. In Tuscany
77 Artisan firms are legally defined as those entrepreneurs who 
own the means of production, the owner participates in the firms 
productive activities, and have a maximum of 22 in-house employees 
including family members (Lazerson, 1990 : 112 ) . Artisans receive 
special dispensations from certain labour and social security laws. 
Craft firms make up the buld of these micro firms.
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generally and Prato specifically, small businesses provide the 
majority of textile employment. Table 3.4 below shows that 
employment in small firms is well above the national average.
Table 3.4
Employees by Firm Size in the Italian Textile Industry
Firm 
Size 
(no. of 
workers)
Area Province of 
Florence78
Tuscany Italy
Year 1971 1981 1971 1981 1971 1981
1-9 33.0% 42.5 33.5% 43.6% 15.2% 24.5%
10-49 37.4% 42.0% 33.7% 38.1% 22.3% 24.8%
50-499 26.3% 15.5% 26.1% 16.2% 46.3% 42.9%
over 500 3.0% -- 6.7% 2.1% 16.1% 7.8%
Source: Province of Florence, Dei Ottati (1994, p. 134), Tuscany and 
Italy, Bellandi (1989).
These small firms in Prato are organized into territorial 
systems called industrial districts. It is from this productive 
organization that the economy gains its vitality.79 An 
industrial district is a defined territorial space, usually a
78 Prato was included in this province until 1991.
79 Not all small firms in Tuscany are found in industrial 
districts. Rather, as Brusco (1986) points out, there is a category 
of small, subcontracting firms who are completely dependent on a 
single large firm for all their contracts. Competition among firms 
specialized in the same phase of production is especially harsh, 
allowing large firms to squeeze their profits. Consequently, these 
small firms must lower wages, evade tax payments, and work long 
hours. When the economic crisis hit, these dependent sub­
contracting firms were hard hit but the small firms in industrial 
districts proved resilient and better able to adapt to changing 
competitive circumstances. I am grateful to Maria La Falce for 
reminding me of this distinction.
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town or a collection of small towns, with a high concentration 
of horizontally integrated, highly specialized, autonomous small 
firms, each representing a single phase of production. These 
small firms work interactively to produce a wide range of 
differentiated goods that are sold on customer-oriented, 
fragmented and varied international markets. The industrial 
district represents a unitary productive system where 
independent small units are integrated through dense 
subcontracting networks.
Industrial districts generally arise around traditional, 
labour-intensive manufacturing sectors, such as textiles, 
because the production process of these sectors easily 
subdivides into multiple phases. Thus small firms are able to 
specialize in a single phase of production (Scarpitti, 1991a). 
This specialization allows the system as a whole to invest in 
new technologies, physically placed in several small firms, that 
are widely applicable to different products and processes. The 
territorial concentration of these specialized firms, often 
several thousand of them within the same community, fosters 
extensive subcontracting networks. These horizontally-integrated 
networks integrate the various phases of production process. 
Living in the same community and working in the same industry 
generates a monocultural area; this common culture bolsters the 
cooperative networks among firms. Geographical proximity
also allows these firms to successfully follow a just-in-time 
small-batch work strategy that supports the production of a wide
variety of differentiated goods; goods which can be easily and 
quickly adapted to changes in market demand. Because they adapt 
easily to changes in demand, these districts are flexible which 
is the competitive advantage behind their success (Brusco, 1982, 
p.179). Thus this productive organization has been termed 
flexible specialization (Piore and Sabel, 1984).
Industrial districts are characterized by the absence of 
large dominant firms. Because most subcontractors work for a 
number of manufacturers, no individual firm can exercise power 
over them. In fact, often manufacturers refer business to their 
subcontractors (Lazerson, 1990, pp.118-119). Only a small number 
of manufacturing firms, however, market the finished products. 
In Prato, there is the unique figure of the "impannatore" who is 
responsible for sales and the procurement of national and 
international orders and for purchasing the raw materials which 
is distributed to the subcontractors.80 The impannatore liases 
with the artisan subcontractors who perform many phases of the 
production process. In Prato, the cycle starts with rag sorters 
and moves on to carbonizing to warping to weaving and then dying 
and refinishing. Elements of each of these independent processes 
can be subcontracted out as well. The start-up costs for a new 
firm in each individual phase requires limited capital 
investment which eases the entry and exit of firms. While 
cooperation among firms in different phases of production is
80 This role is also played by partially vertically-integrated 
woolen mills.
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integral to the system, competition among firms specialized in 
the same productive phase can be quite fierce. This competition 
stimulates the constant innovation required to maintain their 
flexibility. Thus, industrial districts thrive on the delicate 
balancing of cooperation and competition.
Industrial districts have two overlapping mechanisms which 
maintain this balance. First, economic relations are heavily 
embedded in dense community-based social networks creating what 
Dei Ottati (1991) has termed the 'community market'. The joint 
governance of the economy by the market and the community is the 
first mechanism and it functions through the integration of the 
economy with local society. The extended family is an important 
component to this system, especially for its ability to provide 
crucial financial and manpower support (Becattini, 1994), and 
its socialization function which imparts important norms, rules 
and values important for system maintenance (see section III). 
The second mechanism is the multiplicity of community and 
regional institutions that provide a range of services that 
support small firms. These services include the regulation of 
the local labour market, the provision of collective goods that 
small businesses have difficulty obtaining81, and the allocation 
of resources in a manner that ensures the industrial sector as
81 Such goods include but are not limited to: access to easy 
credit and venture capital, access to high technology, market 
research and information, provision of necessary infrastructure, 
and coping with administrative red tape.
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a whole benefits (Piore and Sabel, 1984 ) 82 .
Industrial districts have two other important 
characteristics which merit attention. First, the labour force 
includes workers with broad rather than highly specialized 
skills so they move easily from one type of job to another when 
changes in demand requires product and/or process 
differentiation. As a result, few social barriers exist between 
the entrepreneurs and the skilled workforce (Holmstron, 1986, 
p.30). This fluid social structure enhances the flexibility of 
the productive system. The labour market is self-contained and 
well-skilled to meet the needs of industry. It was the 
recognition of the self-contained nature of the labour market 
within the Prato textile district that was one of the major 
reasons that Prato was allowed to break away from Florence and 
become an independent province in 1991 (Sforzi, 1990).
Second, industrial districts are export-oriented and well- 
integrated into the international economy (Bianchi and 
Gualtieri, 1991). Prato is particularly dependent on exporting 
its products. In 1990, 45.6% of Prato's textile products where 
sold on the Italian market, 41.4% were sold to other European 
Community Countries, and 13.1% were exported to non-EU countries 
(UIP mimeo, 1993).
82 These services are particularly important for helping to 
overcome the inherent weaknesses in industrial districts which 
include a slowness to employ new technologies, a shortage of 
financial management expertise, a lack of know-how required for 
conducting basic research, and an inability to generate major 
technological innovation (Brusco, 1992).
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Although strongly influenced by the nature of the
international economy given its export dependence, Prato's 
industrial structure is completely bounded. On one hand, given 
the small size and interdependence of firms, they are locally 
dependent. On the other hand, the locus of decision-making is 
embedded in the industrial system. In other words, economic
decentralization parallels the political decentralization of the 
Italian local system. Therefore policy can directly address firm 
behaviour in an effective and comprehensive manner. Although the 
district is export-dependent, the decision-makers are local and 
thus policies aimed at helping firms restructure will not be 
impeded by a dependence on firms outside the administrative 
unit. Regarding boundedness, the textile district corresponds 
broadly to the province rather than just the city; thus policy 
must be addressed to this level. Before the awarding of province 
status, the Prato district was recognized by the Region as a 
comprensorio (a catchment area to aid economic development 
planning). As we shall see below and in chapter 5, the
incomplete boundedness between city and economy was compensated 
for by the larger mandate of civic organizations, and
cooperative policy measures with other communes. Therefore, we 
can conclude that Prato is bounded more or less to the province.
Local boundedness and local dependency has been 
demonstrated. The next step is to briefly review the crisis and 
examine the impact of these changes on the economic structure; 
and thus how they might potentially alter the institutional
128
landscape.
II-B.THE CRISIS AND THE NEED FOR STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
Prato has generally achieved great economic success throughout 
the post-war period, experiencing uninterrupted economic growth 
until the 80s (Table 3.2). Due to the flexible and innovate 
structure of the industrial district, Prato was able to 
successfully move from price-driven low quality markets in the 
40's and 50's toward sophisticated and higher quality markets in 
the 60s and 70s and has continuously been able to diversify its 
product line. For example, the decline of the low-cost, low 
quality sector was successfully redressed by the development of 
knitwear in the 60s and new fabrics in the 7 0s. This continual 
restructuring process had allowed for the growth of employment 
and new firms. Between 1971 and 1981, textile and clothing 
employment jumped by 23.7% and knitwear employment increased 
8.7% while national knitwear employment declined by 13.5% 
(Berardi and Romagnoli, 1985 ).83
In the 1980s, as a result of a number of concurrent 
factors, a crisis hit the industry. In particular, the 80s was 
a period of major macroeconomic changes: a decline in world
trade, the fall of the dollar and the ensuing reduction of the 
American market, the restructuring of large firms toward greater
83 Compare this with the UK experience (chapter 4), which shows 
severe job losses during this same period.
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flexibility which allowed them to directly challenge the 
industrial districts, and changes in the European Monetary 
System which removed the benefits of flexible exchange rates. 
This combination of factors provoked the shrinking of small 
firms profit margins and the spiralling of their debts. A crisis 
in the local banking system exacerbated these conditions. The 
local bank, the Cassa di Risparmio of Prato, was saved from 
bankruptcy by the intervention of The Bank of Italy. As a 
result, credit was tightened and the lending rates increased 
(see chapter 5), leading to an overall reduction in the volume 
of textile production. Simultaneously, labour productivity was 
also increasing. The coupling of these trends led to a high 
number of permanent job losses (a 27% drop) and the decline of 
many firms (4,100 were lost) (Bellandi and Romagnoli, 1994).
Firm strategies for dealing with the crisis have led to 
fundamental changes in the way the industrial district works. 
First, the monoculture centred around producing carded fabrics 
has declined and diversification of the industry has occurred 
rapidly. Many inputs, such as yarns, which were once produced 
locally are now imported. Relationships between firms and their 
subcontractors have changed; relations with the core 
subcontracting group have tightened while their reliance on 
looser relationships has declined. Also occurring is the rise of 
'groups' which are clusters of firms linked together through 
common capital holdings. Larger firms have better and more 
efficiently adapted to these changes and this has brought to the
district a new phenomena; the hierarchicazation of firms (Bruni, 
1993). As a result, the number of artisan firms declined by 25% 
between 1986 and 1990 (Bellandi and Romagnoli, 1993). This trend 
has continued, with a 7.4% decline in textile craft firms 
between 1991 and 1992 and a 2.3% decline in clothing and 
footwear artisan firms (Amministrazione Provinciale Firenze and 
Irpet, 1993). The predominance of micro-firms, once seen as the 
foundation of Prato's competitive advantages, is now believed to 
be an obstacle to growth84.
Exports, however, have grown between 1991 and 92, by 3.37% 
of total provincial exports(ibid.) suggesting that the larger 
firms have weathered the storm. Another interesting pattern is 
emerging; diversification. Between 1981-92 a 10% change from the 
manufacturing to service industry has been charted as well as 
the growth of firms in other industries such as mechanics, 
chemicals, and commerce (Bruni, 1993).
This transformation of the productive system has two 
repercussions for the local institutional system. First, it is 
shifting the balance of power and resources among local actors. 
In particular, it strengthens the industrialists/employers at 
the expense of the crafts firms and the employees. Firms are 
getting larger, subcontracting relations are expanding beyond 
both local boundaries and national boundaries as more inputs are 
being imported (i.e. yarn). These fundamental changes in the 
system of production and the degree of its local boundedness
84 All those interviewed shared this view.
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will require a concurrent change in the mode of regulation. Such 
changes, as stressed in chapter one, represent a key test for 
the learning economy. Let us turn now to examine how society is 
organized if we are to effectively assess the impact of these 
economic changes.
III. LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS
This section will first draw an map of the private sector 
institutional architecture (III-A) to assess its local capacity. 
The second half (III-B) will then look at the results of social 
network analysis to evaluate the structure and thickness of 
local institutional networks.
III-A. AN INSTITUTIONAL MAP OF PRATO
The region of Tuscany is endowed with a good social
infrastructure for pursuing economic development a strong
civic society. The recent work by Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti
(1993) demonstrates that areas with strong civic traditions and 
networks of civic engagement are highly correlated with strong 
institutional and economic performance. In fact, they found 
that, although a strong economy does not necessarily predict a 
strong civic culture, a strong civic culture predicts a strong 
economy. Putnam's study determined that the civic society in 
Tuscany and therefore Prato was ranked particularly high, thus
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predicting economic strength.
According to Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti (1993), strong 
civic traditions, characterized by trust, cooperative norms and 
networks of civic engagement, provide a community with social 
capital, a resource which facilitates cooperative behaviour 
among the populace as well as among regional institutions. As 
social capital can only be accumulated over time, areas with 
strong civic societies must have a history of civicness. Thus, 
the prospect for successful collective efforts increases in 
areas with historical precedents and traditions of cooperation. 
Past examples of successful cooperation provides actors with a 
"culturally-defined template for future collaboration"(p.174).
Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti have shown that the civic 
Italian regions have had such a history of civicness dating from 
medieval times. Thus, social capital in these regions has "long 
been a key ingredient in the ethos that has sustained economic 
dynamism and government performance"(p. 170). Trust breeds
cooperation and cooperation breeds trust. Thus, social capital, 
as a community resource, increases with use and, conversely, 
atrophies with disuse. Those communities, like Prato, which 
possess it, will therefore be able to exploit it and increase it 
more easily than those which do not. In fact, work by Dei Ottati
(1994) has highlighted that, historically, Prato has been 
especially rich in this resource and its ability to exploit it. 
Summing up, norms of cooperation, arising from strong historical 
traditions of cooperation, and dense political and social
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networks are important inputs explaining the historic success of 
the Prato economy (Dei Ottati, 1994). They should also provide 
key inputs for supporting the learning required for industrial 
restructuring. Thus, socially and culturally, the institutional 
capacity of Prato is quite high.
Trust and social capital are an important component of 
institutional thickness and these underpin the relations which 
have developed among the key trade and business associations 
that have always been key actors in Prato, historically and 
today. These actors include: UIP (Union of Industrialists in
Prato), the CNA, (National Federation of Artisans), CGIA85 
(Italian General Federation of Artisans), and three trade Unions 
CGIL (Italian General Confederation of Labour), UIL (Union of 
Italian Labour), and CISL (Italian Confederation of Workers' 
Unions).86 All these organizations have a joint mandate; to
85 CGIA is the peak association. Conf artigianato is the 
provincial association.
86 There are also two organizations which represent the 
Merchants (Confesercenti and Confcommercio) and API, (the 
Association of Small Enterprises) but they are fairly marginalized 
within the power structure in Prato. This distribution of power 
among associations is particular to Prato and may not be the case 
in other areas. The marginalization of the merchants does not 
reflect their numbers because there are 6,000 merchant firms of 
which only around 1,500-2,000 are not members of an association. 
Rather, it represents the cognitive dominance of the textile 
industry from the point of view of economic governance (This will 
be elaborated in chapters 5 and 7). Additionally, although the 
Florentine Chamber of Commerce is included in the network analysis, 
it will not be discussed here. Its position in Prato is somewhat 
ambiguous as Prato is in the process of creating its own provincial 
Chamber. Additionally, while it plays a major financing role, it is 
not involved in other important exchanges; hence I will not discuss 
it in detail in this section.
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pursue local industrial relations and to offer local political 
representation to their members.
The UIP was established by the industrialists in Prato in 
1912 in reaction to the local strength of the Chamber of Labour 
(now the seat of the provincial CGIL) which represented the 
"point of reference for city life"(Partini, 1992, p. 11). From 
this period onward, it has continued to develop a range of 
services that it provides its members including credit, culture, 
charity, the promotion of professional schools and the diffusion 
of Prato's products (Patini, 1992). UIP has circa 1,000 members 
and its territorial mandate covers the 13 municipalities plus 
Mugello that comprise the Prato textile industry.
Presently located in the Palazzo Industriale, the UIP 
building houses the UIP, TV Prato which hosts a briefly nightly 
statement by the UIP, the local office of the Florentine Chamber 
of Commerce, and a range of business support consortia 
associated with UIP. The UIP's guiding principles are to 
safeguard territorial business interests and promote forms of 
cooperation that favour shared development but respect the 
independence and interests of the single components.(UIP, 1993, 
p. 2) The UIP is a member of Conf industria, the national 
federation of Italian businesses, therefore they are also 
represented by the major industrial associations such as 
FEDERTESSILE or Laniera. This is structurally quite different 
from the British case, where the national industrial 
associations have only direct membership, not territorial
representatives (chapter 4). Although it has always leaned to 
the centre politically, it has always had good working 
relationships with the leftist local authorities.
Strong craft associations, which represent the microfirms 
that have thus far provided the backbone of the local economy, 
are also important local institutions. Table 3.5 shows the 
importance of craft organizations to craft firms in Tuscany. The 
majority of craft firms (76.2%) belong to a craft association. 
Like the UIP, their territorial mandate is the province. CGIA 
(Confartigianato in Prato) has 7,000 members and CNA has 6,500 
members within the province of Prato87.
87 This includes all enterprises, not just textiles. Around 
60% are textile firms.
Table 3.5
Membership in Italian Craft Organizations (1990)
Craft Firms 
as % of 
Total Firms
CNA
Membership
CGIA
Membership
% of Craft 
Firms which 
are
Members of 
a craft 
Association88
Tuscany 40.2 48.8 27.4 76.2
North 38.5 16.2 15.9 32.1
Third
Italy
41.8 32.2 40.1 72.3
South 35.9 28.7 22.9 51.6
Italy 38.7 25.7 26.3 52
Source: Grote (1992b, p.154) with some elaboration by the author.
Both associations offer a range of crucial services to 
their members including book-keeping, the preparation of pay 
packets, income tax declarations, insurance contributions, 
professional training courses, and credit guarantee consortia 
which obtain low-interest loans by coordinated credit demands 
with local banks. Through experience, the association has been 
able to achieve the expertise of consultants but at far lower 
prices.
The CNA began as a sectoral federation of the CGIL, but 
became independent in the 1950's and now its leftist reputation
88 This does not include CASA (Confederazione Artigiani 
Sindicati Autonomi--the Confederation of Independent Artisan 
Unions), a third craft association because it is quite small in 
Tuscany representing only 1.4% of crafts firms nor CLAAI 
(Confederazione Libere Associazioni Artigiane Italiane—  
Confederation of Free Italian Artisan Associations) which 
represents only 0.5% of firms in all of Italy.
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has dimmed allowing it to become a centre for all artisans. 
Concurrently, Confartigianato was initially linked to the 
Christian Democrats. As a result, the organizations are 
structured differently. The CNA, like the PDS, has a federal 
structure so that the provincial organizations are shaped by and 
adhere to the central organization. Within the CNA, there is a 
high degree of organizational discipline and coherence, allowing 
for a great capacity for policy-coordination and collective 
action* CGIA, alternatively, is truly a peak association where 
the provincial units are highly autonomous from central 
coordination. It has been suggested that this results in a more 
localist type attitude and a less developed sense of cooperation 
(Grote, 1992b) but this has not been substantiated.
Like the business associations, the trade unions have a 
provincial territorial mandate, thus effectively covering the 
entire textile industry. So if the public administration has not 
reflected perfect boundedness with the local industrial system, 
the business and trade associations have compensated for this 
lack-of-fit. CGIL is the oldest (established in 1898 as the 
Chamber of Labour) and strongest union with around 26,000 
members (7,500 in the textile industry). Its dominant position 
within the community comes from the historic relations between 
CGIL and the PDS. Nationally, the CGIL was viewed as the PDS's 
transmission belt of party policy, its main source of 
recruitment (workers comprise 4 0% of PDS membership) and its 
training ground. Even if the increasing pressures for joint
union activity and local representation eventually led to its 
autonomy of action, the high degree of membership overlap and 
the CGIL-PDS link guaranteed that industrial relations remained 
the dominant issue on the party policy agenda (Furlong, 1994). 
The smallest Union, UIL, has 3,500 members but UIL is primarily 
a public sector, white collar union. It is quite important in 
areas regarding the public administration but holds little 
weight in the textile industry. CISL has 11,084 members of which 
1,100 are textile workers. UIL is historically linked to the 
Socialist party and CISL to the Christian Democrats. While these 
organizations have delinked themselves from the party structure, 
the membership between the organizations and their former party 
patrons still overlap extensively. For many years now, the three 
trade unions have tended to act in concert given the high degree 
of shared interests, once the party connections loosened. There 
is even some discussion of eventually establishing some form of 
unitary structure (Grote, 1992b).
Their cooperative stance is not always reflected among the 
other local associations. The structure of organized interests 
found in Prato, according to Grote (1992b), exemplifies 
pluralist interest intermediation because a number of 
politically-diverse associations compete for voluntary 
membership and state recognition in order to take advantage of 
available grants and services. Despite a cooperative culture, 
this competition can at times be an obstacle to collective 
action and policy coordination.
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While many observers have argued that the overall climate 
of cooperation has been an integral component to successful 
system governance (Bellandi and Romagnoli, 1994, Trigilia, 
1989a), the degree of conflict is also an equally necessary 
component that should not be overlooked. One respondent 
stressed:
There does not exist a fine line between collaboration and 
conflict....Because we maintain that while collaboration is 
important for the development of the community, conflict is 
also important because the interests are diverse.89
Balancing competition and cooperation is, therefore, the 
main tension within Prato's local governance structures which 
have historically, coalesced around industrial relations. Over 
the years, these associations have put together a substantial 
number of joint agreements among actors in different areas of 
work relations (Bellandi and Romagnoli, 1994, Trigilia, 
1989a)90. Figure 3.2 shows the number of agreements concluded.91 
The 70s were a particularly busy time. Sixteen agreements were 
successfully concluded, more than any other period.
The economic crisis and the concurrent changes in the
89 Interview 9.
90 Of particular importance within these negotiations was the 
understanding between these associations that work hours were not 
to be regulated because they represented the foundation stone of 
the district's flexibility, thus its prosperity.
91 In addition to these relationships, there are also strong 
contractual relations between the unions and individual firms 
(ranging in the 100s), which have strengthened the overall culture 
of cooperation (Trigilia, 1989a, p.310).
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Territorial Agreements Between the UIP and the Trade Unions, 1945-1987
2
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Source: Trigilia C1989a, p, 3 1 0}
Figure 3.2
associations membership and resources have led to changes in 
nature the industrial relations system as well (Trigilia, 
1989a). It too is in a process of transition. Whereas we could 
easily conclude that the industrial relations system represented 
a tight policy community including primarily the UIP, the trade 
unions and the city of Prato as mediator, the tightness of this 
relationship is starting to break down as the need to manage a 
wider range of issues spurs a drive for new partners and new 
relations. Since social network analysis was conducted on 
information gathered in 1993, it will reflect both these 
changes. Let us now examine Prato's institutional networks.
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III-B. INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS IN PRATO
This section assesses the structure of local institutional 
networks using social network analysis. To reiterate, SNA can 
measure the degree of institutional thickness (density), 
determine the central actors (centralization), and identify 
network structures (structural equivalence measures), and 
finally graph the network structure to assess the potential of 
these networks for promoting innovation, information exchange 
and collective action. Fourteen actors were entered into the 
matrix: three levels of local government (Tuscany, Prato,
Intercommunal Association), the UIP, the two craft 
organizations, three trade unions, the local bank (Cassa di 
Risparmio di Prato), the Florentine Chamber of Commerce, one 
merchants association, the small business association (API) and 
the University of Florence. Network density was found to be 
extremely high .83 out of a possible 1, indicating almost all 
the actors are linked to each other. Thus, Prato has very dense 
networks comprised predominantly of strong rather than loose 
ties. Such dense ties suggest an institutionally thick economy.
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Table 3.6
Centrality Measures of Exchange Networks in Prato
ACTOR CENTRALITY
City of Prato
UIP
CNA
Confartigianato
Region of Tuscany
Intercommunal Association
Chamber of Commerce (Florence)
University of Florence
CGIL
CISL
UIL
Confesercenti 
Cassa di Risparmio 
API
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
100.00
81.25
81.25
76.47
76.47
76.47
76.47
76.47
76.47
Total Network Centralization 28.6
Complementing the density measure is the measure of 
centralization (table 3.6). Density refers to network cohesion 
while centralization refers to degree to which this cohesion is 
organized around specific prominent points; those actors with 
the greatest number of linkages (Scott, 1992). Network 
centralization was found to be 28.6% which is quite low 
demonstrating a horizontal rather than vertical, hierarchical 
relations among the actors because most actors are similarly 
connected. Since the majority of points are interconnected, no 
actor can exploit her position as broker among any other. Thus, 
power is fairly equally dispersed among the range of local 
actors. Additionally, the scope for shifting alliances is ever 
present given the high degree of familiarity within the 
community.
Although the results indicate a more egalitarian structure,
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an analysis of the individual centralization measures for each 
actor (table 3.6) will demonstrate that certain actors do hold 
a more prominent place than others. Clearly, the network centre 
is comprised of all the local authorities, the UIP and the craft 
associations. This subset of actors represents the base of the 
community power structure. The sharing of power and the central 
positions of collective private as well as public actors 
suggests a strong potential for private as well as public 
leadership in spearheading local initiatives and devising local 
support structures. These results also underscore the importance 
of intergovernmental networks as key channels of critical 
resources as they too are central actors.
Regarding these results, however, certain caveats should be 
made. First, the Intercommunal Association has minimal powers at 
present, so while it does interact with all actors given its 
public position and its key role as the authority responsible 
for vocational and professional training, it is still highly 
undeveloped as an institution and local actor. Thus, its 
centrality represents only a potential asset for the future; it 
has not yet matured. Second, the position of the University is 
a new phenomenon, representing attempts to break out of the 
constricting tightness of local links, and bring in new ideas 
and competences required to meet changing conditions. In other 
words, it is a step taken to manage structural adjustment and 
represents an important learning response. At the time of the 
research, the University and the Prato institutions were in the
144
process of setting up an engineering faculty in the city. As a 
result, the relationships among the actors were quite intense. 
However, this has not been the case in the past, thus the 
University cannot be said to be central throughout the period of 
this study. Rather, this activity was an attempt to overcome a
past weakness in the industrial structure a weakness of
business-university linkages and difficulty stimulating major 
technological innovations. Finally, the centralization scores 
may overestimate the position of such groups as API and 
Confesercenti. While these groups are linked to all others given 
party ties, cultural habits of cooperation, and the small size 
of the city, they are often marginalized when it comes to their 
influence on the policy process while the trade unions are not 
(see chapter 5).
Some of the points brought out in the analysis of 
centrality can be enriched by looking at an assessment of 
structural equivalence. Structural equivalence identifies common 
social positions among actors with respect to their relational 
linkages (Scott, 1992). The results are most easily analyzed 
within a block model (Figure 3.3)
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Figure 3.3
Structural Equivalence of Network Actors in Prato
A Block Model
C U C C P T  C C A C  U C U C
I I N G R U  O H P A  I G N I
T P A I O S  N A I S L I I S
Y A V C F M  S L V L
I A E B A E
N N S E R
C Y
BLOCK CITY 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ONE UIP 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CNA 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CGIA 11 1 1 1 1 1
PROVINCE 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TUSCANY 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BLOCK CONFESERC. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TWO CHAMBER 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
API 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CASSA DI.R. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BLOCK UIL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
THREE CGIL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
UNIVERSITY 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
CISL 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Figure 3.3 displays three blocks of actors a
interrelationships. The block matrix demonstrates that block 1 
actors are completely connected to all other blocks, but blocks 
2 and 3 are weakly connected to each other. While these actors 
will all have some contact with each other, their 
interrelationships have not been deemed to be key points of 
information exchange or bilateral collective action.
Block 1 holds those actors that were determined earlier to 
be most central (public authorities, UIP, CNA and 
Confartigianato). Any actor within this group has the potential 
to provide leadership to the community. They are structurally
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equivalent because each actor in this group has strong, regular 
and historic institutional linkages to all other actors in the 
community.
Block 3 holds the trade unions and the University of 
Florence. Their structural similarity emerges from their 
particular importance within certain policy domains; labour 
relations for the unions, technological innovation for the 
University. The equivalence demonstrates the growing importance 
of technological innovation as a necessary input to the system 
which had once centred on industrial relations. While these 
groups are not substitutable as structural equivalence implies, 
the are both critical actors in the question of economic 
governance. Although the trade unions have a more highly 
developed position given their historical prominence while the 
University is a relatively new actor, I would hypothesize that 
the increasing stress on technological innovation as a key 
building block for economic success will help to cement the 
University in a position equivalent to the trade unions. I 
believe that this technique, by clustering the University with 
the Unions, paints a more accurate picture of network relations 
than the centrality scores which determined the University to be 
more central. Rather, they are both central actors but with more 
a more limited policy mandate than those actors in block 1.
Finally, Block 2 includes all other actors. These actors 
are all important within their individual policy domain but they 
are generally limited to those issues rather than general local
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governance concerns. Again, the block model compensates for 
certain problems with the centrality scores. For example, the 
Chamber of Commerce scored as more central than the unions. 
Although Chambers are public law chambers thus all firms are 
required to register with them giving them ample organizational, 
legal and financial resources, the activities of the Florentine 
Chamber of Commerce tends to restrict itself to financing 
business support policies. While it has been a critical 
participant from a financial point of view in certain policy 
areas, it is not more central than the trade unions regarding 
the long-term governance of the Prato textile industry. 
Additionally, the model separates API and Confesercenti from the 
trade unions when the centrality measures lumped them together. 
API and Confesercenti are somewhat marginalized in the political 
sphere as we shall see in chapter 5 while the trade unions have 
been central actors within key governance domains.
Finally, figure 3.4 graphically depicts Prato's 
institutional networks using multidimensional scaling 
techniques. The graph centre includes the six principal actors 
identified throughout our analysis (City, Region, Intercommunal 
Association, UIP, and the craft associations). At the left of 
the graph, the network would expand to include the actors 
important for industrial relations and training (trade unions). 
To the right of the graph the actors involved in business 
support and industrial diversification (Chamber of Commerce, 
University, Merchants) are located. These diverse policy domains
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Figure 3.4 
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are linked through the central community network as the graph 
clearly demonstrates. The significance of these institutional 
networks is that they "reconcile, in a particular way, the 
fractures and opposing positions of the various actors that 
operate internally in the district"(Balestri, 1990, p.27). To 
summarize, this section has demonstrated that Prato is comprised 
of thick institutional networks which augurs well for its 
ability to act promptly and judiciously in response to 
industrial decline. However, the tightness rather than the 
looseness of the ties could serve as an impediment to 
adaptability, especially regarding learning capacity.
In conclusion, this chapter has shown that Prato has 
certain important institutional building blocks for managing 
structural adjustment. These include spending autonomy, 
congenial regional-local relations, a well-trained elected 
political class, a bounded and locally dependent economy, strong 
collective associations, and well-developed dense institutional 
networks with historically shaped habits of collaboration. On 
the negative side, it is hampered by an inefficient bureaucracy, 
a lack of important looser network ties which can link the 
community into broader networks which are crucial for technology 
and innovation transfer, and the power relations among these 
networks are restructuring in parallel to the economic 
restructuring process which will present clear challenges to the 
learning process. Chapter 5 will assess the degree to which 
Prato was able to exploit these advantages and overcome the
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disadvantages to successfully manage industrial restructuring.
151
4. THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT IN NOTTINGHAM: 
CONSTRAINTS ON LOCAL CAPACITY
INTRODUCTION
This chapter is structurally analogous to chapter three. It 
draws an institutional map of Nottingham to identify and 
assess the policy environment of the local system of economic 
governance. It is similarly divided into three sections: state 
structure, industrial structure and the networks which 
integrate them.
I. STATE STRUCTURE
This section looks at the two relationships which shape the 
institutional capacity of local authorities: the division of 
power between different levels of the State (I-A) and the 
nature of the local political elite (I-B). Finally, I-C looks 
at the details specific to Nottingham.
I-A. DISTRIBUTION OF POWERS AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN 
THE UK
The English92 subnational government system is organized
92 This does not cover the entire British local government 
structure. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have separate 
systems. In metropolitan districts (including London Boroughs) 
there is only one tier of government. There is also a parish 
council just below the district with minimal powers and 
functions. Currently, a Local Government Commission is reviewing 
the situation of English local authorities with a view to
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around three tiers: district councils, county councils, and 
the regional branches of central government departments93. 
Traditionally, the territorial distribution of power in 
England has been characterized as that of a dual polity; one 
in which functions are clearly separated between central and 
local government (Bulpitt, 1983). The centre concentrated on 
high politics which includes defense, foreign policy, and 
macroeconomic policy, while the local authorities administered 
low politics which covers the provision of local services 
(Goldsmith and Page, 1987). Currently, county councils are 
responsible for education, personal social services, strategic 
planning, police, fire, highways, libraries and refuse 
disposal. District councils care for local planning, 
environmental health, housing, recreation, public transport, 
cemeteries, and refuse collection94. In economic development, 
all three levels of government have policy competence and this 
represents an overlapping and potentially competitive
establishing single-tiered government. The Commission's review 
is still in progress and thus the divided structure of local 
governance still pertains.
93 Three Ministries have traditionally taken the main role 
in economic development: the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) which covers regional policy and industrial development; 
the Department of the Environment (DOE) which administers land 
use planning, local finances, and urban development policies; and 
the Department of Employment (DE) which oversees national 
training and unemployment programmes. Additionally, the 
Department of Education and Science (DES) and the Department of 
Transport can impact local development but in narrower policy 
domains. Recently, the government has merged the regional offices 
of the DTI, the DOE, the DE, and the Department of Transport into 
a single Regional Office. As it occurred after the research was 
conducted, it does not enter into this analysis.
94 In actual practice, the division of powers is not quite 
as clear cut as it seems.
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functional area.
Regarding economic development, local authorities have 
always had some legal resources to operate in this area. Until 
1989 powers to act came from section 137 of The Local 
Government Act of 1972. Section 137(4) gave local government 
power to incur expenditure, not to exceed the product of a 
rate of 2 pence (or some other amount fixed by the Secretary 
of State) for their area for the year for activities the local 
authorities believed to be in the best interest of its 
locality or its constituency.
However, in 1989, the new Local Government and Housing 
Act substituted section 137(1) with part III which entails 
'Economic Development and Discretionary Expenditure by Local 
Authorities'. Section 33(1) affirms that all authorities can 
take relevant steps to promote the economic development of 
their locality. Section 33(2), however, classifies the 
activities in which local authorities can participate95 while 
sections 34 and 35 require central government's approval on 
the use of certain powers described in the regulations. In 
particular, the Secretary of State has the ability to impose 
conditions, restrictions, and financial limits, while economic 
development plans must be made available to bodies 
representing commercial and industrial undertakings, persons 
carrying on commercial, industrial and public undertakings and 
anyone else considered desirable.
95 These activities include the participation in and 
promotion of financial and other assistance opportunities for the 
setting up or expansion of commercial, industrial or public 
endeavours within the locality or activities which promise the 
creation and/or protection of employment opportunities.
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Under the Local Government Act of 1972, local authorities 
had entered four main areas of activity; property development, 
infrastructure and environmental improvement, training, and 
direct support to the private sector (Bennett and Krebs, 
1991). The 1989 Local Government and Housing Act reforms 
offered both increased opportunities and increased restraints 
for local authority development strategies. In particular, the 
restrictions spelled out in the reform will prohibit some of 
the earlier local government strategies and reduce the overall 
scope of policies in order to prevent local government from 
intervening in areas the Government believe the market is 
better suited to handle96. To try and enforce market 
discipline, the government has required greater private sector 
participation in local economic development and has set up a 
large number of new public/private institutions (known as 
Quangos) in the last several years to do just that leading to 
complex, fragmented, patchy and unfocused networks of economic 
development institutions (Bennett and McCoshan, 1993).
Oddly enough, despite all the encroachment on local 
authority powers which have occurred over the past decade (see 
below), this is one area where, from a strictly legal 
perspective, local authority powers, which previously had a 
tenuous legal base, have now been sanctioned and legally 
safeguarded. Conversely, by framing those powers in precise 
legal terms, what is and is not possible and requiring
96 The key restrictions pertain to wage subsidies, loans and 
grants (which must reflect market costs) and the exclusion of 
local authorities from banking, investment banking, media, 
manufacturing, estate agency and other professional and trading 
services (Bennett and Krebs, 1991, p. 48).
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government approval for many initiatives, strong limits have 
been put on the types of activities that can be pursued.
Without a written Constitution, UK local authorities are 
subject to the constraints that emerge from the doctrine of 
ultra vires. This doctrine states that local government can 
only undertake activities designated to them by the centre 
which the centre can change at any time. However, since the UK 
central government depends upon local government to administer 
a range of services, local authorities have been able develop 
some degree of discretion, knowledge and expertise in their 
allotted policy areas. The degree of local discretion can be 
enhanced by three characteristics of the english system 
(Goldsmith and Page, 1987, p.72). First, local authorities can 
pursue their own strategies within permissive legislation or 
legislation that leaves open room for individual 
interpretation. Second, the lack of any sophisticated 
enforcement on the part of the central government allows scope 
for some independent action. The regional offices tend to 
serve as gatekeepers between the centre and locality rather 
than as enforcement officers. Third, until 1979, local 
authorities have had ample range for raising local revenue. 
The extent of local discretion has eroded greatly under 
Conservative rule.
In 1979, when the Conservative government returned to 
power under Mrs. Thatcher, central-local relations have been 
radically altered. Where the separate policy spheres fostered 
by the dual polity allowed for relatively harmonious central- 
local relations, the reforms to which English local government
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has been subject over the past decade have had a distinct 
centralizing effect and, consequently, have politicized that 
relationship to one of tension and conflict as local power has 
been continuously eroded (Crouch and Marquand, 1989). The 
degree of control the central state has over local government 
policies has become the key issue in British intergovernmental 
relations and this conflict has crystallized in two areas; 
local finances and local government reorganization.
Looking at local finances97, successive Conservative 
governments have attempted to centralize control over local 
government and local expenditure by enforcing fiscal 
austerity98; making local authorities spend less by altering 
the general system of finance. Local spending needs would be 
assessed through a centralized process known as the grant- 
related expenditure assessment (GREs). Following this, the 
centre then established a number of targets and penalties; if 
spending targets were surpassed, central grants would be 
cut". When these methods did not decrease spending to the 
government's satisfaction, the 1984 Rates Act gave the 
Secretary of the Environment the ability to limit the rates
97 This and the following discussion on local government 
reorganization paraphrases from Stoker (1991).
98 In actuality, the first attempts to control local 
government spending began in the 1970s under the Labour 
government as a response to the economic ills of the period. 
Labour's approach, however, was to pursue spending cuts through 
consultation and compromise. The 1979 Thatcher victory saw a 
continuation of that policy objective but not of Labour's more 
consensual style.
99 Although local authorities have taxing powers, tax 
revenues only partially cover expenditures forcing most 
authorities to rely on central grants as well.
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(local government taxes) of a list of named authorities; known 
as rate-capping.
Despite these efforts to cut spending between 1979 and 
1987, success was limited. Not giving up, a new strategy had 
to be found and, indeed, it was; tax reform became the new way 
forward. The rates, which were basically a property tax, were 
to be replaced by the community charge or poll tax to be 
levied on all individuals. Additionally, a new system of 
government support would be instituted which replaced block 
grants with the Revenue Support Grant (RSG) which was based on 
State spending assessments (SSAs) and organized around 
particular service blocks. SSAs would be determined 
individually for each authority by the centre according to a 
formula containing physical, social and demographic 
characteristics as well as relevant costs. Stoker (1991) noted 
that it is the SSA's, rather than spending powers that 
presently determine local authority tax decisions. In 
addition, the 1988 Local Government Act allowed the government 
to cap local authority budgets directly.
The poll tax proved to be politically charged. General 
rebellion by both the populace as well as local government 
authorities regarding this regressive form of taxation led to 
a major defeat for the Conservative government in the spending 
battles. The poll tax was removed under John Major and has 
since been replaced with the council tax, which combines both 
a property and head tax.
The Conservative's campaign against local authorities has 
not been limited to financial reform; privatization measures
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were also vigorously pursued. These measures were aimed at 
undermining the coalition of local politicians, professionals, 
manual workers and their unions which have been the backbone 
of anti-government resistance throughout the 80s turbulence 
(Pickvance, 1990, p.18). These policies included: the sale of 
local authority assets, the introduction of market discipline 
into service delivery through deregulation and competitive 
tendering, and the encouragement of greater private sector 
participation in the meeting of public goals especially in the 
economic development field. Such activities have also
increased the complexity of the local institutional landscape; 
at times instigating turf battles among local actors as they 
fight to redefine their role within an increasingly crowded 
environment.
The most recent attempt, the creation of the local 
Government Commission to restructure the presently two-tiered 
system into a single-tiered local government system is the 
latest central initiative to control local government spending 
as well as generally restructure Britain100. The Local
Government Commission's decisions have run into trouble of 
late as Tory backbenchers have threatened to oppose the 
government's plan and a recent High Court decision judged that 
the government cannot insist on abolishing county councils
except in exceptional cases (Financial Times, 31 January
100 Stoker (1991, p. 150) argues that many of Conservative 
policy's, beside trying to cut spending and weaken the Labour 
party, were aimed at meeting what they believed were the 
necessary changes required for British economy and society; 
building enterprise, changing the welfare system to a two-tiered 
system, and making more flexible economic structures.
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1994).
The tumult of central-local relations over the past 
decade has set severe constraints on the institutional 
capacity of local authorities. Since sharp restrictions have 
been put on local spending, it follows that local authorities 
must rely increasingly on the other policy tools and/or adapt 
their policies to central government criteria, which naturally 
leads to a decrease of local discretion in the design and 
implementation of policy. Loss of discretion can make it 
difficult to build links into the Community; given that power 
is placed in the central government, it makes more sense to 
invest political resources in relations with the Centre than 
with the locality. Consequently, local government authority 
has been weakened as the central government has successfully 
learned to by-pass it. For example, the centre has often 
granted appeals to private developers, which undermines local 
authorities' ability to use their planning powers to control 
development. This situation can force local authorities into 
competition with other local economic development agents, thus 
dividing local resources rather than integrating them, as 
networks would do. Additionally, it undermines the remaining 
policy tools left to local authorities that could have 
replaced their loss of financial freedom. As a result, the 
main tool left to local authorities is its nodality; its 
position in the centre of the myriad of information networks 
that make up the policy environment. Thus, English local 
authorities now rely, more than ever, on their ability to 
build, coordinate and integrate a variety of networks; to pool
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resources, information, and actors to meet common objectives.
I-B. THE LOCAL POLITICAL ELITE: PROFESSIONS AND PARTIES
British subnational government is elected according to a 
simple two-party101 majority system which can allow for 
dramatic swings between parties. It is not uncommon, however, 
for a single party to maintain long-term electoral dominance 
in certain areas. Once elected, the council selects a 
chairperson (Chairman, Mayor, Lord Mayor depending on the type 
of authority) but the prime leadership responsibility is 
vested in the leader of the majority party. Many authorities 
also have a chief executive, a professional civil servant who 
oversees the implementation of council policy. Understanding 
the structure of power within english local authorities 
requires a comprehension of two features, the strength of the 
professions within the public administration, and the role of 
local parties. Each will be examined briefly.
During the post-war period, trained professional officers 
working within local authorities gained a high degree of 
influence over the policy and service delivery process. 
Although they provided a high degree of expertise, skill, and 
motivation to their job, during the heyday of their influence, 
the 1960s and 1970s, their decisions were almost uncontestable 
by both the elected representatives and the local community. 
Gyford et. al (1989) note:
101 There is a small third party, the Liberal Democrats, 
which has managed to build up a loyal constituency in several 
geographic areas•
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The conviction with which the professionals concerned —  
the engineer, the architect, the planner, the 
environmental health officer, the housing manager —  
advocated their solutions, the apparent technical 
rationality of what they proposed, and the usually 
unqualified support from central government generated an 
impetus and subsequently a momentum which it was 
difficult to challenge. The role of the leading 
councillors, of whatever party, seemed to consist largely 
of legitimizing the recommendations of their professional 
advisors, making public pronouncements which extolled the 
virtues of what was being proposed, and the taking credit 
for the physical artifacts which in due course appeared 
(p. 101).
Along with the technocratic expertise they brought to 
their job, the influence of the senior officers was enhanced 
by their position of intermediary between local elected 
representatives and the local administration and between the 
local and central authority. Rather than being coordinated 
through party channels as in the case of Italy, central-local 
relations crystallized around professional bureaucratic 
networks (Rhodes, 1985, 1988, Goldsmith and Page, 1987). Given 
the division of functions between central and local government 
established by the dual polity, there was little need for 
elected representatives to foster close party political 
contacts with the centre because party linkages did not 
provide either alternative resources or useful channels of 
influence (Goldsmith and Page, 1987, pp.79-80). Consequently, 
local party strategies have been subordinated to national ones 
while Westminster and Whitehall have had little direct contact 
with local governments102. Hence, the professions, networked
102 Neither were local politics used as a training ground for 
national politicians. Research by Rush discovered that the 
percentage of local councillors selected as candidates for 
national election in all parties was 25% or less (cited in 
Goldsmith and Page, 1987, p.83).
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nationally through professional associations, had played the 
brokerage role between central and local authorities. Finally, 
their 'expert' mentality can function as barrier to ideas 
emerging from external sources and the participation of 
community agents.
Over the past decade, the influence of professional 
officers has been challenged by five concurrent trends 
(Gyford, et. al., 1989): i) public scepticism regarding
professional solutions; ii) the erosion of separate 
professional domains, with economic development being a 
particular case in point; iii) reduced professional problem­
solving capacity, i.e. the severity of urban problems; iv) the 
politicalization of local politics (see below); and v) 
increasing problems of staff management and motivation 
especially as resources are increasingly cut. Although these 
trends have weakened the role of the professionals, as they 
are now open to successful public and private challenge, they 
have not been unseated. Rather these changes have lead to a 
reshuffling of the status of different chief officers. For 
example, education and social services, plagued with a range 
of performance failures and the privatization of many of their 
services, have been seriously destabilized while the position 
of economic development officers has been enhanced as 
development problems grow (ibid).
Concurrent to the changes in the role of the professions, 
the activities of local parties have been in transformation as 
well. As noted above, central-local relations had 
traditionally revolved around bureaucratic channels. Recently,
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in response to the centralizing policies of the Conservative 
government, local authorities, political parties in 
particular, have been entering into the political fray103. 
The clashes over spending limits and the malaise in the 
economy, which placed additional burdens on local government, 
politicized local government more than it has been in the 
past. This situation has strengthened the questioning of the 
role of the professionals and thus opened up space for greater 
activity on the part of councillors (Stoker, 1991).
Politicalization has splintered both parties into 
traditional factions and reforming factions, armed with 
different policy agendas and work methods with important 
implications for network-building. The local Conservative 
party has broken down into three groupings (Stoker, 1991). The 
traditionalists are marked by a strong localist tradition, a 
resentment of central intervention and hands-off approach to 
governance thus continue to rely heavily on the professionals. 
The suburban managerialists have taken an active, hands-on 
approach in the running of local councils and a more 
corporatist approach to management. The urban ideologues have 
embraced the extremist ideology of the new right and view the 
role of local authorities as limited only to correcting market 
failure; they are suspicious of the more interventionist
103 This is not to say that there were not already trends 
toward politicalization of local authorities earlier than the 
1980s. For the purposes of this thesis, however, these were the 
key years, because the politicalization of certain authorities 
led to a higher degree of economic interventionism than 
previously seen at a local level (See below). See Gyford et al. 
(1989) for an historical discussion of the politicalization of 
local authorities.
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professionals•
Divisions in the local Labour party are also manifest 
(ibid.)* The traditionalists are committed to a policy of high 
spending on a range of quality local social services and still 
rely heavily on professional expertise for service delivery. 
The urban left concentrates on opening up politics to the 
public, which often means by-passing or changing the role of 
the officers. This group, the most politicized of all 
factions, led the fight against the centralizing policies of 
the ruling Conservative party (Lansley et al., 1989). 
Furthermore, the locality, being the Labour party's remaining 
power base since 1979, was seen as the obvious laboratory for 
testing new ideas of economic interventionism. The Government 
response to the urban left was to disband, in 1986, their most 
vocal and active representatives, the Greater London Council 
and six Metropolitan Councils, on the grounds that they were 
economically expensive and wasteful.
Although the Urban left was mainly defeated by the end of 
the 80s (see Lansley et al., 1989), it did leave an 
influential legacy. Community links were forged and many of 
the more interesting activities in field of local economic 
development were promoted. These initiatives were to offer the 
UK a new approach to economic policy-making that was 
decentralized, accountable to the community and sensitive to 
local needs (Totterdill, 1989). From this legacy a third local 
Labour party group emerged, the urban managerialists who 
accept the urban left's general views regarding the purpose of 
local government but support a more moderate political agenda
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(Stoker, 1991),
Clearly, the stance taken by the local authorities will 
influence the policies they pursue, their specific 
relationship with central government, the officer-councillor 
relationship, and their connections with the private and 
voluntary sectors. Let us turn now to look at the situation in 
Nottingham.
J-C. NOTTINGHAM
Nottingham is the capital city of the East Midlands. With a 
population of 644,000, it comprises 63% of Nottinghamshire 
county inhabitants (1,016,000) and 16% of the regional 
population (4,025,700) (Nottingham County Council, 1991). Both 
Nottingham and Nottinghamshire, located in the historic 
industrial heartland, have been Labour-held councils although 
there has been the odd swing to the Conservative party (Table 
4.1). Notably, there has been a greater degree of fluctuation 
at the national level with the Conservative Party holding the 
majority of seats throughout most of the 1980s (1983-1992), 
indicating a potential ally in the Government in terms of 
allocating resources, even though the city and county councils 
were run primarily by the opposition party104. As we shall 
see, Nottingham has been a large recipient of central 
development funds (chapter 6).
104 The party split between local and national elections is 
the result of the redistricting of Parliamentary constituencies 
which favoured Conservative party supporters.
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Table 4.1
Elections In Nottingham and Nottinghamshire
Year and 
Constituency
Labour Conservative Other
NOTTINGHAM CITY COUNCIL
1976 14 40 1
1979 31 24 —
1983 28 27 -
1987105 26 28 1
1991 37 17 1
NOTTS COUNTY COUNCIL106
1973 54 36 -
1977 20 66 3
1981 33 28 1
1985 31 31 —
1989 49 34 3
1993 59 23 6
PARLIAMENTARY SEATS
1974 3 - -
1979 3 - -
1983 — 3 -
1987 1 2 -
1992 3 - -
Source: Nottingham Evening Post, The Times, various years.
Local efforts to resolve the economic problems besetting 
the city, although interventionist, are best classified as 
urban managerialist rather than the more rebellious, more
105 Labour won a 1988 bi-election making the division 27 to 
27. With the one Communist member, Labour effectively regained 
leadership.
106 Discrepancies in total figures results from a change in 
the way votes were counted between 1977 and 1981.
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directly conflictual urban left. Although their development
initiatives, especially in the early 1980s, generally followed
a restructuring for labour philosophy, they made sure to gain
the approval of the DOE for their policies, respected the
spending requirements, and involved the private sector in many
initiatives. Neither Nottingham nor Nottinghamshire, for
example, have ever been a capped authority.
Reflecting this pragmatic approach to policy-making,
there have been many areas of genuine agreement between the
local parties and between the public and private sectors in
Nottingham and Nottinghamshire. Referring to the city, one
respondent described Nottingham as:
...a modern, go-ahead pragmatic place where you can come 
and sit down, discuss ideas, deal in a business-like 
fashion without the politicians carrying any ideological 
baggage around with them. Because of that.•.we've had a 
good, healthy positive image for the city, internally and 
externally, and its undoubtedly assisted in people making 
their investment decisions to come to Nottingham.107
Discussing Nottinghamshire County Council, another respondent 
noted, "We are a pragmatic authority. There is no entrenched 
ideology, either right or left. We can get agreement on a 
situation."108 Therefore, the activities of both authorities, 
although at times highly innovative and arguably 
interventionist, have generally taken a pragmatic character; 
working between parties and with the private sector in order 
to accomplish mutual objectives.
Equally, good working relations developed between
107 Interview 21.
108 Interview 24.
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councillors and the professional officers, even as councillors 
increased their involvement in development-related activities. 
Although there was some indication of interdepartmental 
conflict between the planning and economic development 
departments in Nottingham City Council (chapter 6), they were 
being reorganized into a single department at the time of the 
research.
Relations between the city and the county, however, have 
been fraught with conflict and tension. One observer noted, 
"They fight like cats and dogs,"109 a situation which has 
been exacerbated by the activities of the Local Government 
Commission as each authority was out to demonstrate why it 
should be maintained. Consequently, economic development 
policy has often been competitive rather than complementary 
culminating in the extreme action of setting up of two 
different offices in Brussels (chapter 7). Such uncomfortable 
relations has promoted a dispersion rather than the 
integration of area resources; diminishing the overall 
potential of policy initiatives.
Alternatively, local-central relations are more 
ambiguous. On one hand, central policies generally and within 
the East Midlands have often undermined many of Nottingham 
city's strategies toward the textile sector (chapter 6). "The 
DOE has not been generally supportive of the [textile] 
industry110." On the other hand, most of the finances for 
economic development comes from central funding regimes
109 Interview 19.
110 Interview 27.
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including the Urban Programme and City Challenge I (chapter
6). The view from the top notes:
Relationships with local authorities are particularly 
good on grant regimes when we have money for them. There 
has always been central-local problems. On the funding 
side, we are both working towards the same aims. 
Sometimes we have to say unpleasant things like no but I 
think its a very good working relationship111.
The view from the bottom-up recognizes a need for pragmatism, 
for good working relations with the centres
You have got to have the government department on your 
side all the time. You have to talk to them and keep them 
informed when you are doing things like this because they 
are a fundamental part of the whole business. We have 
done that to date112.
Thus Nottingham has been shown to be a left-leaning but 
pragmatic authority, open to private partnerships, but marred 
by conflict with the County authorities.
Section I has shown that local authorities have been 
consistently subjugated to a barrage of central policies which 
have left it weakened of resources, and put in an environment 
which encourages competition rather than cooperation between 
city and county. Dependence on the centre for development 
resources chains local authorities to a choice, of policy 
solutions that can meet the criteria set by funding providers, 
usually the central government, rather than an objective 
assessment of local need. Although the tradition of 
professional strength within english local authority has
111 Interview 40.
112 Interview 20.
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provided them with a well-trained, expert staff and the 
technocratic capacity to provide policy leadership, current 
changes in the structure and management of local authorities 
may be having a demoralizing effect on staff motivation. In 
fact, the pragmatism of Nottingham authorities may actually 
represent a learning response to this structural environment. 
Chapters five and eight will look at this more fully. We turn 
to look at the structure of the local textile industry and its 
influence on local capacity.
II. INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
This section examines three issues: the structure of the
textile and clothing industry, the changes it has undergone, 
and the degree to which the industrial structure in Nottingham 
is bounded to the local polity.
I I-A. The UK TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY
Despite great upheavals, the British textile and clothing 
industry still remains an important manufacturing sector 
although it is concentrated only within a few regions. The 
East Midlands, in particular, provides home to the highest 
proportion (Figure 4.1) of UK textile and clothing 
employment(23%),and the knitting industry more generally
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(66%)113. Furthermore, of 
all British regions, the 
East Midlands also has the 
highest dependence on 
textile and clothing 
employment (22%) as a 
percentage of total 
m a n u f a c t u r i n g  
employment114. Within the 
East Midlands, the industry is concentrated in the Derbyshire- 
Nottinghamshire area (LATC, 1992, Section 6.2).
Looking specifically at Nottinghamshire's economy, there 
is a significant manufacturing presence, 41.6% of total 
employment (Nottinghamshire County Council, 1991). Within the 
manufacturing sector 
(figure 4.2), three sectors 
dominates textile, clothing 
and footwear (32%), mining 
(28%), and engineering 
(22%). Given its relatively 
high dependence on these 
three industrial sectors, 
the economy has been 
especially vulnerable to
113 Interview 29.
114 The second highest regional dependence in found in 
Yorkshire and Humberside, where the industry comprises 14.75% of 
manufacturing employment (LATC, 1992).
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changing market conditions. Consequently, high unemployment 
has plagued both the city and county (Table 4.2). Between 1977 
and 1986, county unemployment trebled from 20,000 to 60,000 
out of work (Collis, et. al. 1986, p.3). Since 1981,
unemployment has been, on average, 11.1%. Until 1987, the city 
and county rates were generally equivalent to the UK and 
regional average. After 1987, area unemployment rates have 
been consistently above them.
Table 4.2
UK Unemployment Rates, 1981-1993 (%)
Unit Nottingham Nottinghamshire East UK
Travel-to- County Midlands
Work Area
Year
1981 11.1 11.2 10.9 10.7
1982 11.8 12.1 12.1 13.8
1983 11.7 11.7 11.5 13.0
1984 13.1 12.7 12.5 13.3
1985 13.7 13.2 12.9 13.9
1986 14.0 13.7 13.1 14.0
1987 13.5 13.4 12.6 13.4
1988 11.2 9.4 7.6 8.6
1989 9.0 9.4 6.6 7.4
1990 7.3 6.6 5.1 5.9
1991 7.5 7.4 6.1 6.9
1992 10.0 10.0 8.7 9.4
1993 13.0 11.3 9.9 10.8
Source: Regional Trends, Employment Gazette, various years •
Within the key industrial sectors, job losses have been 
very severe. Since 1980, 26,000 mining jobs were lost with the 
closure of 17 collieries (Cheeseright, 1992). Engineering and 
metals saw a loss of 30,000 jobs between 1981 and 1984 alone 
(Collis, et. al. 1986: 2-3) The county textile sector
experienced 7,000 redundancies between 1978 and 1981 
(Nottinghamshire County Council, 1991) and a further 5,100
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were lost between 1981 and 1985 (Collis, et. al 1986).
The Nottinghamshire textile industry is concentrated in 
3 main areas, Ashfield, Mansfield and Nottingham (table 4.3) 
Nottingham city hosts 21,600 textile employees. Textile 
employment comprises 24% of total manufacturing jobs in the 
city.
Table 4.3
Dependence of Nottinghamshire Travel to Work Areas on 
the Textile and Clothing Industry115
District Total % of
Manufacturing
Employment
% of Total 
Employment
Ashfield 10,950 40.9% 18.7%
Nottingham 21,600 24.1% 7.2%
Mansfield 2,688 28.0% 5.0%
Source: Census of Employment cited in LATC, 1992, section 6.2.
This section has shown that the textile industry remains 
an important industry within Nottingham, despite significant 
decline. The next section looks at industrial change.
II-B. RESTRUCTURING IN THE UK TEXTILE AND CLOTHING INDUSTRY
The UK textile industry has been in the process of 
restructuring. Throughout the 1970's and 1980's, this sector, 
characterized by price competition, mass production methods 
and little design input, found itself increasingly vulnerable
115 These figures cannot capture the other industries that 
depend on textiles, such as textile machinery, dyestuffs, 
chemicals, transport and the retail sector (LATC, 1992, section 
6.4). Nor do these figures include part-time employees and 
homeworkers•
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to the increase in third world production which could offer
similar products at much lower prices. In an attempt to cut
costs, the workforce was reduced. Concurrently, the fashion
market was also changing and the demand for design-led, higher
quality fashions escalated.
Successful industrial readjustment toward higher quality
production, however, has been impeded by structure of the UK
retail sector116. Retailing is highly concentrated with the
top ten firms accounting for over 50% of clothing sales and
thus are able to exert substantial control over the way the
industry produces. One observer noted:
Its a retailer market in the UK. Take a company like
 , they have five factories but do not have their own
name. They sell almost 100% to Marks and Spencers so
they can't afford to cooperate with _____  or   when
all three are fighting for the same contracts and 
fighting for survival with one retailer.117
Ergo, the retail structure has hindered collaborative and
networking ventures among textile and clothing firms, a
condition which is critical to meet these new market demands
(chapter 1).
Admittedly, in the past, steady contracts with the strong 
retail stores had provided firms with some degree of 
stability. Guaranteed contracts allowed for, on one hand, the 
long term planning which is required to meet the demands of 
long-run, high-volume, mass production methods, and on the 
other hand, the deskilling and partial automization of parts 
of the production process which reduces labour costs. These
116 This discussion of the fortunes of the British Textile 
and clothing industry paraphrases from Totterdill (1992).
117 Interview 30.
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cost reductions, however, ultimately proved inadequate against 
the lower labour costs of third world competition. To take 
advantage of these lower costs, retailers have moved business 
outside the UK thereby decreasing internal demand for 
production. Concurrently, importers found that they could 
easily penetrate the market because a contract with one main 
retailer guaranteed them a large proportion of the UK market 
for their product. Thus competition increased on two fronts; 
internally among UK producers and externally from lower priced 
imports.
In the mid 80s, the market for mass produced goods 
saturated and the retailers began to compete in a middle range 
market where competition stems from style, quality and fashion 
trends as well as price. These new markets demanded firms that 
could provide quick response times and small batch methods 
that could keep pace with rapidly changing fashion trends. 
Just-in-time production methods favour firms which were 
territorially accessible, thus reopening up space for UK 
firms, especially small firms, which can provide the 
flexibility to meet these new production demands. On this 
market, the main competitors did not come from Asian and 
eastern sources but from the European Union, especially 
Italian and German suppliers, who have an advantage in design 
innovation that the UK lacks.
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Table 4.4
Employees by Firm Size in the UK Textile Industry
Firm 
Size 
(no. of 
workers)
Area East Midlands Great Britain
Year 1985 1991 1985 1991
1-9 employees 621 741 2632 3031
10-19 employees 188 153 675 469
20-99 employees 319 326 1145 1090
100-499 employees 159 118 594 506
Over 500 employees 17 13 47 37
total 1304 1351 5093 5115
Sources Business Monitor, various years.
NBs This is the textile industry only. There is a separate 
class for clothing and footwear.
Looking at table 4.4 there is clear evidence of a change 
in firm size indicating that some successful restructuring has 
occurred. Since these new production methods favour flexible 
small firms, an appropriate indicator of successful 
restructuring would be a movement away from larger firms 
toward smaller firms. The number of small firms (under 20 
employees) has increased in the East Midlands between 1985 and 
1991 while medium-sized and large firms have clearly declined. 
Of particular significance, there has been a general increase 
in the number of textile firms between 1985 and 1991. However, 
since the growth occurred in the small firm sector, total job 
creation does not compensate the jobs lost from the decline of 
larger firms • Let us now examine the precise industrial 
structure in Nottingham in order to assess the boundedness of 
the local industry.
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JJ-C. THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN NOTTINGHAM
Looking at the situation in Nottingham, the majority of firms 
are located in a confined geographical space known as the Lace 
Market. Around 200 firms including manufacturers, ancillary 
services and a few small retailers comprise the Lace Market 
fashion system employing over 1,100 people (not counting 
homeworkers). Within the Lace Market, the geographical 
concentration of firms has allowed for Ma complicated 
networking community118"(Crewe and Forster, 1992, p.7). The 
firms are interdependent and rely on subcontracting and shared 
services, and the area itself has provided a central point for 
labour recruitment (Totterdill, 1992). The firms work in small 
units that were created through the division of old Victorian 
factories which are highly suited to the production methods of 
small businesses needed to compete on th$ high quality market 
and provide a seedbed for newer design-led companies, often 
started by graduates from the local polytechnic's Fashion and 
Textile Department (ibid.)119.
A study conducted by Crewe and Forster (1992) of the Lace 
Market identifies the types of firms that are located in the 
area: 1) 21% provide ancillary services and supplies such as 
lace finishers, wholesalers, and embroidery, 2) 5% are
118 This should not be interpreted as an industrial district.
119 Many of the larger firms which once dominated the fashion 
system had been enticed out of the Lace Market in the 1960s and 
1970s to relocate in the centre and north of the county 
(Ashfield-Mansfield) in order to diversify the coal-based 
economies without worsening the male labour shortages already 
plaguing the mining industry.
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manufacturing firms that produce for the low ranges of the 
market, 3) 25% of firms manufacture for the medium range of 
the market, 4) 3% are medium-sized firms that manufacture for
the high range of the market, 5) 8% are small firms
(manufacturers and/or designers) who also produce goods for
the top range of the market, 6) 17% of the enterprises are
small manufacturers/designers who operate either as retailers 
or are independent retailers with manufacturing facilities, 
and 7) 20% are small retailers who sell products at the top 
range of the market. Notably, Crewe and Forster found that 
firms operating at the lower and medium end of the market were 
much older (average age 32 years) than those operating at the 
quality end of the market (average age 6 years). Almost all 
the firms qualify as small firms, employing 16 workers on 
average. Crewe and Forster attribute the growth of quality 
firms to local government strategies which had specifically 
tried to attract designers into this area through the supply 
of essential services and workspaces taking advantage of the 
expertise and skills already present in the city (Chapter 6). 
For example, 65% of the Lace Market Designers were trained in 
Nottingham, 41% at Nottingham Polytechnic (now Nottingham 
Trent University).
In the Lace Market, foreign competition is not the only 
threat to the survival of the textile and clothing industry. 
Recently, the fashion market has been in difficulty as 
consumer expenditure has dropped while rents, taxes and 
interest rates have increased. Hence a second, equally 
important threat comes from the sustained and continuing
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redevelopment of the buildings in the Lace Market into office 
space and the increased rents this activity encourages. Many 
manufacturers have already been forced to move out. Crewe and 
Forster (1992, p.12) found that 32% of the firms remaining in 
the Lace Market felt under threat and believed they also would 
eventually be forced to relocate. A report conducted by the 
consultant Ben Johnson-Hill for the Nottingham City Council 
(1988) reinforces the acuteness of this threat. Johnson-Hill 
reported:
The main conclusion is that, because of the improvements 
in status, visual appearance and market value of the 
buildings in the Lace Market generally, the future of 
LMTM [Lace Market Textile Manufacturing] is increasingly 
on risk. If no offsetting action is taken by NCC 
[Nottingham City Council], the numbers of LMTM will 
decline steadily over the next ten to fifteen years to a 
fraction of the numbers in business today (p.2).
The loss of the Lace Market also threatens firms with the 
loss of their skilled workforce. Firms which produce for the 
quality end of the market require multi-skilled employees who 
can perform a large number of tasks and switch easily from one 
product to another. This tends to be mature women, often 
mothers, juggling familial and work responsibilities. These 
women are more easily employed and retained in a central 
location close to shops and other services where travel to 
work is relatively brief and convenient; this is known as the 
'one bus journey'. Labour turnover in these firms is very low 
because the workforce has been built up gradually, and a good 
deal of trust has evolved between employees and employers, 
fostering the warm feelings of belonging to a tight knit 
group. Firms producing for the lower end of the market tend to 
have a younger, less skilled workforce which does not require
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a central location. In fact, a study conducted two years later 
in 1990, again by Johnson-Hill, discovered that quality-led 
firms that moved out of the Lace Market were having great 
difficulty retaining their skilled labour who were returning 
to employment in the Lace Market.
Although the Lace Market is an area in which part of the 
industry seems to have successfully restructured toward the 
quality-driven end of the market, the firms there are still 
highly dependent on the British domestic market to sell their 
wares. Crewe and Forster found that 49%, half the 
manufacturing firms in the Lace Market, do not export at all. 
44% of Lace Market firms export up to 25% of their production 
while only 7% of all firms export over 25% of their output. 
The customers of the Lace Market firms are predominantly the 
British retailers, who are the largest customers for 56% of 
the Lace Market's companies. On a more promising note however, 
many of the products are sold to small, quality retailers, and 
those that are sold to the larger retailers are the top of the 
quality range. Finally, 68% of firms were found to produce 
some goods under their own brand-names. There is a growing 
commercial value of a "Made in the Lace Market" identity 
(Johnson-Hill, 1990). This organization in the Lace Market is 
atypical for the industry as a whole which mostly produces for 
the retailers' brand name.
The production system in Nottingham can be interpreted as 
a partially bounded core-ring system. Dependence on national 
retailers located externally sets clear limits on the 
influence of local institutions and will tend to foster an
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industrial identity that is divorced from territory and more 
closely linked to the sector, as defined through national 
input-output linkages. This is partially compensated by the 
localness of the labour market and the firms perceptions that 
being in the city matters for obtaining appropriately skilled 
staff. In addition, given the nascent growth of interfirm 
networks, a shared identify within the Lace Market, and a 
general willingness of Lace Market firms to work with local 
public and public/private institutions (Section III and 
chapter 6), scope exists for local initiatives which can 
strengthen this nascent fashion system and expand its customer 
base, especially through export promotion; leading ultimately 
to the increase of the boundedness of the system.
III. LOCAL INSTITUTIONS AND INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS IN 
NOTTINGHAM
The first half of this section assesses the institutional 
capacity of the private sector in Nottingham including 
employers associations, trade unions, public/private 
organizations and education and training institutions (public 
actors were discussed in section I). The second half then 
looks at the results of SNA, to assess the strength and 
thickness of institutional networks in Nottingham.
Ill—A. AN INSTITUTIONAL MAP OF NOTTINGHAM
The Nottingham economic development environment is comprised 
of a number of business associations: the Nottinghamshire
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Chamber of Commerce, the Confederation of British Industries 
(CBI), the Lace Market Manufacturers Association (LMMA), and 
the Knitting Industries Federation (KIF)120.
The Nottinghamshire Chamber of Commerce is one of the 
stronger Chambers in the UK121, with a membership of 2,650 
which covers approximately 65-70% of the County workforce. It 
performs two main functions— local political representation 
and business service provision. Although an important player 
in economic development generally122, it has had little 
involvement in textile strategies especially as its clothing 
and textile committee has recently disbanded123.
The Chamber's development activities are numerous and 
varied including: training (it is the largest training
provider in the county), business-education compacts to create 
links between business and education agencies to promote the 
building of necessary local skills,124 trade missions to
120 Local enterprise agencies are also players in this policy 
field.
121 UK Chambers of Commerce, which are voluntary 
organizations, tend to be weaker and more poorly resourced than 
their public-law counterparts in Italy and most other European 
countries•
122 As one respondent noted when asked who were the most 
influential actors in local initiatives: "Nottingham city, the 
County Council and the Chamber of Commerce. The rest all would 
follow from one of these areas, indirectly or directly. Without 
those three players you can't do anything locally (Interview 
34)".
123 The textile unit served as one of the mandatory wages 
councils whose main purpose was to set industrial wages. When 
these councils were abolished by the Conservative Government, 
there was no perceived need to maintain the unit.
124 Textile companies participate in such endeavours as a way 
of building up the declining local skill base.
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Europe and abroad, a Euro information centre, a BC-Net link
and, more recently, encouraging an East Midlands identity and
a promotional body for the region to encourage inward
investment. It has good working relations with the local
authorities; their collaboration and advice are trusted and
respected. Like the local authorities, the past decade has
brought important changes in the Chamber's method of
operation, especially increased involvement with the public
sector— primarily with central government departments.
It is not unusual now for me to say that we contract with 
the ODA [Overseas Development Administration], the 
European Commission, the British Council, The Department 
of Employment, the DTI and the TECs...Ten years ago that 
pretty well was unheard of. Chambers went with Central 
government on things like trade missions and that was 
probably about it.125
Although the Chamber has increased its involvement with 
public agencies, the regional office of CBI rarely 
participates in local activities. Equivalent to the UIP in 
Prato as both are local representatives of the main national 
employers association, it differs dramatically in its local 
role. The regional CBI provides a link for regional firms into 
the national policy network and acts as a national transmitter 
of business advice and information. Given its strategic 
position within national business networks, although the CBI 
is not an actual player in policy design and implementation, 
it is often consulted on important local business matters. In 
areas of information and advice, relations with local 
authorities are good. For example, when the TECs were
125 Interview 19.
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established, the CBI helped select the appropriate people to 
serve on the Board of Directors.
The next employers group, the Lace Market Manufacturers 
Association (LMMA), which represents Lace Market textile 
firms, is quite young, set up in 1989, with the assistance 
from the Nottingham City Council, when the threat from 
property speculation was at its highest.126 Leadership is 
voluntary and membership is around 35 although it started at 
55. Members dropped out when the property market collapsed and 
the speculation threat momentarily declined. Because it offers 
a collective structure to the Lace Market firms, it receives 
political support to provide the local authorities with a 
group that can genuinely voice the concerns of area firms. Not 
only does it serve as the main conduit of information between 
the Lace Market Manufacturers and the NCC, it also plays a key 
role relaying information regarding local policy and 
developments to local firms. The LMMA passes word to is 
members who then pass the word to their customers, 
subcontractors and suppliers (Crewe and Forster, 1992, p.59).
However, although the LMMA provides the firms with a 
collective association, their collective identity stems 
primarily from recognition of a common threat rather than as 
an interdependent system as evidenced by the almost halfing of 
its membership after the removal of that threat. One 
respondent noted; "We helped to set up the LMMA and held its
126 The NCC provided some indirect assistance to get the LMMA 
started by furnishing them with a list of all the manufacturers 
in the area and doing the first mail shot to get the firms 
involved.
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hand but there is no real collective action."127 When asked 
what could be done at the local level, the LMMA representative 
responded "They've got to start at the top and work down. 
We've got to become more protective of our industries. We 
should not be supporting the level of imports that we've 
got.128
This attitude suggests two things. First, the firms 
identify with the textile industry generally, and not 
territorially within the Lace Market. Although they recognize 
the importance of the Lace market location for their labour 
force—  the 'one bus girls'— they do not recognize the 
importance of proximity and interdependence for their 
international competitiveness. Second, they seem to perceive 
their relationship with local government as a way of 
influencing national government rather than as an end in 
itself. When asked about the value of local initiatives, the 
response was, "Its hard to identify any of these initiatives 
and say yes there has been anything that's helped us....Our 
biggest threat is simply foreign imports. We can't compete 
with the labour rates."129 These are not the types of 
activities that can be pursued locally. Nevertheless, a 
dialogue has been created between the local firms and the 
public authorities, and a general degree of consensus has been 
established for public involvement in the industry, albeit in 
a vague and undefined manner.
127 Interview 27.
128 Interview 32.
129 Interview 32.
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The LMMA is the only sectoral actor with a purely local 
constituency. KIF, the Knitting Industry Federation, is a 
national association. Since the bulk of the knitting industry 
is located in the East Midlands, the KIF could be considered 
a regional (as opposed to local institution). Historically 
located in Nottingham, it moved to Leicester in 1992. KIF's 
remit, however, is the provision of primarily functional 
rather than territorial representation and services to their 
members. Given this national (and arguably European) 
orientation, KIF can not provide adequate institutional 
representation for the textile and clothing industry at a 
local level. One respondent discussing the industry 
associations (employers and trade associations) stated quite 
clearly, "They are small and have not been very effective. Had 
any associations, unions etc.. been at all effective, we would 
not be doing what we are doing •M130
The trade unions, which are also, at heart, nationally 
organized, have been important actors, albeit often in an 
informal manner. There is some complication identifying this 
community of actors because of numerous changes that have 
occurred in the past decade. In the early 80s, the two main 
Nottingham-based textile and clothing unions were the National 
Union of Tailors and Garment Workers (NUTWG) and the National 
Hosiery and Knitwear workers131. More recently, both these
130 Interview 24.
131 Two other unions have had a presence in Nottingham. The 
Trade Union Congress (TUC), which is the largest UK union. The 
TUC-CBI relationship is quite important nationally but has no 
regional complement. The Transport Workers and General Union has 
a dyeing and finishing branch, which was a target sector of early
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unions have amalgamated with other, larger unions. NUTWG is
now part of the general trade union, General, Municipal,
Boilermakers and Allied Trade Unions (GMB) while the Knitting
and Hosiery Workers joined with the National Union of
Footwear, Leather and Allied trades to form KFAT, the National
Union of Knitwear, Footwear, and Apparel Trades, now based in
Northamptonshire•
Institutional reshuffling was not the only destabilizing
element regarding union presence; financial problems were also
present and, we must keep in mind, unions, like local
authorities, were targets of Thatcherite policies to
restructure Britain (but that is another thesis). As a result,
although union-local authority relations are quite good,
involvement in policy is primarily informal; usually through
personal contacts. The city and county maintain links with the
unions and consult them on policy decisions in this more
informal style. One respondent stressed:
Just the other day the trade union liaison officer from 
the Nottingham City Council rang me, what do you think
about  textiles. They want to borrow money and the
banks won't lend them any but we are prepared to if we 
get the OK from the Union.132
There are also a number of public/private agencies in 
Nottingham created to promote economic development; the 
Training and Enterprise Councils which are centrally-funded 
institutions and Nottingham Development Enterprise (NDE), the 
Lace Market Development Company (LMDC), and the Fashion Centre
policy initiatives.
132 Interview 26.
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(FC) which were generated locally. Except for the FC, the 
birth of the other institutions is directly attributable to 
the Conservative's policy to place, to the maximum degree, 
economic development in the hands of the private sector.
The TECs are independent legal entities set up and led by 
local employers to promote economic development through 
partnerships between the public and private sectors. The TECs 
manage all existing government sponsored training programmes 
and, consequently, require government approval for most 
funding decisions. Two/thirds of the TEC membership would be 
senior employers and the other 1/3 came from local education 
and training agencies, voluntary groups and trade unions "who 
supported the aims of the council (Marsh, 1992: p. 196,
emphasis in original)." The TECS are employer-led rather than 
tripartite again showing the Government's need to weaken the 
role of unions in industry. Nottinghamshire has two TECs, the 
North Nottinghamshire TEC and the Greater Nottingham TEC which 
were established in 1990. Although they are new and growing 
actors which are still defining their role in the local 
economy, their access to central funds and their large 
private-sector networks make them important local actors.
The other local institutions (NDE, LMDC, FC) will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 6 as institution building was 
an important component of the local textile strategy. These 
institutions were created specifically to fill in 
institutional gaps in the area of development and establish 
formal relations between the public and private sectors to 
accomplish specific development objectives. Once established,
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they became local actors in there own right.
The last group of actors which require attention are the
training providers. For the textile and clothing industry, the
TEC contracts primarily with two private Industrial Training
Organizations, KLITRA and CAPITB and some local further
education colleges to deliver training programmes. Both
started as Industrial Training Boards (ITBs), statutory bodies
made up of business and labour representatives to oversee
industrial training needs. As the ITBs, and their obligatory
funding levies, have been abolished, these agencies now
survive in the private sector. KLITRA is headquartered in
Nottingham, and CapitB has a local representative. As ITBs
these organizations were important partners in some of the
earlier textile training initiatives. As ITOs , they have not
been as involved in local activities. One observer noted:
I think its fair to say they have had their own problems 
during this period rather than getting involved in more 
partnerships. They've had to cut staff and cut costs. Its 
been more important to have individual partnerships with 
their individual companies.133
Other institutions worthy of note are the University of 
Nottingham which plays a role indirectly as part of the local 
economy and by participating on boards such as the LMDC board.
Finally, the last major player is Nottingham Trent 
University, previously the Nottingham Polytechnic. Of 
particular significance is the textiles and fashion department 
which trains designers, technologists and managers for the 
industry. It is an important local and national actor, being 
represented on NEDO (the National Economic Development
133 Interview 39.
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Organization) when NEDO was still active. Established in 1843 
as a Government design school to help the local firms compete 
against their French counterparts, this institution has 
maintained the presence of textile skills in the area and has 
been a major contributor to the growth of design within the 
local production process.
Summing up this tour of Nottingham institutions, it is 
quite plain that Nottingham suffers from institutional 
mismatch; territorial representation (the Chamber) is 
inappropriate and functional representation (KIF) looks from 
the top down. The one association that could provide both 
territorial and functional representation (the LMMA) is 
underresourced, understaffed, and unconvinced. As a result, 
the institutional capacity of business associations with 
reference to the textile industry is quite weak. In addition, 
many of the other sector associations (trade unions, ITBs) 
have undergone serious internal changes, limiting their 
resources and their potential as network partners. The 
weakness or absence of collective actors, a changing 
institutional landscape, differing perceptions of threat, all 
will seriously challenge Nottingham's ability to instigate 
collective action. We shall see in chapter 6 how it has dealt 
with these constraints.
Returning to our theoretical framework, it is clear that 
there are multiple institutions covering a wide range of 
development areas (training, business support, industrial 
relations, dialogue building) which might offer the foundation 
of institutional thickness. However, the constantly shifting
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institutional map and concurrent internal redefinitions and 
financial constraints sets limits on the degree to which many 
of these institutions can involve themselves in external 
programmes. Additionally, the institutional mismatch between 
the centrally-directed sectoral institutions and locally- 
directed development institutions indicates the absence of 
both a common industrial purpose and a shared set of 
conventions regarding the shape and legitimacy of subnational 
activity. The constant institutional change that has marked 
the local landscape undermines the ability of institutions to 
make credible long-term commitments to substantial trust-based 
relationships with other institutions as each organization is 
struggling simply to survive in the medium-term. Those good, 
trust-based relations which have developed revolve around 
local authorities; relations among the private sector actors 
are patchy and uneven. Local union-business association 
relations, for example, are practically non-existent. Let us 
look at the results of the SNA to get a picture of the nature 
of the interactions which have developed among these 
institutions.
IJJ-B. INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS
The adjacency matrix used to measure the networks included 23 
actors, the institutions discussed above as well as the key 
public bodies— the city, county, DTI, Department of Employment 
and the Department of the Environment. The density of the 
network was found to be .53, which suggests that a mixture of
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strong and loose-tied actors or only partial integration. 
Compare this to institutionally-thick Prato, whose density was 
•83, indicating a strong interregional functional network with 
loose ties in particular policy areas. The density measure 
suggests a lack of institutional thickness, indicating that if 
area resources are to be integrated in support of the 
industry, certain actors must be able to play a brokerage role 
between these various institutions.
Centralization measures (Table 4.5) demonstrate the 
degree to which a network is organized around specific 
prominent points which represent the actors with the greatest 
number of linkages and hence best placed to play that 
brokerage role. Network centralization was found to be quite 
high, 64% suggesting a strong degree of centralization around 
a small number of actors. Compare this to Prato where 
centralization was found to be 28.6% indicating widespread 
interaction among all area actors. In Nottingham, only the 
city is connected to all other actors although the county is 
a close second (it has no direct linkages to the LMMA). The 
other key actors are central government departments, the CBI, 
the Greater Nottingham TEC, the Chamber of Commerce, and of 
those involved directly in the textile industry, Nottingham 
Trent University and the Fashion Centre which is technically 
part of the NCC. In Prato, five actors were found to be 
completely connected (score of 100)— all three levels of 
subnational government and the three business associations 
indicating the potential of multiple leadership roles. In 
Nottingham, although multiple leadership roles are indicated,
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they are isolated to subnetworks and do not hold the potential 
for galvanizing the community toward a common purpose in the 
same manner as the networks found in Prato.
Table 4.5
Centrality Measurement of Exchange Networks in Nottingham 
Organization Degree of Centrality
NCC 100.00
County 95.65
Greater Nottingham TEC 84.65
Nottingham Trent University 78.57
CBI 78.57
DTI 73.33
DE 73.33
Chamber of Commerce 73.33
Fashion Centre 70.97
University of Nottingham 70.97
NDE 68.75
North Nottinghamshire TEC 66.67
KIF 64.71
CAPITB 64.71
KLITRA 64.71
LMDC 64.71
DoE 62.86
Further Education Colleges 62.86
GMB 61.11
KFAT 61.11
Enterprise Agencies (City) 59.46
TUC 56.41
LMMA 55.00
Total Network Centralization 64%
We must be careful when analyzing this centralization 
information. The centrality of the NCC indicates solely that 
it has the most linkages. Although centrality may be an 
appropriate indicator of power (as in the case of Prato), in 
this case it is not. Because central government departments do 
not have direct contact with some of the more local actors, 
especially those outside their specific policy range, they 
would not appear as central. What this data does indicate is
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that the local authorities represent the primary link between 
the highly localized groups (i.e. the LMMA and the enterprise 
agencies) with the main power structure in the area— the 
county, the government agencies, and the business 
organizations, and the key link between policy area 
subnetworks•
The brokerage role of the local authorities is quite 
evident in the multidimensional scaling (figure 4.3). Looking 
at the graph, four subgroups can be identified. The local 
authorities, the Greater Nottingham TEC and Nottingham Trent 
University are placed in the centre demonstrating their 
potential brokerage role between the various subnetworks as 
these actors possess the most linkages to all other groups. 
Unlike Prato, where the central points represented a strong 
functional network, this network centre represents only 
potential network brokers.
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Figure 4.3s Institutional Networks in Nottingham
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Second, the left half of the graph comprises the real 
community power structure and key economic development network; 
the regional government departments and the general business 
associations (the CBI, the Chamber of Commerce, and Nottingham 
Development Enterprise). These groups provide territorial 
representation and services to area businesses and have strong 
linkages amongst themselves and with the city and county. Other 
studies have shown Nottingham to have very strong economic 
development networks that centre around these groups (Bennett 
and McCoshan, 1993). Third, the right quadrant contains the 
sectoral network, the Fashion Centre, CAPITB, KLITRA, KIF and 
separated off, the trade unions. Finally, on the lower portion 
of the graph are the organizations that are responsible only for 
the Lace Market; the LMDC and the LMMA. This group is the most 
isolated from the rest, relying ontheir connections to the local 
government as their main voice into the more general networks. 
The graph also reflects the degree of centrality of each group, 
the groups most linked are central, and the groups with the 
weakest linkages, such as the LMMA, and the unions, are on the 
outer edges of the graph.
Putting the results of the SNA analysis together134, the 
data suggests several conclusions. First, there are a number of 
networks that make up the economic policy dimension: 1) a
general functional economic development network that includes
134 Structural equivalency measures, which were used in chapter 
3, were not included here because they added no new information.
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the business associations, the government agencies, and the 
local authorities; 2) a sectoral network with knitting and 
territorial subgroups; and 3) an isolated issue network centring 
directly on the institutions involved in the Lace Market. As 
shall be seen in chapter 6, the NCC created this network in 
order to increase the resources that could be brought into 
improving the Lace Market and safeguard its manufacturing base. 
Although there were many institutional actors, lack of 
interconnectivity means that thickness has not developed. 
Second, the networks tend to act in isolation from each other. 
Only the central actors (the local authorities and the Greater 
Nottingham TEC) are well placed to integrate diverse area 
resources by acting as brokers among the various institutions.
To sum up the conclusions of this chapter, the overall 
effects of Conservative policies on local government have been 
mostly negative. Local government initiative and discretion and 
have been reduced substantially as a result of the loss of 
financial and political resources. In addition, they are more 
open to the whims of market forces and less able to counter or 
ameliorate potentially detrimental effects (Gurr and King, 1987, 
pp.180-184). Hence the institutional capacity of local actors is 
overpowered by central-local relations, whereby the centre 
dictates the parameters of local action. However, the growing 
fragmentation of the institutional architecture enhances the 
last resource remaining to local authorities, their positioning 
in the centre of multiple networks, demonstrated by the SNA
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results, suggesting that they are the best placed to broker in 
and integrate these dispersed resources. If it is able to broker 
these networks, Nottingham could build some type of active 
capacity.
However, this capacity also depends on the institutional 
strength of the private sector, which we have shown to be 
questionable at best. The growing fragmentation and complexity 
of the institutional landscape, and the internal instability of 
many of the older institutions undermines their ability to make 
credible commitments over the long-term, hence hindering their 
potential as network partners in collaborative governance 
activities. Bennett and McCoshan (1993) had found that the UK 
local authorities, generally, have had difficulty promoting the 
horizontal integration of actors because the institutional 
landscape is characterized by "fragmentation; overlaps; gaps; 
complexity; and poor focusing" of networks and development 
initiatives (p. 203). The analysis so far suggests that
Nottingham conforms to this picture. Despite a weak 
institutional infrastructure, Nottingham has been actively 
involved in industrial restructuring with some measure of 
success. Chapter six will analyze in detail the support given to 
the industry over the past decade, and whether or not the local 
authorities found effective ways to build up a supportive 
institutional environment or learned how to manage without it.
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5. NETWORKS WITHOUT LEADERSHIP: TEXTILE
INITIATIVES IN PRATO (1975-1992)
INTRODUCTION
Chapter four established that the institutional structure in 
Prato had particular advantages and disadvantages for managing 
industrial restructuring. To briefly reiterate, her strengths 
are a bounded, flexible, quality-driven, and export-oriented 
economic structure which has historically been able to swiftly 
adapt to market changes, continuous governance by a political 
party which has been ideologically predisposed to pursuing 
balanced and just development, and highly developed civic 
traditions and well-established cooperative institutional 
networks among economic and political groups. All of these 
strengths are important components of a learning economy. On 
the down side, the public administration is sluggish, 
inefficient and subject to restrictive legal and financial 
constraints on policy-making, and the competition among 
economic associations can inhibit strategic economic 
management, a situation which has been exacerbated by the 
process of structural adjustment which has redistributed 
resources among local associations to the benefit of some and 
the detriment of others.
This chapter evaluates how these conditions have affected 
Prato's ability to manage structural change and guide its 
economy out of the severe crisis of the 80s. In particular, it
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will focus on how the network-based system of economic 
governance has had to adapt to new economic, political and 
social conditions emerging from structural change. In other 
words, it will assess its ability to learn.
The chapter will take the following structure. Section I 
sets the scene by looking at development initiatives in the 
1970s to identify the system of economic governance that had 
successfully managed the economy before the crisis. Section II 
looks at economic governance during the crisis years. Finally, 
section III examines the results of social network analysis to 
2draw conclusions about the importance of institutional 
networks for economic governance in Prato.
I. SETTING THE SCENE: (197 5-1982 ) 135
As elaborated in chapter 4, Prato has managed, until recently, 
to stave off decline through the development of new products 
and industrial processes. Throughout the years, a rich and 
varied range of initiatives from both the public sphere and 
from civic society have emerged to help the industry regularly 
adjust to market and technological change. The large range of 
activities and policy instruments result from, on one hand, 
the number of involved actors, and on the other hand, from the 
multiple objectives pursued (Balestri, 1990). The contribution 
of each sector (public and private) will be examined 
individually and then their attempts at collective strategies
135 This historical section relies heavily on the work of 
Balestri (1990).
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will be reviewed.
I-A. THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Much of the literature on the textile district in Prato does 
not attribute its economic dynamism to political factors but 
to its integrated social fabric, fluid class structure, 
innovative capacity, and flexibility (Camagni and Capello, 
1990). However, this overlooks the vital role played by the 
local authorities in three key areas: political mediation136, 
infrastructure and social services.
Mediating among various issue-based networks is one of 
the municipality's key contributions to economic governance. 
The city has used this mediating role to create and sustain 
the conditions which are favourable to both workers and firms 
as well as facilitate agreements among them. For example, 
Balestri (1990, pp.100-1) attributes the mediation of local 
authorities as the determining factor in the creation of 
Pratotrade, a local business consortia, because it won over 
the confusion and resistance initially offered by firms 
concerning the collective promotion of local textile products. 
Although the city has been governed by the PDS which had clear 
links to certain trade associations (CGIL, CNA), the 
municipality was able to effectively perform this role because 
it focused on pragmatic development needs rather than party 
ideology.
136 Interview 15.
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The unique feature of Prato's experience is represented 
by the fact that the sense of belonging and of 
identification with community values prevail over any 
type of political bias. The defense of local economic 
interests comes before ideological party positions; the 
local municipal administration and trade associations 
acquiesce to, in fact, the process of industrial 
development (Balestri, 1990, p.28).
The municipality's second significant contribution has 
been the provision of essential infrastructure especially in 
the area of water usage and industrial space137. One of the 
most serious problems plaguing both the industry and the 
community is the water pollution that results from industrial 
usage. When new regulations emerged in the early 80s requiring 
the purification of water before it is discharged back into 
the environment, it was obvious that very small firms would be 
unable to bear the financial burden these regulations 
required. To overcome this problem, the municipality helped to 
establish a centralized purification system which is expanding 
even today. It is co-funded by the Region, the EU, and the 
partners of the Water Project consortia (see section I-B), who 
are also involved in the overseeing of the system. As for 
industrial space, establishing well-equipped industrial zones 
(Macrolotto) was included in the city's general regulatory 
plan drawn up in the mid-7 0s (and revised on advice from UIP,
137 The city has also had several ambitious transport 
projects but their success rate is poor. Attempts to build a 
transport centre during this period to ease the transport of 
imported and exported goods is still today experiencing 
difficulties getting off the ground. Additionally, much money has 
been invested over the years to build up regional transport 
networks but these projects ran into bureaucratic difficulties. 
For example, 800 million lira was set aside to construct a 
connection between the Prato-Calenzano Highway and a densely 
populated industrial zone in southeast Prato, As a result of 
bureaucratic lapses, the money was never used (Balestri, 1990,
p. 100) .
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CNA and Confartigianato). A public-private consortia, which 
included the Municipality, the Cassa di Risparmio, UIP and the 
craft associations, was established to coordinate the transfer 
of firms to these areas138.
The provision of infrastructure illuminates the 
importance of institutional networks for economic governance. 
Since infrastructure is often jointly financed by the city and 
the region, public networks are key funding and governance 
mechanisms in this issue area. Nevertheless, although the 
financial provision is public, the projects are usually 
managed by public-private partnerships.
The final contribution of the local government has been 
the provision of social services139. At the end of the 70s, 
50% of local expenditure was allocated to social services 
which at the point was higher than the Tuscan average. The 
city provided day care, gymnasiums, swimming pools, sporting 
areas, and enhanced public transport facilities; all at very 
low costs and sometimes for free (Trigilia, 1989, p.319). A 
medical service that undertook health checks and medical 
research within the factories was also instituted. Although 
this service was funded by the municipality, it was regulated 
by an agreement between the UIP and the trade unions; again
138 Presently, one Macrolotto is up and running but there 
have been problems coordinating firm relocation given the high 
number of firms and the consistent under-resourcing of the 
consortia (Bellandi and Romagnoli, 1994).
139 Actually, Prato only fully developed this role in the 
late 70s. Trigilia (1989) hypothesizes that the attention of the 
municipality from 1951-1985 (when the population doubled) was 
focused on the urbanization process and the provision of basic 
services. During this period, some social services were provided 
by civic society (see I-B).
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evidence of public funding but joint governance of many key 
projects. As pointed out in chapter 3, the provision of social 
services has been a crucial contribution to both local 
development and social cohesion. Collective service provision, 
acting effectively as social wages, served as a crucial 
support structure to interfirm and employer/worker 
relationships. Let us now view the contributions of the 
private sector to economic governance in these early years.
3-B. THE PRIVATE SECTOR
As elaborated in chapter 3, Prato has strong civic traditions 
with historically developed habits of cooperation and rich 
networks of civic engagement which support a highly 
articulated system of local industrial relations that managed 
the local productive system successfully until the crisis. 
Relations among private sector actors is not reducible solely 
to this area of activity. Joint private sector initiatives 
have made a substantial contribution to economic development 
in three key policy areas: business support, technological
innovation, and social services.
The private sector has played a fundamental role in the 
provision of business support in two ways: through the banking 
system and by the development of a range of consortia. 
Balestri (1980, pp.105-108), a keen observer of Prato's 
development, has gone so far as to suggest that the local bank 
(Cassa di Risparmio) has been the only actor which has offered 
a kind of industrial policy to the textile area through an
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easy and abundant credit policy and a series of services to 
firms especially in the area of international trade.140
Table 5.1
Bank Investments and Deposits in selected Italian 
Municipalities (1986) in millions of lira
INVESTMENTS PER 
CAPITA
DEPOSITS PER 
CAPITA
Bergamo 24.4 25.0
Biella 21.0 24.2
Prato 18.0 16.8
Modena 13.6 15.1
Carpi 11.2 14.1
Cossato 5.4 10.6
Barletta 2.7 7.8
Italy 5.4 9.3
Source: Balestri (1990, p.107), revised.
The credit system may have been too easy. Table 5.1
demonstrates that Prato has had an exceptionally high rate of
investments per capita and actually one of the few areas in
which investments minus deposits per capita is actually
negative. Balestri (1990) noted:
The credit policy exercised by the Cassa di Risparmio was 
inspired by an unconditional faith in the capacity of the 
development of local firms and had transmitted expansive 
stimuli to the whole industrial system without following 
more severe and selective criteria in their trust
(p.106).
Thus, the bank's credit policy may have sustained many firms
140 Before the 197 0s, the adequate provision of credit was 
due in some part simply to luck. As a successful industrial 
district, Prato was considered by national banks to be a training 
ground for habituating their personnel to the particular 
situation of these districts. In the 70,s the local bank took 
over this credit-providing role (Balestri, 1990).
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that the market would have destroyed. There is disagreement 
however if this policy was more beneficial or detrimental in 
the long run. On one hand it provided vital capital for 
growth. On the other hand, it led to overexpansion and 
overproduction, ultimately leading to both a crisis in the 
local banking system and in the entire industrial system 
because of the firms' inability to pay back those loans.141 
Constrained by debts, the firms fell into competitive pricing 
policies which exacerbated the economic crisis. The banking 
crisis presents the consequences of certain aspects of thick 
institutional networks; shared common belief as to the 
infallibility of the system created a cognitive lock-in which 
hindered their ability to recognize warning signals when those 
signals undermined or threatened their collective belief 
systems.
The second main form of business support, the 
establishment of consortia, represents a highly successful 
form of business collective action to help small firms to cope 
with the problems inherent in a fragmented productive 
structure. These consortia represent the industry's search for 
innovative solutions based on horizontal, cooperative 
endeavours which do not offer advantages to single firms 
(Balestri, 1990, p.108). While these consortia are independent 
entities, most are linked to the UIP, and are located directly 
in the UIP's building complex. There are a wide range of
141 Interview 7.
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consortia142 including: l)Pratotrade which coordinates Prato
Expo, a biannual exhibition of local products; 2)Uninform 
which provides a data bank on the commercial behaviour of 
customers and includes over 14,000 Italian firms; 3)Consortium 
to promote the commercialization of special categories of 
products such as Promozione Magliera (Knitwear Promotion); and 
4)credit consortia available at the craft, merchant and 
industrial associations to ease the provision of credit to 
their members by guaranteeing 50% of a bank loan.
These consortia have offered the industry a wide 
selection of commercial and financial services. Complementing 
these consortia are the services provided directly by the 
network of associations (see chapter 3). Although the building 
of a consortium is a time-consuming experience fraught with 
difficulties, they make a fundamental contribution to network 
building and collective efforts and constitute a principle 
foundation of the learning economy. Balestri (1990) concludes:
All the consortia... have promoted opportunities for 
meetings and the exchange of ideas in a world that 
previously had been closed and jealous of its own 
experiences, and this represents a result whose 
importance is easy to undervalue but remains extremely 
positive with respect to the cultural profile (p. 111).
The second area of private sector activity was 
technological innovation. In 1972 the UIP exploiting Law 1089, 
which promoted applied research through financial means, 
fcrmed Tecnotessile (with the assistance of the Florentine
142 Given the wide range of Consortia present in Prato, it 
would take up too much time and space to discuss their specifics 
in detail. See UIP (1992).
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Chamber of Commerce and the Cassa di Risparmio) to assist the 
development of technological activity. Given the small size of 
the firms, they would be unable to develop these activities 
independently because of the prohibitive costs of research. 
The initial scope for the centre was to "guarantee the 
recuperation of productivity of textile firms (Mariani, 
1972)." Besides applied research, it would provide consultancy 
and technical advice to local firms and has expanded into 
machine quality certification and training courses for textile 
technicians. Although Tecnotessile has now became a private 
company one of the shareholders is the TEKIN consortia, which 
provides a channel for UIP capital into the institute.
Partners in Tecnotessile are not just Prato firms but come
from Biella, Lombardy and Veneto which provides a useful way
to promote technology transfer. "In the Administration 
Committee, the firm representatives exchange opinions, they 
exchange information, they exchange technologies."143 
Tecnotessile also represents an important node in both the 
Italian and European networks of research institutions. It has 
been linked to the Universities in Florence, Bologna and Pisa, 
especially their chemical and engineering sectors. It is an 
important bridge between university and industry thus a 
crucial instrument for technology transfer and local
learning.144
143 Interview 4.
144 Despite this seemingly strong position, Tecnotessile has 
three serious weaknesses: 1) its small size (10 personnel), if 
compared with analogous centres in Troyes, France (50) and 
Aachen, Germany (80); 2) the dominance of non-Prato firms; and
3) the inability of local firms to express their specific needs
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The last area of private activity is social policy. The 
Fund for Social Policy (Fondo Per Interventi in Campo Sociale) 
was established in 1974 by a committee of representatives from 
the UIP, the artisans, and the trade unions, and financed by 
the firms themselves. The Fund provides a range of social 
services including day care, transport, and health care at 
work that adds to the cohesion of the industrial district. 
More recently, it has been used to finance training courses.
Although this fund has had its difficulties firms not paying
their contribution, difficult relations among the local 
associations--it has contributed to the overall cooperative 
climate and flexibility of the productive system (Trigilia, 
1989a). It represents an important network for managing, 
albeit with difficulty, vital socioeconomic issues.
Summing up, the picture that emerges is one of criss­
crossing overlapping institutional networks and subnetworks 
pursuing various policy goals using a variety of policy 
instruments. Although I subdivided the discussion into public 
and private sector activities, these distinctions refer 
primarily to where the project initiated. Once started, it was 
not uncommon for other actors to become involved. The 
private/public distinction means very little in a governance 
system of this design. Local governance is collective 
governance, coordinated through thick institutional networks. 
However, most of the issues discussed are project-based, aimed 
at managing a particular problem or meeting a particular need. 
During this period there was only one real attempt to bring
(Balestri, 1990, pp. 104-5).
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all the actors together in a single forum to devise a 
comprehensive strategy for the textile industry. To this 
attempt we now turn.
J-C. A LOCAL FORUM: THE INTEGRATED PROJECT FOR THE TEXTILE 
INDUSTRY
Acting on a national study which recognized Prato's unique 
industrial structure, the local and regional authorities 
(including all municipalities within the textile district) in 
conjunction with the local employers and artisan associations, 
the Cassa di Risparmio, the trade unions, API, researchers and 
other key organizations formed a committee to identify 
priorities and policy areas to collectively guide the future 
of the industrial system (Balestri, 1990, Progetto Integrato 
1975). This strategy marks a conscious attempt to collectively 
govern the future direction of the industry.
A multi-dimensional plan for the district, the Integrated 
Project for the Textile Area in Prato,145 identified six 
areas for intervention: 1) professional and vocational
training; 2) research on the technological revitalization of 
the carded wool yarn sector; 3)demand and resources for 
financing; 4)studies and planning of water resources; 
5)industrial zones; and 6)transport connections especially 
those to Pisa airport and the port at Livorno. Each policy 
area would be managed by a different partnership. For example, 
the research for revitalizing the carded yarn sector was 
organized primarily through the region and UIP, water resource
145 Progetto Integrato Dell'Area Tessile Pratese
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planning was conducted through a network of public actors, and 
vocational training was governed by the whole group. Many of 
the projects discussed earlier were brought into this 
strategic framework.
Training policy was substantially aided by the European 
Union, through the European Social Fund. The Integrated 
Project coincided with the EU's Programme for a Community 
Textile Policy. Due in part to EU involvement and in part to 
the large-size of its managing partnership, the training 
projects were the most complex and articulated of the six 
(Balestri, 1990).
Despite all good intentions, this attempt at designing a 
comprehensive, collective strategy for governing the 
industrial system was a disappointment. While some positive 
results materialized such as the attainment of EIB funding for 
the Macrolotto and the establishment of crucial guidelines for 
confronting some of their most severe water problems, most of 
the projects fell short of the desired objectives (ibid.). The 
organizations involved in the vocational training project 
expressed dissatisfaction with the courses offered and more 
importantly, no long-term training framework ever emerged. 
Attempts to make space available for industry got lost in the 
slowness of the public bureaucratic machinery, the water 
problems got worse and the Research Centre never achieved its 
objectives which eventually led to its closure (ibid.). 
Perhaps the worst damage of all was legacy it left regarding 
the locality's experience with strategic initiatives. Balestri 
(1990) notes:
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The completed efforts for putting local development in 
order were unable to cope with the problems of
overlapping competences and inadequate resources; they 
encountered great difficulties finding agreements among 
the organizations involved; it all ran aground when 
confronted with the complexity of the processes of 
assuming tasks and attributing responsibilities.
In the end, the limits demonstrated by the
realization of objectives and the proper management of 
prepared instruments had sustained a sense of mistrust of 
the real possibilities of intervention. The climate of 
collegiality, of general participation in the processes 
of intervention and territorial planning was cooled and, 
within a short time, the season of horizontal committees, 
collective programmes, and faith in the guided
rationalization of the local industrial system had come 
to a close (p. 96).
Thus, the decade of the seventies was a disillusioning 
experience regarding the building of a collective strategy for 
the local economy. In the absence of such a strategy, the 
individual projects which did move forward remained partial 
and unfocused. Although the existence of the dense 
institutional networks promoted joint activities within 
particular issue areas, some type of leadership was clearly 
required which could knit together the fragmented policy 
pieces and mediate more effectively among the diverse 
interests.
The overall failure of this strategy, however, should be 
interpreted as part of the overall learning process. Gambetta 
(1988) argues convincingly, "Being wrong is an inevitable part 
of the wager, of the learning process strung between success 
and disappointment, where only if we are prepared to endure 
the latter can we hope to enjoy the former"(p .235). Although 
this experience left a bad taste in the mouths of local 
actors, they ultimately did try again, all the wiser for the 
early experience.
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This section demonstrated that economic governance in 
Prato was based on a dense web of institutional networks. 
Although these networks had trouble coordinating broad, far- 
reaching programmes, and the weakness of the public sector 
inhibited key projects, these networks did provide a range of 
business and social support services to area firms and workers 
that maintained the viability of a small firm economy. The 
next section examines how the crisis and concomitant 
structural adjustment required a similar adjustment of the 
system of local economic governance.
II. THE CRISIS YEARS: MANAGING INDUSTRIAL CHANGE (1983-92)
The 1980's mark a fundamental change in both the functioning 
of the socio-economic system and the general role of the local 
government in the economy. Like its British counterpart, the 
local authorities in Prato began to directly enter the field 
of economic development as their previous role as service 
provider was no longer considered sufficient to cope with 
increasing social and economic change.146 Unlike Nottingham, 
Prato already had an established institutional infrastructure 
and strong civic culture for collectively approaching economic 
problems. Furthermore, economic hardship generated a need for 
external resources, enhancing the role of local authorities as 
they are best able to tap into national and European funding 
opportunities. Despite the lack of success of the 70s project
146 Remember, however, that Italian local authorities have 
no direct powers in this field, thus it is still done through 
indirect means.
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in terms of direct strategizing, the cooperative climate 
remains a key resource that the local government has had at 
its disposal. The challenge then for Prato was to find the 
leadership that could effectively exploit that resource.
During this period a number of changes in the overall 
policy environment, besides the entry of the local government 
into economic development, can be charted which have altered 
the local economic governance system. First, extra-local 
actors (regional, national and European) are now becoming 
increasingly important as sources of finance and innovation. 
Second, the projects are more ambitious in scope. Since they 
represent solutions to the crisis of the economic system, they 
are aimed at changing the local culture and the organization 
of production rather than just supporting it through services. 
Third, the crisis has disadvantaged certain actors more than 
others and this has led to a redistribution of resources among 
the involved organizations which exacerbates local conflict 
and competition. Learning, however, requires the ability of 
institutions to adapt their relations as well as their support 
services to meet all changes engendered by restructuring, 
including political relationships. The effect of these changes 
will be examined in this section. On the policy side, to cope 
with the crisis a range of initiatives were developed in four 
policy areas147: technological innovation, the strengthening
147 Infrastructure, although still an important area of 
concern, has not been included because most of the projects 
during this period were a continuation of those projects begun
in the 70s the Macrolotto industrial parks, the water
purification system, and the Transport Centre. There is one new
project, the Industrial Aqueduct another venture to get Prato's
water problems under control. As infrastructure is still the one
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of SMEs, human resources, and institutional capacity building. 
Each will be examined in turn.
II-A. PROMOTING TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION
One of the earliest, largest and most ambitious projects to 
emerge in 1984 is the SPRINT consortia (Prato's System for 
Technological Innovation148) . As this project promised to 
revolutionize the local industry and its governance system, it 
is worth analyzing in great detail.149 The trials, 
tribulations and successes of the SPRINT project offer a 
prototype of the difficulties of collective policy learning 
and adaptation while in the throes of network transformation. 
The SPRINT initiative, in particular, promised to radicalize 
the local communication system on which the industrial system 
was founded; threatening both the traditional organization of 
production and the established power relations.
SPRINT was initially conceived in May 1983 between the 
UIP and ENEA, the national research agency for alternative 
energies150, as the result of a meeting, sponsored by ENEA,
area governed primarily by public sector networks (although with 
some private-public management as discussed in section I) the 
crisis has not fundamentally altered the governance structure.
148 Sistemo Prato Innovazione Tecnologica.
149 The historical part of this section borrows heavily from 
the excellent article by Scarpitti (1991b), an ENEA employee, who 
reconstructed the SPRINT experience between 1983 through 1988 in 
a comprehensive and exhaustive manner.
150 Although ENEA's initial mandate was to promote research 
on alternative energy, in the early 1980s it had decided to build 
a reputation as a national agency for innovation. Thus it 
concentrated its attention on a local system specializing in a
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between local and scientific experts on the possibility of 
promoting research on the technological revitalization of the 
textile industry in Prato through the introduction of 
information technologies on a wide scale. To animate the 
project, an association was formed that could incorporate a 
range of diverse partners. The founding partners were UIP and 
the two artisan firms.151 The first step was the instigation, 
by ENEA, of two studies on information technologies and 
technological innovation. While the studies were being 
conducted, the number of partners grew rapidly. The new 
partners included: 6 banks (including the Cassa di Risparmio 
of Prato)152 the Florentine Chamber of Commerce, STET (a 
public telecommunications company in which the State is the 
major shareholder), the city of Prato, and later, in 1986 
Fulta, the Federal Union of Textile and Clothing Workers. 
Once the studies were completed, the proposals presented to 
the governing committee were caught up in such an extensive 
political debate that the next phase did not begin until the 
end of 1985. The outcome was the promotion of two projects: 
one to set up a system wide network to connect firms and 
information providers using advanced information technologies 
and the other to promote technological innovation. Funding for 
the projects would come from Tuscany and EU programmes.
traditional industrial sector (Scarpitti, 1991b, p.164).
151 For institutional reasons, ENEA could not become a direct 
partner.
152 The others are Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Cassa di 
Risparmio di Novara, Banca Toscana, Istituto San Paolo di Torino 
and the Cassa di Risparmio di Pistoia.
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Although the region of Tuscany was not an active partner, it 
invested a good deal of money into the project with the aim of 
creating a regional telematics pole (Bevilacqua and Croce, 
1990, Bellandi and Trigilia, 1991). This suggests that 
subnational authorities (especially the region), because of 
their ability to tap into a wider range of external funding 
sources and integrate local projects into wider information 
and technology networks, are becoming key components of 
successful local initiatives, and can enhance the learning 
process by providing a wider, more diverse policy environment.
The first project on information technologies was by far 
the more ambitious of the two projects and received much 
greater attention and greater resources. This project's main 
objective was to render transparent, and therefore more 
efficient, the communication system which the studies had 
determined to be quite costly. To do this, a VIDEOTEX system, 
which relies on inexpensive terminals connected through modems 
and telephone lines, was proposed153. 300 terminals would be 
distributed to firms to link them into numerous data banks 
provided by local actors. These data banks would cover a range 
of issues including demands for and offers of work for 
subcontractors, updates on technical advancement, a home- 
banking system, financial consultancy, and administrative 
procedures required by the local government and other public 
bodies.
Despite a general consensus regarding the broad aims of
153 Because the system relied on phone lines, SIP, the 
national telephone company, had to be brought into the plan.
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SPRINT, the project was fraught with problems from the outset.
In particular, relations among the partners were politically
charged. In 1985, a technical committee, the CT, had been
created to coordinate the planning of SPRINT services. Within
this committee Reseau, a Milanese consulting firm which had
undertaken the initial project study, had the job of assigning
and coordinating work tasks and attempted to do so using
technical criteria. This approach, however, was undermined by
an unavoidable aspect of partnerships politics and the need
to divide the spoils. Scarpitti (1991b) notes:
In fact, to coordinate a CT, whose main role is the 
definition of services, is not only a technical problem, 
but also political and this was an aspect that maybe was, 
then, undervalued. The overlap of roles is, therefore, 
very high. Technical competence and politics intersect 
and collide with each other and technical instruments 
come to be used to confront political problems and vice 
versa (p.167).
This interpenetration of technical expertise and political 
bargaining substantiates the key assumptions regarding network 
theory (chapter 2); power is manifested in a form of 
persuasion that relies heavily on technical arguments.
Different relative bargaining strengths left their mark 
on the project. Greater attention was given to the data banks 
concerning subcontracting work at the expense of the others; 
evidence of the power of UIP and the struggles of the artisans 
to maintain their power base as the loss of small firms cut 
into their membership. The training aspect was almost 
completely ignored. This proved to be an important oversight 
as SPRINT ran into cultural resistance among local firms who 
could not easily understand the value in cost/benefit terms of 
what SPRINT could provide (Balestri, 1990). SIP was mainly
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concerned with setting up a national system and did not devote 
sufficient attention to the specific problems of the users in 
Prato. The phone lines kept falling in the early phases of the 
project. Additionally, the new systems were not always 
compatible with existing equipment such as printers.
By the end of 1985, the political dimension got the upper 
hand. This is evidenced by the dissolution of the CT, which 
had been designed, at least in theory, as primarily a 
technical committee, and the establishment of the CG, a 
Steering Committee, which took on a completely political 
character. Two local consultancies joined the CG. These new 
actors would take on relations with the community leaving 
Reseau with the responsibility for managing non-local 
relationships such as SIP. By 1988, despite these initial 
problems, a system, albeit not as ambitious or widespread as 
initially planned, was up and running in the experimental 
phase. By 1989, all local actors were providing a range of 
data bases. By 1990 400 terminals were distributed free among 
SMEs and artisan firms; SPRINT was established (Bevilacqua and 
Croce, 1990) .
The second project on technological innovation was 
different in many ways than the first project. It received 
markedly less resources and was project-based, focusing on 
explicit problems in specific phases of the production 
process. Like the first project, the subprojects chosen were 
determined more by political muscle than by technical measures 
(Scarpitti, 1991b, p.171). In fact some of these smaller 
projects were primarily for the benefit of craft firms,
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suggesting the bargain between the UIP and the craft firms 
with the UIP winning the bigger prize. The subprojects 
covered: 1) loom automization which benefitted the artisan
subcontractors; 2) CAD textiles to help firms create their 
sample collections which closed in 1987 because many firms did 
not use these services; 154 3 ) colour management (later
quality control) in dyeing firms which resulted in the 
creation of new dyeing methods but ironically, these were not 
taken up by firms in Prato but by a firm in Castellanza; and
4) robotization of combed yarns which created an innovative 
system but the results again were exploited by firms external 
to the district. Thus, the uptake of these projects ran into 
serious cultural barriers. In fact, the need for changes in 
the entrepreneurial culture was recognized by many 
participants as a key obstacle to successful restructuring 
which suggests that, despite successful examples of 
institutional learning, there were insufficient linkages 
between local associations and local firms that could bring 
the firms along, limiting the overall learning potential of 
the economy.
The SPRINT experience provides a wealth of information 
concerning changes in Prato's system of local economic 
governance. First, the institutional networks have expanded to 
include a wider range of regional and national actors. This 
has had both positive and negative consequences. On one hand, 
it has expanded the financial, technological, and
154 This failure was credited to cultural hostility on the 
part of the users and an inappropriate interface between users 
and providers which benefitted the providers (Scarpitti, 1991b).
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organizational resources available to the area, which subtly 
enhanced the role of local authorities within the development 
process, as they are key channels of access to these other 
resources. On the other hand, so many organizations within the 
structure considerably slowed down the decision-making process 
and increased the number of objectives which had to be met 
(Balestri, 1990). Additionally, cultural factors impeded the 
ability of Prato's firms to exploit the fruits of their own 
labours, with project results taken up by firms external to 
the district. So although Prato was successfully building up 
the institutional environment for the textile industry 
generally, its network structure seemed better developed 
politically than economically, as many local firms were not 
able to benefit from local efforts.
Second, the diversity of interests prohibited the 
development of a strategic telematics project155; resulting 
in the provision by the associations of data bases to their 
individual membership. We must recall, that restructuring 
fundamentally alters interfirm relations as well. These 
changes naturally were manifest in the bargaining relations of 
the actors. Given the uncertainty as how different categories 
of firms would be affected by the crisis, their collective 
representatives attempted to use SPRINT as a way of enhancing 
their own positions. Thus a key component of learning is to
155 For example, the industrialists opposed the total 
transference of market information because the foundation of the 
Impannatore's position in relation to the artisan subcontractors 
was his monopoly of market information (market orders, deadlines, 
future work predictions). The artisans, alternatively, wanted to 
use SPRINT to gain greater access to this information (Bevilacqua 
and Croce, 1990 ) .
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work within a bargaining framework--building policy in a way 
so that all involved benefit from the outcome.
Notwithstanding substantial problems, many participants 
believe that SPRINT was a valuable project. "It was a 
worthwhile experience that has advanced and matured the 
knowledge and the capacity that we are using."156 "In our 
opinion, the culture of diffuse firms has grown greatly 
through the SPRINT experience."157 Clearly, these 
participants stressed the learning aspect of the SPRINT 
experience. Hence, although SPRINT did not meet its initial 
objectives, it provided an important framework for learning 
and growth in a changing environment.
Recently, there has been strong indications of change and 
growth. A task force was established to work with the SMEs and 
train SPRINT users "...assisting them, and listening to their 
suggestions, they have learned many significant things to 
disseminate telematics culture in a basin of microfirms" 
(Bevilacqua and Croce, 1990). Thus, watching the fruits of 
SPRINT going to external firms, they have started to build 
links to local firms, to help them reap what the local actors 
have sown. SPRINT is also expanding. For example, SPRINT users 
can now tap into the Chamber of Commerce data banks located in 
Padua. Biella firms have become members; an action which 
represents the first collaborative project between firms in 
the two most important Italian textile zones (II Tirreno, 
Prato edition, 23 November 1989). Thus SPRINT is slowly
156 Interview 6.
157 Interview 5.
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emerging as an important link between Prato and outside 
sources of information. Despite a very slow start, SPRINT is 
taking root.
Besides SPRINT, another centre for technological 
innovation was established during this period. CESVIT (the 
Centre for the Development of Technological Research158) is 
a regional non-profit research institute targeted at enhancing 
technological innovation by promoting collaborative research 
between firms and public research centres regionally, 
nationally and European-wide. Its main objective is to support 
applied research and technology transfer to assist small and 
medium enterprises operating in sectors most hit by the 1985 
enlargement of the European Union including textiles and 
clothing. CESVIT is a regional rather than local initiative 
and thus includes a different range of actors but the city of 
Prato was founding member and associated members include 
Tecnotessile, UIP and Prato's Artisan Associations. Although 
there are direct institutional relationships with many of the 
key Prato actors, the majority of the CESVIT's research 
activities are targeted toward the electronics, mechanical and 
electromechanical sectors. However, CESVIT still represents a 
key node within regional, national and European innovation 
networks and thus the potential for the Pratese to use this 
axis is there. Significantly, the CESVIT initiative highlights 
the growing importance of the regional government to promote 
and integrate wider links to assist local initiatives. CESVIT 
allows for the creation of synergies and technology transfer
158 Centro per Lo Sviluppo della Ricerca Tecnologica.
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between industries, which would not be possible at a local 
scale.
This section examined initiatives to promote 
technological innovation. In both cases, the institutional 
networks were broader and looser than those found in the pre­
crisis years; now including many more non-local actors. 
Innovation means expanding networks; tapping into wider bodies 
of information. Prato has recognized this need and is adapting 
to meet it by expanding its institutional networks. However, 
although these new links convey new sources of finances, 
expertise, and information, they can also bring in competitor 
firms, which have thus far been more effective than the Prato 
firms at exploiting the results generated by these 
initiatives. Greater attention to changing the working culture 
within the district is clearly mandated. Let us now look at 
other policy areas to see if similar things are happening.
II-B. BUSINESS SUPPORT: STRENGTHENING SMES AND ENCOURAGING
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
A number of policies to strengthen SMEs and encourage 
structural adjustment have been pursued during this period. 
The Structural Funds continue to support loans and the 
consortia have survived and expanded. Of particular interest 
are the projects devoted specifically toward structural 
adjustment and quality control.
Until the crisis, the small size of firms and their high 
degree of flexibility and specialization have been important 
components of Prato's productive success. This has changed.
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All respondents cited excessive fragmentation as one of the 
key problems that now has to be confronted. To overcome this 
difficulty, the artisan associations, in partnership with the 
local administration, have promoted two projects that 
specifically address the problem of excessive fragmentation; 
Grantessuto and Gulliver. They are similar in objective (to 
aggregate a number of small firms), but not in design.
Grantessuto resulted from an aggregation project 
sponsored by the local economic development department as part 
of their more general strategy to promote industrial 
restructuring (Gambassi, 1991) and a similar endeavour 
promoted by Confartigianato. It was financed in two stages. 
Money was provided by the EU, the region, the Chamber of 
Commerce and the city of Prato for the formative and planning 
phase. Once established, the more regular forms of investment 
for small firms were used; in particular the Guarantee 
Cooperative provided loans and the Sabatini law offered 
support for investment in machinery. Grantessuto is a non­
profit consortium made up of 9 artisan firms159. The artisans 
remain independent but are located in a shared workspace. All 
are coordinated by and participate in the Service Centre which 
represents the single interface between these firms and the 
market. The centre provides the strategic and commercial 
direction as well as a range of shared services.
There are two advantages to this organizational structure 
and both represent fundamental contributions to the
159 While the initial project included 60 artisan firms, in 
the end only these few "had the motivation to change" (Interview 
17).
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competitiveness of these firms (Indirrizi Tessili, 1991). 
First, concentration allows for significant cost reductions. 
Previously, each firm would have to pay for their own 
warehouse or transportation expenses, now they combine these 
costs at significant savings. Second, this organization allows 
for these artisans to provide high quality goods, tailored to 
meet specific client requests at a higher level of quality 
uniformity than would be possible if each worked in separate 
work areas. Previously, large orders would be divided out 
among subcontractors resulting in different quality of work 
and different finishing times. To guarantee a common quality, 
new, homogenous looms, 7 0 in all, had to be provided for the 
artisans. Heretofore, the main problem encountered in the 
implementation of this project has primarily been a lack of 
finance.
Grantessuto was not the only experiment of this kind. 
The CNA also undertook a similar initiative in 1991, Gulliver, 
but structured it quite differently. In the Gulliver 
initiative, the artisan firms did not all relocate into a 
single shared workspace but each kept their own. Rather they 
started an external consortium that can contract with clients 
on behalf of all artisans. Similar to the service centre 
created in Grantessuto, it allows these firms to jointly make 
large contracts and then distribute the work amongst 
themselves. The existence of the consortia guarantees greater 
control over quality and time frames than would be possible in 
its absence. Although they do not have similar looms and 
equipment like Grantessuto, the consortium, since it has
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knowledge regarding the quality of the artisans and their 
equipment, can guarantee that work is distributed in 
accordance to what each artisan is capable of delivering. No 
artisan has an incentive to cheat because bad quality reflects 
on all the involved firms. Gulliver started with 10 firms and 
has grown to 30. Since the firms remain autonomous, it has 
been easier to organize them collectively than in the case of 
Grantessuto. One observer noted about Gulliver, "It is a 
rather interesting experience which could also be the route 
with which we can work to overcome the structural crisis we 
are passing through."160
Although these two projects are structured differently, 
both are managed and coordinated by a consortium of the 
involved firms which allows for them to overcome the problems 
of fragmentation in a way which benefits both the firms and 
their customers. The consortium, as a collective interface, 
must guarantee quality and each participating firm knows it 
cannot cheat or it as well as the others will lose out. These 
are true examples of overcoming market failure through 
collective action, in which local leadership provided the 
catalyst and the firms themselves ran with it and grew 
independently. The partnerships, in these cases, were small 
and very effective. Although these projects only assist 
directly the firms involved in the project, these initiatives 
represent important prototypes for others to follow. In fact, 
Grantessuto was presented first in Milan rather than Prato 
because it was believed to be of national significance.
160 I n t e r v i e w  5.
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Although the partnerships surrounding these projects were 
small, the associations used their national links as a way of 
expanding the implications of the project. The success of 
Grantessuto and Gulliver does not just bode well for Prato but 
for industrial districts and small firms generally. By 
following different routes to the same end, which are shared 
through common networks, a greater understanding of the 
problem and potential solutions is developed within the 
locality. Policy experimentation is an important component of 
learning institutions.
One theme which is shared by both these initiatives is 
the need to provide and guarantee quality products. Clear
evidence of the strategy of up-marketing and preserving their 
advantage in high quality markets. Another initiative in this 
vein which was also launched in 1991 is the Textile Quality 
Centre or CQT161. CQT is a non-profit corporation whose 
purpose is to: 1) provide training for textile experts with
regards to inspecting and certifying quality; 2) to publish 
the standards for certification and total quality techniques 
and manuals to explain their application; and 3) research into 
methods for achieving a higher degree of quality control
during the manufacturing process. It has its own laboratory 
facilities and performs quality control tests for Prato firms. 
CQT represents a clear example of how collective action once 
established creates its own momentum and creates more
collective pursuits and encourages the growth of the learning 
economy. It was not created by individual firms but by a
161 Centro Qualita' Tessile.
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number of the already established consortia including 
Pratotrade, Promozione Filati, Promozione Maglieria, 
Promarredo and the business associations (UIP, CNA, 
Confartigianato and the Industrialist Association of Pistoia). 
The financing institutions include the EU, the region of 
Tuscany, the city of Prato, and the Florentine Chamber of 
Commerce; underscoring the growing importance of subnational 
authorities as key channels for external resources and forces 
for the integration of multiple resources which support a 
learning environment.
The partnership surrounding CQT is a wider network of all 
those involved in business support, compared to the smaller 
consortia, but it is still a smaller subnetwork than that 
which was formed to govern SPRINT. The evidence so far 
suggests that these smaller projects based on smaller 
functional partnerships that coalesce around specific issues 
are more effective. While these projects seem similar to the 
activity in the early period, they are differentiated in two 
fundamental ways. First, the partnerships have an enlarged 
mandate; they are not just about Prato's problems but concern 
industrial districts more generally which intellectually 
inserts them into wider networks and thus open to broader and 
more innovative solutions to their own troubles. Second, they 
are clearly building on earlier forms of collective action, 
thus representing a second, deeper stage of collaboration 
which relies on well-established trust relations between 
specific actors. Let us look at the next policy area, human 
resources policy, to deepen our understanding of the new
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system of economic governance emerging in Prato.
II-C. HUMAN RESOURCE POLICY
In the area of human resources, one of the major centres, 
established in the early 70s, is the Professional Training 
Centre (Centro Formazione Professionale) . Although established 
in the early years, it reaches great importance only after the 
instigation of the Structural Funds, thus it has been included 
here. The significant aspect of the partnership which 
surrounds the management of this centre is that the more 
marginalized actors, the merchant associations and API, the 
other small business association, are present in the 
management committee. Additionally, the region has legal 
competence for vocational training but Tuscany had devolved 
this competence to the province or presently in Prato to the 
Intercommunal Association, thus it rather than the city is the 
key actor.
The Centre offers training courses in two ways: through 
the centre itself or through the individual associations. Thus 
the unions, the artisans, the industrialists and the merchants 
provide home to training courses which are supported by the 
region and the EU. Human resource policy has developed 
substantially, due in no small part to the Structural 
Funds162. First, it has deepened the inclusion of these 
actors in the provision of training programs through mandatory 
participation in the management of the Centre. Second, there
162 I n t e r v i e w  12.
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is more money available to pursue these policies. Third, it 
has directly integrated the associations into training 
provision because they are themselves training providers. This 
is an important mechanism for tailoring policy to local needs, 
for overcoming the general dissatisfaction with training 
policy apparent under the Integrated project, and for
effectively dividing the spoils among network members so all 
benefit from the experience and have incentives for continuing 
to participate in collective strategies. Europe has offered 
tangible resources which has led to the development and 
consolidation of a human resource network; one which is 
discernably different from the networks which had developed 
around other policy areas. This includes all actors within the 
textile district; thus empowering actors who are marginalized
in other policy areas, providing them with some voice in
economic governance.
In fact, in the 1980s a number of new human resource 
initiatives have emerged. Such policies include the provision 
of managerial training courses (also supported by the
structural funds), experimental post-diploma training courses, 
and the institution of an international Fashion Polytechnic in 
Prato. With the smaller focus, this larger network seems to 
function quite well. The problems with training policy come 
mostly from the late arrival of finances and the difficulty 
predicting market needs when course decisions must be made a 
year in advance. However, as with the integrated project, 
while vocational training is managed on a yearly basis, there 
is no evidence that a directed, strategic vision has emerged.
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Despite the range of actors collaborating within the training 
network on a regular and formalized basis through the Centre, 
the capacity to act strategically has still not developed.
Aware of this problem, the municipality took steps to overcome
this. To this initiative we now turn.
II-D. BUILDING LEARNING INSTITUTIONS: THE CONSULTA ECONOMICA
Although the range of initiatives were broader, more
innovative and more numerous during the crisis years, Prato 
still faced the same problem of fragmented, unconnected and 
quasi-competitive policies. Although institutional networks 
were strong and growing to expand other actors, they were 
still too competitive; battling to get the best for their 
members as the SPRINT experience aptly demonstrates.
Overcoming the crisis required leadership which could 
successfully mediate the tensions between power struggles and 
the need for a collective response to the crisis; to aggregate 
all the available resources, develop a common industrial 
purpose within changing conditions, and provide the tools to 
guide it on its way.
In order to overcome this general weakness, the local 
administration promoted the Consulta Economica or Committee 
for Economic Consultation. The Consulta met sporadically in 
the early 80s, but it developed more completely in the second 
half of the decade. The Consulta brings together all social, 
economic and political actors at a common table to develop a 
common policy strategy. The Consulta is an informal gathering
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that meets according to perceived needs; thus takes on greater
significance during periods of crisis. It is difficult to
measure its actual contribution.
On one hand, it presents a strategic collective approach
to local economic management which has been usually conducted
through bilateral mediation or through network subsets. "The
Consulta does not have the power for direct action. It has
the power of orientation...; to make a common position
emerge."163 It is not about specific negotiations but
dialogue and information exchange to build up a Prato
identity. One observer noted:
It is a role in which we seek to work through dialogue 
towards convergence because aspects of bilateral 
negotiations remain among the various actors. That is we 
have bargaining relationships with the industrialists, 
and with the unions, the industrialists have with the 
unions. Inside the Consulta we seek to work towards 
convergence more than that which could divide us and it 
has been an extremely positive experience and it has 
brought us, in several periods, to present ourselves as 
a single actor to the region, also to [National] 
Ministers, and to the EC. Because at the end, the 
documents that we produce are not documents of the 
artisans or the industrialists or the unions but 
documents of the Prato textile area. And this is an 
aspect that heavily influences the capacity to get the 
attention of higher levels: of the region, of the state 
and of the European Community.164
The Consulta is also a key actor in negotiations with the 
region.165 It has been particularly important in the 
negotiations regarding the renewal of Prato's Objective 2 
status. Although the relationships amongst these various
163 Interview 9.
164 Interview 6.
165 Interview 1.
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actors have developed through both conflict and cooperation,
most agreed that during the crisis, there has been a high
degree of unity. One respondent remarked:
I do not mean to say that there are not moments of 
dialectic, of collision, but regarding the analysis of 
the situation and the proposals for leaving this 
situation, we are fairly united. This is a very important 
legacy because we believe it is one of the most relevant 
conditions for pushing the public authorities--the 
government--to enact substantial initiatives to overcome 
this difficulty. Our culture comes a bit from this
experience.166
Another emphasized:
There is a sense that we are agreed on many things also 
because we have had agreements over the years. For many 
years...we have made agreements for confronting the 
crisis; agreements that have given results.167
However, although collaboration was present before the
Consulta, it was not as developed. A relationship existed
previously but:
It was less full, less integrated, it was more
occasional, more episodic and therefore did not give 
fruit that instead, this structure, has helped us to 
realize these projects, these plans. Certainly, it is not 
a seat where all relations are exhaustive, relations move 
ahead on other planes, in a bilateral way.168
On the other hand, the Consulta tends to work well only
when there is a crisis, not when things are going
smoothly.169 "Its easier to activate when there's a
problem."170 One factor which hinders the work of the
Consulta is that:
166 Interview 5.
167 Interview 9.
168 Interview 5.
169 Interview 2.
170 Interview 8.
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Each association lives its own problems day by day, 
inside its own headquarters. There is not a mentality, a 
culture of socializing objectives and experiences in 
terms of the city.171
This observation furnishes an interesting insight into our
understanding of institutional networks. Although they supply
important mechanisms for managing conflict and coordinating
essential exchanges, their presence does not ipso facto create
a shared identify. Effective leadership could fill this
lacuna.
This suggests another element that hampers the work of 
the Consulta; the transfer of the direction of the Consulta 
from the Assessore of Economic Development to the 
Intercommunal Association. The Intercommunal Association still 
does not have either the full powers of the province or the 
full financial allotment; and "it is not considered by the 
local administration as a serious thing.,..So they have not 
pushed it much."172
"We are only waiting for the Intercommunal Association to 
move. ...Among the private actors, there is already agreement 
on these issues. What we are waiting for is the public 
[sector]."173 Collaboration among the private actors has 
emerged outside the framework provided by the Consulta. Thus 
the problems pointed out by Balestri in the early years--the
inadequacy of the public sector have not been rectified.
This criticism, however, undervalues the role of the local
171 Interview 8.
172 Interview 11.
173 Interview 11.
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authorities. The city created it, the region, by negotiating 
with them on issues of great substance, has legitimated it. 
When the province retains full powers, and gets through the 
initial teething pains of institution building, it may be able 
to provide more effective leadership than it has in the past. 
It is too easy for observers to dismiss the ambiguous role of 
the Intercommunal Association, which could only ever be an 
institution-in-waiting.
The final obstacle to the Consulta's work is the lack of 
established relations between Prato and the central 
government. Having established in 1991 a common document 
regarding ways of coping with the present economic crisis, the 
city of Prato presented it collectively to the national 
government. A complete lack of government response after the 
difficult work of determining joint goals naturally led to 
doubts regarding the usefulness of the Consulta and to a 
general demoralization of the actors. Prato's past shunning of 
building up central-local relations had come back to haunt 
them. Even when joint activities are successful, if higher 
authorities are hostile or indifferent to those activities, 
they can ultimately undermine both that particular project and 
the collective consensus which was so painstakingly developed. 
In Tuscany, however, the region's recognition of the Consulta 
through the CSF negotiations (chapter 7), has compensated 
somewhat for national indifference. However, in any case, to 
maintain a learning economy, requires that the participants 
value the dialogue for itself, not simply for the projects it 
can put together.
237
Although the Consulta remains an important forum for 
dialogue, it has been unable to supply the institutional 
leadership and coordination to the fragmentation of policy 
initiatives. "And today there is an insufficient role on the 
part of the Consulta that decides little and there is also the 
absence of an instrument that coordinates the initiatives of 
the various actors."174 The Consulta, and other attempts to 
promote collective planning, have had greater success in the 
area of culture than in building the capacity to undertake 
effective industrial policy (Balestri, 1990, p.96). The 
building up of a collaborative culture, and stimulating
dialogue is no small achievement especially as cultural change 
is the most difficult aspect of the learning process. As we 
shall see in chapter 7, certain European programmes were able 
to build on this foundation of dialogue and culture change 
provided by the Consulta, allowing Prato to maximize on
European opportunities in a way in which Nottingham, which has 
had difficulty establishing similar institutional structures, 
could not.
The final section examines the results of social network 
analysis on policy networks and makes some initial conclusions 
regarding institutional networks, learning and the challenge 
of industrial restructuring.
III. CONCLUSIONS: NETWORKS IN PRATO
An analysis of policy networks requires a different
174 I n t e r v i e w  11.
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methodology than that used to analyze general exchange 
networks. An actor by policy matrix is reconfigured into two 
independent matrices; an actor by actor matrix and a policy by 
policy matrix. We can use these two different matrices to help 
us analyze the relationship between networks and leadership in 
the policy process.
Table 5.2
Centrality Measures of Policy and Exchange Networks in Prato
ACTOR
POLICY
NETWORK
CENTRALITY
GENERAL
NETWORK
CENTRALITY
City of Prato 100.00 100.00
UIP 100.00 100.00
CNA 100.00 100.00
Confartigianato 100.00 100.00
Region of Tuscany 100.00 100.00
Chamber of Commerce (Florence) 100.00 81.25
CGIL 92.86 76.47
CISL 92.86 76.47
UIL 92.86 76.47
API 92.86 76.47
Confesercenti 86.67 76.47
Intercommunal Association 86.67 100.00
Cassa di Risparmio 81.25 76.47
University of Florence 65.00 81.25
Degree of Centralization 17.47% 28.63%
Table 5.2 compares the centrality measures of policy 
networks with those calculated from exchange relations. Some 
interesting differences are immediately obvious. The 
Intercommunal Association is much less central indicating both 
its youth and the its dearth of policy responsibilities. The 
Chamber of Commerce moves to centre stage because it is a 
principle funding provider. The University of Florence appears 
marginalized because it participates in only a few projects. 
Its centrality in general exchange networks, however,
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demonstrates its importance in the network of technology 
transfer and innovation support. The addition of the 
University to the general network is evidence of the expansion 
of networks in response to the crisis. No longer self- 
sufficient, Prato required the build up of wider, looser links 
to access important knowledge resources to enhance their 
innovative capacity. The trade unions, alternatively, are more 
central when it comes to examining policy initiatives, 
indicating significant participation in the governance of 
certain economic policy domains. Finally, API is often 
included within policy and strategic sessions even if it does 
not hold much weight within the local system.
The general conclusion which emerges from these data is 
that the learning economy hinges on dense exchange networks of 
which policy networks are only one component. Exchange 
networks outside specific policy domains are key aspects of 
governance as they shape and condition the way information is 
passed and knowledge is interpreted. The presence of multiple 
agencies which can and do play fundamental leadership roles 
(local authorities and business associations) animate policy 
and act as integrating mechanisms for both physical and 
learning resources. The ability to provide leadership in 
multiple areas and multiple networks is a source of power, and 
does influence the way policy develops and is interpreted. 
Leadership, however, is not about eliminating conflict but 
transforming it from petty squabbling to constructive 
exchange. One respondent stressed, "Development is not 
reducible to moments of participation, collaboration. Conflict
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is necessary also for stimulating, activating more advanced 
solutions."175 Thus, Tuscany's reticence to intervene when 
arguments become too parochial is at odds with its central 
position within institutional networks. At present the 
Intercommunal Association may have the territorial legitimacy 
to play this role, being the only political authority almost 
completely bounded to the local economy, but its lack of power 
and position is demonstrated clearly in its lack of policy 
involvement. This may change as the province more fully 
develops. Centrality alone within networks only indicates 
leadership potential. Action turns potential into reality.
There is evidence that the subnational authorities have 
expanded their role and are trying to build up their 
institutional capability. The region, in particular, has been 
instrumental for accessing external funds and providing 
institutions, such as CESVIT, which can stimulate innovation. 
Prato, alternatively, has created the Consulta, a clear bid to 
enhance the institutional performance of the locality for 
dealing with the economic crisis. The city, however, still has 
a few weaknesses that hinder the full development of a 
leadership role including a shortage of the entrepreneurial 
skill required to be an effective and proactive leader and the 
separation of services among levels of government and 
assessore which obstructs the development of a common 
strategy176.
The differing centrality scores again emphasize the
175 Interview 9.
176 Interview 2.
241
different but equally vital tasks that policy partnerships and
institutional networks perform for economic governance. Both
function to integrate different resources into political and
economic activity. Partnerships target specific problems,
posing specific solutions. Networks are the main conduit for
information circulation and provide the initial experience for
building up relations of trust and establishing modes of
operation and rules of the game among various participants.
Partnerships build on network relationships, enhancing and
deepening them as we saw in the business support policy
domain. Both experiences build on one another. Overlapping
memberships ensures that the knowledge and learning gleaned
from one experience can be easily transferred to and enhance
other experiences. Networks also provide ways of working
through the legacy of bad partnerships. The ill-success of the
Integrated Project may have contributed to the difficulties of
SPRINT and the Consulta, but the on-going exchange
relationships continued to encourage smaller partnerships and
alternative fora.
Finally, institutional networks integrate the voice and
experience of those who are more marginalized in the policy
process. One respondent noted:
For the large initiatives, our relationship [with the
local administration] is minimal because all the
initiatives are aimed at the traditional textile world. 
Since we would be more representative of the innovative 
character, of diversification--being this we are very 
marginal in local politics...177
However the same respondent, when asked about relationships
177 I n t e r v i e w  8.
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w i t h  the o t her local institutions, commented: "Industrial
relations in the city are fairly positive. We meet, discuss 
and obviously we also fight a little, but we could lay down 
higher objectives."178
Our understanding of these differences can be deepened by 
looking at the results of structural equivalence. Figure 5.1 
shows the block model demonstrating structural equivalence 
among the actors. The numbers in the boxes indicate the number 
of policies on which each pair of actors jointly participated. 
When the actor is paired with itself, it shows the total 
number of initiatives in which the actor took part.
Four clusters were identified. Block 1 includes the local 
leaders, those actors which participated in the largest number 
of initiatives. Block 4 represents those players outside the 
central group who have been very involved in local initiatives 
such as the trade unions and API. Block 2 and Block 3 are 
actors who are only involved in select policies domains. They 
are distinguished primarily by the absence of a policy 
relationship with each other; exchange relations may be 
present.
Looking more closely at the information contained in the 
boxes, they suggest that the most active agencies are actually 
the employers associations. The UIP participated on 11 
initiatives while the CNA and Confartigianato were involved in 
9. The city and the region, alternatively, show up prominently 
in 8 initiatives. Looking at the dyadic relationships, the 
prominence of the private sector within textile initiatives is
178 I n t e r v i e w  8.
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again revealed. There are five shared initiatives among the
Figure 5.1: Block Model of Policy Networks in Prato
C U C C C T U C C P U A C C
I I N G H U N A 0 R I P G I
OCKS T P A A A S I S N 0 L I I s
Y A M C V S F V L L
I B A F. A E I
E N R. S. N
R Y C
E
CITY 8 7 7 7 6 7 1 3 1 1 3 2 3 3
UIP 7 11 8 8 6 7 1 4 2 2 5 3 5 5
CNA 7 8 9 9 6 7 1 3 2 2 5 3 5 5
CGAAI 7 8 9 9 6 7 1 3 2 2 5 3 5 5
CHAMBER 6 6 6 6 7 6 1 3 1 1 3 2 3 3
Tuscany 7 7 7 7 6 8 1 2 2 2 4 3 4 4
Univ. F. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Cassa R. 3 4 3 3 3 2 4 2 1 2 2
Confeser. 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Province 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
UIL 3 5 5 5 3 4 2 2 2 5 3 5 5
API 2 3 3 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 3 3 3
CGIL 3 5 5 5 3 4 2 2 2 5 3 5 5
CISL 3 5 5 5 3 4 2 2 2 5 3 5 5
employers and trade associations but only three between the trade 
associations and the trade unions. Thus, leadership has come from 
the private not the public sector in Prato, which may partially 
explain their difficulty in establishing a strategic vision. The 
turf wars among the private sector actors thwarts the development 
of a coordinated, strategic overall approach to the problems of 
structural adjustment.
One caveat is required. Often, after an initiative is off 
the ground, the public sector may later support it through 
funding or mediating mechanisms. As with the public sector 
infrastructure projects, almost all projects will at some point
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rely on both public and private inputs. Since the local system 
is almost completely networked, those groups which assemble 
around particular projects may actually misrepresent the 
knowledge, advice, insights and political manoeuvring which takes 
place throughout the life of that initiative. Given the 
networking structure, lack of direct involvement does not 
preclude substantial indirect influential. As we shall see in 
Nottingham, alternatively, with only a partial network structure, 
influence requires direct policy participation.
Looking briefly at the policy types, it is obvious that 
different network subsets do emerge around particular policy 
areas. The policies can be subdivided by into network subsets 
(Table 5.3): intergovernmental, private sector,
intergovernmental/employers partnerships, and interregional 
functional networks (including all territorial actors).
Table 5.3
Local Initiatives toward the Textile Industry 
by Dominant Network in Prato
INTERGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS PRIVATE SECTOR NETWORKS
1. Water Purification
2. Aqueduct
1. Business Consortia
2. Tecnotessile
3. Social Fund
INTERGOVERNMENTAL/EMPLOYER 
ASSOCIATION PARTNERSHIPS
INTRAREGIONAL FUNCTIONAL 
NETWORKS
1. CQT
2. Gulliver/Grantessuto
3. Cesvit
1. Sprint
2 . Consulta Economica
3 . Centro Formazione
4 . Integrated Project
5. REMTEX/CSF (chapter 7)
6. Macrolotto
Intergovernmental networks have been instrumental in providing 
important infrastructure projects. Private sector networks have 
stimulated local self-help initiatives which strengthen the local
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institutional and industrial fabric. Public/private partnerships 
have emerged surrounding business support services which require 
larger resource bases or are of regional or national importance 
(in other words constitute key nodes in interregional or 
transregional networks). Finally, the largest number of 
initiatives included the whole network, and they were aimed at 
substantial strategic issues regarding the long-term governance 
of the textile industry. The presence of such an institutionally 
thick network and multiple fora for dialogue, negotiation, and 
self-definition has provided important space for the development 
of both a shared identity and common rules of the game for
dealing with common problems.
Although these policies have not always been successful, 
they have provided important templates for learning how to learn. 
The presence of multiple leadership points have encouraged a 
wide-range of policies to support industrial restructuring in 
various ways. The strength of dense intraregional functional
networks provides the arena to integrate these policies and
experiences. This central network acts as the nucleus for
learning because it is through this structure that new 
information and knowledge from subnetworks and external sources 
are interpreted and integrated into the local culture. This 
central network guarantees that policies and relationships are 
continuously renegotiated as conditions change. Its weakness is 
that the relationships still are stronger bilaterally than 
multilaterally. The local authorities, by providing important 
fora such as the Consulta Economica and the monitoring committees 
for the Structural Funds have provided multilateral fora to build
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a sense of community that is associated with the economic and 
social prosperity of Prato. If these fora have not been perfect, 
they have provided important learning tools for the district to 
work itself through the crisis; which it appears to be doing 
quite well (Financial Times, 25 October 1994, Bellandi and 
Romagnoli, 1994).
In conclusion, this chapter has stressed three factors 
which are crucial for understanding the relationship between 
networks and local capacity building. First, institutional 
networks provide vital infrastructure for managing social and 
economic change. They develop habits of cooperation among areas 
actors leading to joint projects in areas of common interest; 
even acting to preserve cooperative habits in the face of failed 
collective action. They also serve as an important channel for 
integrating actors which may be marginalized politically or 
territorially. Although multiple leadership points may encourage 
the fragmentation of initiatives, they also promote a learning 
environment because they expand the boundaries of available 
knowledge as they experiment with different types of support 
structures and expand the networks themselves beyond local 
political boundaries. Finding national, european and 
international links is becoming increasingly important for 
information transfer especially for stimulating productive 
innovation. Networks which are too closed or limited solely to 
the local community are becoming increasingly inadequate to meet 
the demands of global restructuring. However, to manage these 
growing networks first requires that presence of strong local 
networks which can integrate the growing information base and use
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that knowledge for effective policy and political learning.
These conclusions will be strengthened in chapter 8, when 
we directly compare the experiences of Prato and Nottingham.
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6. LEADERSHIP WITHOUT NETWORKS: LOCAL
INITIATIVES TOWARD THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY IN 
NOTTINGHAM (1979-1992)
INTRODUCTION
Chapter four suggested that although Nottingham had several 
important institutional resources to help guide industrial 
restructuring (highly skilled professional elite class, a 
partially bounded economy in the Lace Market, some policy 
autonomy, and a budding network structure with the city 
positioned in a key nodal point), generally the institutional 
environment has been in constant flux, with institutions 
coming, going and changing--generating instability, 
uncertainty and conflict especially between city and county, 
elected and administrative officials, and local and central 
government. Given the overall institutional weakness of the 
private sector and the growing constraints on local resources, 
key initiatives pursued by subnational authorities have been 
to strengthen the institutional infrastructure--to open a 
dialogue with the private sector, strengthen the relations 
between development actors, and create new institutions which 
could establish a foundation for the expansion of these 
relationships and the promotion of collective action within 
the private sector--hence intrinsically building up local 
thickness and learning capacity.
This chapter is subdivided into two sections 
corresponding to different phases of the evolution of
249
institutional support. In phase I, which runs from 1979-1987, 
the city provided the leadership and focal point for 
industrial assistance. In the second phase (1988-1992), the 
county has taken the main role.
I. PHASE I (1979-1987): CITY LEADERSHIP179
City initiatives during this period fall into three general 
categories; institution-building (II-A), promoting industrial 
restructuring (II-B), and service provision (II-C). The 
county's role, as we shall see, is as a secondary partner in 
some of the city's strategies. Central government offices, 
during this period, especially the early years, had been 
generally supportive. Looking at each policy area, we can 
assess the degree to which learning capacity and institutional 
support structures have developed; hence if local governance 
capacity has been promoted.
I-A. INSTITUTION-BUILDING INITIATIVES
This section will show, that once the decision was made to 
assist industrial restructuring, the principal initiatives 
focused on institution-building; trying to establish a 
dialogue between industrial actors and institutionalize that 
dialogue in organizational fora.
179 The historical account of early policy initiatives is 
based on the discussion provided by Totterdill (1989) and 
Roberts, et al. (1990).
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Irrespective of the 197 9 victory of the Conservative 
Party, the local Labour party won the Nottingham City Council 
(NCC). From 1979-1982, their economic development strategies 
were limited to the provision of factory units, service sites 
and grant schemes--fairly ordinary activity for English local 
government. In the early 1980's, influenced by the principles 
of the Urban Left (chapter 4), Nottingham's economic 
strategies were reoriented to meet four objectives: i) to
counteract economic decline and safeguard, increase if 
possible, manual industrial employment by assisting struggling 
manufacturing firms; ii) a wider ideological commitment to 
alternative economic thinking especially concerning the 
structure of the production process; iii) to challenge the new 
Right's beliefs in the supremacy of markets; and iv) to use 
these economic powers in order to meet social and 
redistributive goals180 (Lansley, et al., 1989).
To help the city develop a local economic strategy 
tailored to meet its pressing economic needs and move beyond 
the ad hoc measures of the past, in 1982 the NCC commissioned 
Trent Polytechnic (now Nottingham Trent University) to 
undertake the Nottingham local economy project, a policy-based 
research programme. The designation of Nottingham in 1979 as 
an Urban Programme Area under the Central Government's 1978 
Inner Urban Areas Act guaranteed that the finances would be 
available for pursuing any strategy which emerged from the 
project.
180 In Prato and Italy more generally, paradoxically, social 
service provision was used to meet local economic goals.
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The findings of the local economy project were used as a
foundation for the Local Labour Party's manifesto in the 1983
elections. The main points were as follows:
-Creation of a major unit to co-ordinate economic 
intervention within the City Council, accountable to a 
new Employment and Economic Development Committee;
-A sectoral approach to intervention, based on detailed 
analysis of key industries and the development of clear 
objectives for each;
-Community based employment initiatives targeted at the 
most vulnerable groups within the city's workforce;
-The creation of an arena through which the City Council, 
trade unions and the community could confront key issues 
facing the city's economy and formulate appropriate 
responses and strategies (Nottingham District Labour 
Party, 1983, Manifesto, Nottingham: Labour Party cited in 
Totterdill, 1989 p.504 and Roberts et. al. 1990 p.147).
Labour kept control of the council after the 1983 
elections and the recommendations of the Local Economy Project 
were put into action. An economic development committee 
(elected councillors) and an economic development unit 
(officers) were established and a sectoral strategy was 
launched. The project had concluded that there were many 
structural weaknesses in the textile and clothing industry and 
proposed solutions that supported small firms, encouraged 
cooperation among the enterprises, and provided collective 
services to the sector as a whole rather than selected, 
individual firms.181
181 These weaknesses include: l)the importance of SMEs to the 
industry; 2)general underinvestment; 3)poor working conditions 
and wages; 4) no introduction of new technologies into the 
production process; 5)need for increased design input and 
productive specialization; 6)need for marketing strategies and 
cooperation among producers; 7) structure of the retail sector; 
8)lack of collaboration in production; 9)inadequate training for 
both operators and managers; and 10)poor management (Roberts
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The foundation stone of the NCC strategy was to encourage 
firms to produce for more specialized, quality driven markets; 
effectively removing them from the low quality price-driven 
markets that were being lost to Asian and North African 
producers. The central proposal was the establishment of the 
Nottingham Fashion Centre which would have certain facilities 
for encouraging networks among the sector's economic actors 
(Totterdill, 1989). These included: 1) a permanent showroom to 
bring potential buyers to the area; 2) regular exhibitions 
that were aimed at giving small firms the opportunity to mix 
and mingle which would eventually encourage long-term 
collaboration among small firms; 3) a computer--based sourcing 
register that provides information on local sub-contractors' 
capabilities and supply availability; 4) a homeworkers' 
register that would match women seeking home work with 
employers that offered the minimal acceptable standard 
conditions for home employment; and 5) a long-run strategy to 
develop technical and market research facilities for use by 
local producers and to allow the Centre to offer advice on 
fashion trends. The Centre would be based on a similar 
initiative created earlier in the London borough of Hackney. 
Established in 1984, the Fashion Centre was visualized as a 
resource for the industry, to promote local designs and to 
bring people in the industry together. Totterdill (1989) 
suggests that this strategy, given its focus on small firms 
and the provision of collective services, could be considered
et.al. p. 148 citing Trent Polytechnic (1983) Nottingham Local 
Economy Study: A Report, Nottingham: Trent Polytechnic).
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a strategy toward flexible specialization; albeit an 
unconscious one.
Although the Fashion Centre would provide a range of 
services to the textile industry and encourage the 
restructuring of production by stimulating new forms of 
interfirm relations, it also represents an important 
initiative to institutionalize a network among sector and 
local actors. This network could be used to inform and adapt 
the services offered by the Centre as well as create an 
ongoing dialogue between these actors, which might present an 
important fora for learning and building new relationships in 
the area of local governance. In particular, the centre's 
advisory structure was designed to ensure the participation of 
local councillors, trade unions, employers and local experts 
(academics) in the management and direction of Centre, and 
thus indirectly on the management and direction of the 
industry.
The principle trade unions involved were the Tailor's and 
Garment Workers Union (now GMB), a representative of which had 
also been involved in the setting up of the Hackney centre, 
and the National Union of Knitwear and Hosiery Workers (now 
KFAT).182 During these early years, however, specific sector 
representation was available in Nottingham. Employers were 
represented by individual business leaders who were selected 
on the advice of the Chamber of Commerce and the academics 
came from the Polytechnic. The objective of this structure was
182 A third union, Transport and General, also shows up from 
time to time and the TUC, the largest British trade union, also 
has a regional office in Nottingham and a textile subdivision.
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to promote consensus concerning development goals and greater 
legitimacy for future local government intervention. Moreover, 
firms would have access to the Centre only if they first 
agreed to the adherence of a code of conduct which included 
such clauses as union recognition, equal opportunity, and 
certain health and safety standards.
The bulk of the funding for the establishment of the 
Fashion Centre came from the central government's Urban 
Programme. At its inception in 1984, the Fashion Centre was a 
set up as a limited company within the Lace Market that would 
be initially funded through local and central government funds 
for three years until it would be self-funding. The centre was 
also the first NCC initiative to win support from the EU, a 
grant of £19, 000 from the ESF to support some its training 
programs, after many years of unsuccessful efforts to tap into 
Community sources183 (Nottingham Arrow, Oct. 1984).
In its second year of operation, the Centre decided to 
focus its attention and resources to help firms deal with 
changing market demands and help them grab new market 
opportunities; in particular this meant providing consultancy 
and advice in areas of design, product quality, technology, 
and increasing flexibility, especially to help vulnerable 
firms who are highly dependent on orders from a small number 
of retail firms (Nottingham Arrow, January 1986). With regards 
to its other services, however, certain problems soon became
183 This suggests that areas with well-built up public- 
private networks, supported by the regional government structures 
(central or subnational), are best able to maximize European 
funding (hypothesis 4). See chapter 7 for an exploration of this 
in detail.
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evident. Buyers were not coming to the display features in 
Nottingham. The monitoring system, particularly pertaining to 
the code of conduct, had been employed in an ad hoc rather 
than thorough and consistent manner (Totterdill, 1989). As 
noted previously failure is a part of learning, thus in 
response to these shortcomings, the Fashion Centre changed 
strategies and started making visits to meet buyers in London 
and abroad.
By the end of the second year, these problems were not 
sufficiently solved and, as a result, the Fashion Centre 
underwent a number of changes. The original limited company 
was wound up and the Centre was reestablished as a local 
government department. The new centre would provide designer 
studios, managed manufacturing workspace, showroom facilities, 
and a textile and clothing library for research. Other
services include consulting and business advice, training 
partnerships with private companies, and facilitating links 
between the Centre and companies, education institutions, and 
other relevant institutions to meet the needs of local
industry. Currently, the Centre receives 60% of its finances 
from renting spaces and the city provides the other 40%.
The Fashion Centre has had its successes and failures. 
The successful work of the Centre, according to Totterdill 
(1989), stems from the transformation of its original function 
from a showroom to a networking institution that creates 
strong and regular ties with all important economic actors
involved in that industrial sector including the local
polytechnic department of fashion. The Fashion Centre has also
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developed European links as well with textile areas in 
Alicante, Dusseldorf and Amsterdam. As an institution, the 
fashion centre is still an important actor for the Nottingham 
textile industry. "Everything comes through here [the FC], all 
the textile and clothing initiatives. Nothing gets passed in 
the sector without going through the Fashion Centre. Its the 
focal point for industry assistance--for the city, the county, 
for the whole industry."184 Crewe and Forster ( 1992) 
discovered that 70% of the firms in the Lace market have used 
the Fashion Centre's facilities. Their study found that the 
centre's biggest contributions were providing, firstly, advice 
on sourcing, business contacts, and marketing advice 
especially for those firms trying to move out of older markets 
into newer, higher quality markets, and, secondly, a place for 
nurturing promising designers and new manufacturers. 
Specifically:
In many ways the Centre has established an effective 
information system which one firm felt had effectively 
replaced and remodelled the networks of past decades, 
"Old time entrepreneurs used to go to the clubs on 
Victoria Street, It was an old boy network. They also 
went to the Chamber of Commerce. The Fashion Centre has 
done a good job in replacing these, its more accessible." 
(Crewe and Forster, 1992, p.62)
Although the Fashion Centre has generated closer links 
between the subnational government agencies and the industry 
permitting more interactive policy formulation aimed at 
precise problems and greater consensus regarding development 
goals and a greater legitimacy for political intervention, the 
termination of the advisory structure meant the removal of a
184 I n t e r v i e w  22.
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tangible institution; a fora for regular dialogue and 
potentially for learning. Although it has provided clear 
benefits to the local firms in the Lace Market, recent 
attempts by the County and the DTI to build alternative 
fashion centres in the East Midlands suggests the limitations 
of such a local, limited institution. I will come back to this 
point in section III. The transformation of the Fashion Centre 
from, arguably, an industrial fora to a local government 
department underscores the institutional weakness of the 
private sector, which lacked clear identifiable collective 
territorial agents that could effectively forge an 
institutional understanding and a common purpose. The public 
sector took the leadership role, provided a structure and 
initial resources for dialogue, but the private sector did not 
respond and a local sectoral network was not established. 
Consequently, the rest of the policies pursued by the NCC 
relied primarily on public resources and public leadership.
This reliance on public resources is demonstrated in 
Nottingham's second institution building initiative--the 
creation of Local Action for Textiles and Clothing (LATC) 
which is a network of British local authorities who are active 
in helping out their local textile and clothing industry. LATC 
began informally in 1983 as a means to exchange ideas about 
building fashion centres between officers from Hackney, the 
NCC, West Midlands County Council, and the Greater London 
Council (now defunct)185. In 1985, Nottingham hosted a
185 Note the particular importance again of public networks 
for the design of centres meant to assist particular industries; 
more evidence of the private sector's institutional weakness.
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conference for all local authorities with a strong textile 
presence. This conference represented the formal creation of 
the LATC as a membership organisation. The LATC's principal 
function is information exchange through seminars, 
publications and an enquiry service and has expanded its 
lobbying functions to the national and European levels. 
Totterdill (1992) suggests that the LATC offers an 
interregional coordination role that can potentially 
counteract the fragmentation of the textile areas and the lack 
of regional structures which often serve as key industry 
advocates in other European countries. In 1992 the LATC was 
nominated by the European Union as the group responsible for 
coordinating British participation in RETEX, the European 
programme for textiles and clothing (Nottinghamshire County 
Council, 1992). Thus, it was LATC who provided the European 
Commission a general agenda for the operation of its RETEX 
programme (chapter 7) in the UK.
I-B. INITIATIVES ENCOURAGING STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT
The institution-building initiatives were part of the overall 
strategy to encourage structural change in the textile 
industry by creating an important dialogue among sector 
actors, institutionalizing that dialogue, and hence build an 
infrastructure that can encourage and then later support 
structural adjustment. Other local government policies were 
aimed at encouraging specific changes within the industrial 
structure to help the industry modernize, and concurrently,
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embed it more deeply into the local economy. Many of these 
activities did not require collective action; the public 
authorities could pursue them fairly independently. The two 
strategies under this category were the establishment of 
designer workshops and the dyeing and finishing initiative.
The first strategy aimed at strengthening and improving 
the industrial sector was the promotion of textile design 
through policies devised to add an important layer of small 
designer firms to the industrial structure. This was done by 
offering workshop units near (and later inside) the Fashion 
Centre (fashion enterprise workshops) to firms chosen through 
an interview process and by offering rent and interest relief 
to help start-up designer firms. The Fashion Enterprise 
workshops provided workshop space on a monthly rental, easy- 
in, easy-out basis, to give a boost to designers who did not 
have adequate capital to start-up independently. The rents are 
not subsidized, however, but let on market terms. The 
advantage comes from the short-term leasing arrangements, 
proximity to other firms, and the accessibility to the shared 
services and facilities of the Fashion centre. The funding for 
the loans was provided under the Urban Programme. Since the 
act stressed the need for the loans to assist firms who 
contributed to product innovation and product development, 
design firms easily met the eligibility criteria. The Crewe 
and Forster study (1992) discovered that this nurturing of 
promising new designers is considered to be an integral 
contribution to the overall economic health of the industry.
The second strategy was aimed at the restructuring of a
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specific subsector of the industry; dyeing and finishing. This 
initiative directly resulted from the general information 
networks existing during the time. The National Union of 
Hosiery and Knitwear Workers (now part of KFAT) provided the 
city with a list of textile and clothing firms believed to be 
in difficulty; many of which were dyeing and finishing firms. 
To preserve this crucial subsector, the NCC furnished an 
interest relief grant to assist the management buyout of a 
company in receivership. While this helped the firm survive, 
the action itself did nothing to address the structural
difficulties plaguing the subsector including: overcapacity, 
a decline of the overall level of orders and the run size of 
the orders given, and large price increases in essential
utilities such as energy and water. Addressing itself to these 
problems, the NCC hired two consultants to examine current 
best practices in this subsector and identify new market 
openings. Additionally, firms were encouraged to hire their
own consultants under the DTI's Business and Technical
Advisory Services Scheme. Ten firms followed this advice (DOE, 
1990a). Then the city helped these firms put together the 
finances to implement the findings of the DTI's consultancy 
using the UP's business support programme. The intention 
behind this was to help firms cut production costs by 
increasing their efficiency and to help them move into more 
sophisticated markets as a way to cope with the problem of 
overcapacity.
Although these policies did successfully strengthen the 
local industrial fabric, they were limited to assisting a few
2 6 1
important firms, and as opposed to creating enduring 
institutions which could support firms adapt to changes over 
time. The lack of a networking structure meant that city 
policies were limited to what they could with their own 
resources or with other public resources that they were able 
to gather together.
I-C. TRAINING AND BUSINESS SUPPORT
The final set of policies pursued to encourage industrial 
restructuring fall under the heading of service provision. 
This includes the provision of vocational training and 
business support.
Despite the general unemployment problems and the long­
term contraction of the industry, the textile industry faces 
important skill shortages. The sweat shop image has been a key 
disincentive to encouraging youths to view the industry as a 
potential career choice. To counter these problems, training 
initiatives, which could supply multi-skilled machinists to 
the industry, were pursued. The Clothing Operatives Training 
Scheme (COTS) was implemented in partnership with schools, to 
help improve the overall image of the industry and help 
students build potential career paths as clothing and textile 
operatives. The scheme, influenced by a similar programme run 
by the West Midlands County Council, who also collaborated in 
its development, had some early success but eventually was 
undermined by changes in the Central government's training
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programs.186
Changes in national training policies also had a direct 
effect on an important partnership set up between the NCC and 
the industrial training boards, KLITRA and CAPITB. During 
Phase I, the local authorities were key actors in delivering 
the central government's training policies and for the textile 
industry it was done through formal, financial partnerships 
with these two Industrial Training Organizations (ITOs). COTS, 
for example, was implemented through the Fashion Centre in 
partnership with CAPITB. This situation changes dramatically 
in phase II.
Finally, business support programmes, in the guise of
grants to firms, were also used to assist the industry, albeit 
indirectly. There are three types of grants which local
authorities can offer: rent relief grants, interest relief
grants and industrial improvement grants which are channelled 
to politically designated areas which included the Lace 
Market. While these funds are provided for business generally, 
priority was given to textile and clothing firms as the cases 
of design firms and dyeing and finishing firms above
demonstrate. Because the grants are part of the Urban 
programme, they require prior approval from the DOE, "Officers 
know basically what will and will not be approved."187 A 
study undertaken by the DOE (1990a) found that between 1984- 
1987, 67 firms were assisted through the Business Support
fund of which 16% later failed. Given that the UK business
186 See Marsh ( 1992 ) for an analysis of these changes.
187 Interview 23.
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failure rate is 40-45%, this is considered a great success. Of 
the 21 textile and clothing firms that were assisted and 
survived (31% of all firms assisted), employment increased 
from 344 to 517 jobs.
Almost all the funding used to pursue all three policy 
areas came from the Central Government through the Urban 
Programme. The DOE funds 75% of the programme and the local 
authorities 25%. The NCC, serving as a broker, had to build 
bridges among area actors and government funding to see its 
policies pursued. The lack of a collective organization of 
textile and clothing employers undoubtedly weakened the 
endeavours as the NCC never had direct means to network among 
areas businesses outside of going to each firm, one by one. 
One observer even suggested that it was the lack of business 
input that undermined the initial Fashion Centre strategy.188
Although there was an existing textile and clothing 
network among industrial organizations, most of the actors 
involved were not local in orientation. Furthermore, this 
policy subset was outside the mainstream economic development 
network; thus the participation of the mainstream actors, such 
as the Chamber of Commerce and the DOE, was accomplished 
through the NCC in its role as broker. The NCC, however, 
relied as much on other local governments through LATC for 
provision of information and innovative ideas as on the 
associations. "Associations provide little bits [of
188 Interview 22. However, another observer believed that the 
difficulties lay with the initial choice of director (Interview 
39) .
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information] which must be put together, 1,189 again stressing 
the brokerage role played by the local authorities.
For the restructuring and service-provision initiatives, 
the NCC played a key brokerage role between firms and funding 
providers (Government Departments and the County Council). 
Unlike the institution-building initiatives which attempted to 
create a specific textile support network, the restructuring 
and service-based initiatives were pursued primarily by the 
NCC using its position as intermediary between various actors 
to gather enough resources to successfully see through its own 
policies. Although these policies did have some degree of 
success, they did not serve to build a stronger local 
infrastructure. Thus policies to help the industry remained in 
the public sector, private sector leadership had not emerged. 
In Prato, alternatively, multiple agencies provided policy 
leadership resulting in a wider range of policies that 
provided overall institutional support for the industry,
rather than supporting the odd key firm.
During this period, the County's involvement in the 
textile industry was minimal, entering only as a silent
partner to some of the city's initiatives. The Labour Party 
took power in the County Council in 1981. Although it gave a
high priority to general economic development strategies,
their activities were focused on organizational change (the 
establishment of a new Economic Development Unit to assist a 
new Economic Development Sub-Committee) and the provision of 
more traditional economic development strategies such as land
189 I n t e r v i e w  24.
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development (Roberts, et. al. 1990). The new Labour council 
expanded into two new development activities; financial 
assistance through loans, grants and equity finance, and the 
promotion of inward investment.
During this period, the county's main assistance toward 
the industry was done as a partner to the city's initiatives. 
Since only the county has the ability to finance direct 
investment in an individual company, the city required their 
support to help the dyeing and finishing firm accomplish the 
management buyout discussed earlier. The county provided a 
loan that was linked to the city's investment relief grant. 
While this was quite a successful city/county collaboration, 
these partnership efforts occurred quite infrequently and 
cannot be seen as the norm (Totterdill, 1989, p.512).
The county's policies in this period were without 
strategic direction, and overtime, county councillors began to 
question the effectiveness of their development strategies. 
The reelection of Labour in 1985 strengthened the county's 
commitment to economic development which is illustrated by the 
promotion of Economic development from subcommittee to full 
committee status and increased development spending. The 
county also started to move toward a sector based approach to 
policy. This was accomplished with the creation of a separate 
research unit, directly funded, within the Economic 
Development Unit whose remit is to study the textile and 
clothing sector among other sectors. In the second phase, the 
county enters directly into the field industrial policy.
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II. PHASE II (1988-1992): COUNTY LEADERSHIP
During this period, the momentum is dropped by the city and 
taken up by the county. Additionally, the institutional 
landscape shifts and slides as certain actors exit or change 
and new ones enter. These changes coupled with the increasing 
financial constraints emanating from the Central Government 
have had a profound influence on the shape of the 
institutional environment and the institutional capacity of 
local authorities.
In 1987, the Conservative Party was returned to power in 
Nottingham for 18 months until they lost a 1988 bielection. 
Although the policy momentum slowed dramatically as a result, 
the Fashion Centre was left in place able to continue with its 
work (Totterdill, 1989, p.510). With the return of a Labour 
council came new attempts to revitalize the a textile 
strategy, but by now the inadequacies of the earlier policies 
coupled with central-local hostilities had begun to take their 
toll. Previously, the NCC had relied on two mechanisms to 
pursue policy--informal network linkages and UP funding. In 
this phase, Central policy changes required the authorities to 
set up formal, legalistic networks with the business sector, 
in which local authorities are no longer a majority partner.
The alterations in the NCC's policy development 
mechanisms have consequently led to a change in the types and 
scope of initiatives generated. Rather than pursuing 
strategies that assisted the industry directly, like the 
Fashion Centre and other early initiatives did, policies were
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now part of broader development schemes that included the 
industry but did not focus solely upon it. More precisely, the 
goal was no longer to encourage the growth of the local 
governance institutions which could guide industrial 
adjustment, but simply to make sure some firms survived. In 
particular, help for the industry was now translated to help 
for the Lace Market; which, as shall be seen further down, is, 
at best, a paradox, at worst an oxymoron.
As the city struggled with the increasing limitations 
emerging from Central policies, resource constraints and a 
shifting institutional landscape resulting in a minimal 
textile strategy, the better-resourced and better bounded190 
county, alternatively, becomes particularly innovative and 
active in their support of the industry. In 1989, the County 
sponsored a survey of the textile and clothing industry. The 
research identified the need to revitalize the sector because 
of its general importance to the county, especially in terms 
of job provision (chapter 4). Simultaneously, the county's 
economic development unit was being reorganized; industrial 
strategies were now to be stressed and clothing and textiles 
were to be a key target industry. A consultant was 
commissioned to produce an overview of the state of the 
industry and the possibility for the future. Notably that 
consultant once worked for the NCC and had been a key internal
190 Boundedness refers to the fact that some of the largest 
and strongest British textile firms (i.e., Cortaulds, Coats 
Viyella, Meritina) are located in the County. Policy directed at 
these firms could indeed influence the structure of the industry 
as these firms could in turn generate changes in both their 
competitors and their subcontractors.
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actor during its initial foray into textile policy and the 
creation of the Fashion Centre. The significance of this 
personnel changeover will be discussed further on. Where once 
the County was a smaller partner in the main textile 
initiatives, in this phase, the leadership roles have reversed 
and the city, although still involved, is often the smaller 
partner of the more proactive County policies.
As in phase I, we can subdivide policy initiatives into 
support services, institution-building, and industrial 
restructuring.
II-A. TRAINING AND BUSINESS SUPPORT
In Nottingham, business support services were a continuation 
of the grant programmes. As in phase I, textile firms remain 
a priority. For the 1991-92 financial year, of the 15 rent and 
interest relief grants awarded, nine or 60% were given to 
textile and clothing firms. As of April 1992 of the 92-93 
financial year, three had already gone to textile 
industries.191 Three industrial improvement grants were also 
given to textile and clothing firms in 1992-93; two of which 
were located in the Lace Market.
However, this business support programme is on its way 
out. Since the central government has replaced the UP with 
city challenge192, rent or interest grants are unavailable
191 Interview 23.
192 City Challenge has since been replaced by the Single 
Regeneration Budget.
269
from 1993. Thus the main support provided to small businesses 
in the textile and clothing industry will come from the 
Fashion Centre. Business support, which has been an important 
tool used since the beginning of the sector strategy, is now 
defunct as a result of central government funding changes.
City Challenge, which represents an economic development 
partnership between the City and County councils, NDE, Inner 
City Enterprises pic, British Rail, Boots Properties, the Lace 
Market Development Company (see below) and other private 
sector, community and voluntary organizations, does include 
some provision for the textile industry. The five-year project 
provides 37.5 million pounds to regenerate two depressed areas 
near the Lace Market through the redevelopment of industrial 
and manufacturing areas and the improvement of housing. 
Although City Challenge has multiple development objectives, 
some money was used for textile workspaces and training people 
for jobs in the textile industry. Although the Lace Market was 
excluded from the city challenge bid, the LMDC along with the 
City, the County and local developers were allowed to extend 
their operations into the challenge areas to help match the 
employment needs of people in the challenge areas with the 
textile industry's needs for factory and workshop space. The 
overall effect would be the expansion of firms into the 
challenge area which borders the Lace Market. This policy, 
while helping to provide workspaces and a labour force to the 
industry, is no longer about restructuring, governance or 
institution-building, just trying to hold on to some of the 
firms and provide jobs for some of its citizens; well-
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intentioned policy but limited in terms of the longer-run 
survival of the local industry.
General business support is also provided by the county 
which includes business and financial advice, export 
marketing, trade missions, loans, general grants, management 
advice, marketing, provision of premises, promotions and 
exhibitions, training provision, and careers advice. A fashion 
show was organized between the County and the North 
Nottinghamshire TEC. Of particular importance is the county's 
inward investment activities which brought in two real coups: 
Toray industries, a Japanese textile firm located in the north 
of the County and Dress Black, a wedding dress firm, was 
brought into the Lace Market. Another support initiative, 
which is quite pro-active but remains in the early stages, is 
the investment in a modern IT infrastructure which can be used 
to create to facilities for the textile industry. As in the 
case of Prato, the objective of providing an IT environment is 
to link up retailers with designers and subcontractors, to 
further enhance flexibility, information flows, and just-in- 
time production methods. However, where the IT project in 
Prato was a collective community effort which was arguably 
private sector led with strong public support, in 
Nottinghamshire if it emerges, it will have been stimulated 
predominately through public activity.
The County has also been active on the European stage to 
provide a greater range of services to firms. The county 
joined ACTE, a European network of textile and clothing areas 
(see chapter 7) and has been a frequent participant as well as
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sponsor of conferences on European textile and clothing 
regions. The economic development officer in charge of the 
industry at the time of the interview was negotiating with 
CITER, a renowned Italian Fashion Centre, to have the sole 
access rights to its market and fashion research and 
information. Trips abroad are made as well in the search for 
European partnerships and new markets for local products.
In the area of human resource policy, successful 
recruitment of skilled workers has consistently been of great 
concern to the industry. In response to that need, the Fashion 
Centre in partnership with the County, the TECs, and the 
Industrial Training Organizations, the FEs as well as other 
private sector organizations and firms have instituted an 
annual careers exhibition, Stitching Up Your Future, since 
1990. This policy hopes to draw attention to the training and 
career opportunities available within the local textile and 
clothing industry. Although this is a relatively innocuous 
policy, it does represent the only truly functioning local 
network concerned with an important governance issue (the 
local labour market) that has emerged around city initiatives 
that is still thriving. Paradoxically, it highlights in a 
clear, almost glaring, manner the inadequacy of the local 
institutional infrastructure.
II-B. INSTITUTION-BUILDING
To cope with the increasing infringement of the central 
authority on local financial and policy discretion, the city
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has responded by building up several formal networks to pursue 
economic development. One respondent noted: "The formal,
legalistic company structures have really been forced on us 
because of the spending restrictions."193 Within these formal 
companies, the local authorities are minority partners.
The first of these network-building institutions to be 
established was Nottingham Development Enterprise (NDE). This 
organization was established in 1987 in response to fears that 
the Central government might set up an Urban Development 
Corporation (UDC) in the city194. To avoid that possibility, 
the NDE was set up as a private company, jointly funded by the 
NCC, the County, and the private sector. The organization's 
godparents are the City, the County and the Chamber of 
Commerce. The board is made up of one city councillor, one 
county councillor, and 11 businesspeople including 
representatives from the major area firms such as Boots, 
Plessey, and British Telecom as well as the two local 
universities. The central government has also been involved. 
One of the company directors was also a regional director of 
the DTI and leader of the city action team (CAT), a central 
government sponsored inner-city initiative. In the past, the 
NDE had an arrangement that whoever chaired CAT would be a 
director of the company effectively linking this local 
development organization into centrally-generated development
193 Interview 21.
194 This was seen as a particular threat because UDCs focus 
on property development, and have the power to remove planning 
powers from local authorities, one of the key resources they have 
left for guiding economic development.
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i n s t i t u t i o n s .
The aims of the NDE are to improve the economic social 
and general environmental conditions of Nottingham by 
fostering public- private networks. "Its role is to think up 
new ideas about the social and economic structure of the city, 
work them through feasibility and then launch them."195 It 
has spun-off around 10 new network-building organizations 
including Conference Nottingham, a marketing bureau for the 
area as a conference destination, the city challenge 
partnership which bid for city challenge, and the Lace Market 
Development Company (LMDC-see below). The NDE furnishes 
linkages between the public-private sectors for general 
development purposes and then helps to match up new 
partnerships in specific policy subsectors. The success of the 
NDE suggests that regarding economic development generally, 
there does exist an effective network structure among certain 
key actors (identified in chapter 4) which includes local 
authorities, the Chamber and Government Departments; a network 
which is marked by a general absence of interest in the 
textile industry.
However, the NDE did launch the LMDC to deal with the 
Lace Market which includes the textile industry. The LMDC is 
a public constituted, private limited company set up in 1989 
of which 50% is owned by the two local authorities and 50% by 
private development companies and has an independent 
chairperson, the University Vice Chancellor. There are eight 
directors which include city and county councillors, the LMDC
195 I n t e r v i e w  38.
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chairman, the private companies and two observers, the 
regional director of the DOE and the Lace Market Manufacturers 
Association. The company is primarily an enabling company. 
The objectives of the LMDC is "to secure the overall 
regeneration of the Lace market through a partnership of the 
private and public sectors"(NCC, 1989). The LMDC was
instructed to promote development and where appropriate, to 
undertake directly the development of sites and renovation of 
buildings by encouraging private sector investment and to seek 
public grants. To achieve this goal, the organization was to 
invest in profitable development opportunities in the Lace 
Market and then reinvest the profits into non-profitable but 
necessary schemes to preserve the manufacturing base of the 
area, thus fulfilling the objectives of the overall Lace 
Market strategy. The LMDC is a crucial institution for 
carrying out the city's Lace Market development strategy 
(LMS), the NCC's principle textile initiative. This strategy 
has run into a large number of difficulties.
The Lace Market, the historic home of the textile and 
clothing industry, has long been the recipient of government 
assistance having been designated a conservation area in 1969. 
In 1973, the NCC initiated a regeneration scheme for the area 
to stem the decline and deal with the large number of derelict 
sites. In 1976, the Conservation Grant Scheme was instituted 
in partnership with the County and English Heritage. This was 
a twin-track approach to support both conservation and 
industrial improvement. In the 1980's, grant aid increased 
concurrently with the surge of the property market. Many
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buildings were refurbished and ultimately converted from 
industrial usage to office space. By the end of the 1980's, 
the increased speculation of property in the Lace Market area 
was recognized as a serious threat to the industry who could 
not afford the large rent hikes that would inevitably result 
from the increased property activity. In 1987, a study 
commissioned by the NCC from Peat, Marwick, McLintock noted 
that the Lace Market held great promise for economic 
development in the city. In 1988, the NCC in partnership with 
the NDE and the DOE hired Conran Roche to do a study of the 
Lace Market and the LMS was developed in 198 9 from the 
recommendations in that study.
The LMS recognizes that support for the textile industry
is one part of an overall strategy for the revitalization of
the area. Specifically, the three main goals of the LMS are to
transform the Lace Market into:
a 'centre of excellence' for the fashion, clothing 
and textiles industry;
a location of major new developments bringing inward 
investment to Nottingham;
a new focus for leisure and tourism (Lace Market 
Development Strategy, NCC, 1989).
The Conran Roche report suggested that the textile 
industry could not generate sufficient value in the buildings 
to adequately restore them and therefore suggested a mixed 
approach. On one hand, some office development would be 
supported and then the profits from this could be used to 
support the textile workshops; thus providing the small, 
quality-driven firms, which needed the support and held the 
most promise for the future, the security of tenure they 
required. The LMDC was created to implement the scheme because
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it is a private sector company and thus is not subject to the 
government regulations on local authority activities 
designated in the 1989 Local Government Act. Along with the 
company, the NCC also envisioned using planning powers, 
compulsory purchase powers, direct public investment in 
environmental and road improvements, and support from the DOE 
through city grants and UP funding as well as aiming for 
increased European funding all to help the area (NCC 1989). 
Notably, the major actors regarding the Lace Market included 
primarily the NCC and private developers. In order to 
guarantee that the concerns of the industry were voiced, the 
NCC helped organize the Lace Market Manufacturers Association 
(see chapter 4), which has observer status on the LMDC board. 
Finally, as in most local activities, a Central Government 
representative was in attendance.
The LMDC ran into difficulty from the start. Since the 
strategy which identified the profitable development 
opportunities was publicly issued to comply with the 1989 
Local Government Act six months before the company was formed 
and nine months before the staff was in place, most of those 
opportunities were bought up by the private sector and then 
offered to the LMDC at double the original price. Fortuitously 
(perhaps), the property market began to fall. So although the 
LMDC could not pursue the profitable office development vital 
to gain the resources to assist the industry, that fall in the 
property market also removed the threat to textile buildings, 
at least momentarily, and ideally would help bring down the 
building prices sufficiently to realize the LMS.
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The Central Government was another obstacle to the 
successful implementation of the strategy, especially in three 
areas. First, the 1987 Use Classes Order on planning 
regulations seriously weakened the planning powers the NCC 
could use in pursuance of the strategy. Under the previous 
planning law, light industry (which includes textile 
manufacture) and office use were categorized under two 
separate use classes for the use of a specific building. To 
change between them required specific planning permission from 
the local authorities thus giving those authorities the power 
to prevent the conversion of many Lace Market buildings. When 
the central government changed the use class order, they 
abolished the line between these two categories thus removing 
the need for local planning permission to undertake such 
conversion. The inability to protect buildings represents a 
major flaw in the strategy because most of the textile firms 
are in rented accommodations and thus continuously vulnerable 
to losing their workspace. The use order can only be 
circumvented by the use of Article 4 directions in the 
Planning Act which allows local authorities to remove 
permitted developments if there is exceptional justification.
The NCC did try to stop specific conversions believed to 
be vital to the strategy. However, in this case the DOE ruled 
that exceptional justification was not demonstrated and thus 
the DOE refused to confirm the NCC' s use of this directive 
which effectively negated it. The result of this decision, 
according to Planning spokesman John Lynch, "...appears to 
deprive us of one of the tools of the strategy although there
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are other means of pursuing it"(cited in Tresidder, 1991).
After the refusal, the NCC then attempted to buy the 
building using a compulsory purchase order with the intent of 
converting it into textile workspaces. This was appealed by 
the business attempting the reconversion. The appeal was 
allowed by the DOE, thus effectively stopping the strategy in 
its tracks. In addition, the NCC was ordered to pay the costs 
of the appeal process. The strategy of government to by-pass 
local authorities worked against Nottingham's interests, 
severely constrained Nottingham's development strategy, and 
cost them a pretty penny for their efforts.
The lack of support by the DOE in all conflicts that 
arose as a result of the LMS is ironic given that the strategy 
itself was an attempt to implement the findings of the Conran 
Roche study which had been funded, to a great extent, by the 
DOE. However, given the legislative changes that removed 
certain planning powers, without government support of their 
decisions, the strategy stagnated. One respondent noted that 
the DOE prevented the placement of the Lace Market into the 
City Challenge bid. Generally, the DOE disapproved of the Lace 
Market workshop conversion schemes; enough had been done and 
it was now time to let the market takeover.196 Much of 
central money now that is pumped into the Lace market supports 
tourism initiatives.
A final problem encountered was bureaucratic; within the 
NCC itself. The planning side of the Development and Planning 
Unit has been more supportive of the industry than the
196 I n t e r v i e w  27.
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development side. Additionally, the textile strategy pursued 
by the Development Department (business support, accessing 
European funding) and the Lace Market strategy (a Planning 
Department initiative) have been kept separate. At the time of 
the interviews, some respondents noted that organizational 
changes were being initiated to try to bring these elements 
together, but things were only in the early stages.
Despite these setbacks, the LMDC did try and find 
alternative routes to meet its objectives and the road it 
found was, again, formal institution-building. The LMDC was 
instrumental in forming the Lace Market Heritage Trust, a 
charitable trust, to try and bring into the Lace market funds 
that were not available to either the company as a private 
sector organization or the city as a public organization. The 
LMDC chairman is honourary secretary to the Trust. The LMDC 
also tried to establish a Lace Market Retailers association to 
provide a single voice to the area's retailers regarding the 
future of the Lace Market, but the organization did not last.
The attempt to carry out the Lace Market Strategy can be 
seen as a study in institution-building. The institutional 
spin-offs to encourage networking within policy subsets have 
been substantial--from the NDE was born the LMDC which spun 
off the Lace Market Heritage Trust and encouraged the creation 
of the LMMA. All of these organizations were created to join 
up a variety of public, private and voluntary sector actor to 
pool common resources to pursue common goals. Given the legal 
constraints on one type of structure, each organization then 
created new institutions to maximize their ability to collect
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resources. The LMDC also tried to organize the Lace Market 
Retailers to give a collective voice to that particular sector 
but was not successful.
On a more positive note, the LMMA has become a crucial 
manifestation of the shared group identity of the Lace market 
manufacturers. It is only after its creation, that we see 
local collective initiatives, albeit small ones, emerging from 
the private rather public sector. Having created a common 
identity based on the Lace Market location, these firms now 
have a shared Lace market logo that is used on letterheads and 
labels as well as a factory shop, set up by a local firm, that 
provides a shared retail outlet for all lace market 
manufacturers (Crewe and Forster, 1992).
Although the pursuance of the LMS has been a study in 
institution-building, it is also clear evidence of the decline 
of local power and the constricting hand of Central 
Authorities. The-city's early policies were quite ambitious 
and proactive, aimed at enhancing the local institutional 
architecture which could aid a painful restructuring process 
and then remain as an essential component of longer-term 
economic governance. These restrictions have forced them back 
to embracing a minimalist, reactive strategy; doing what can 
be done to assist some productive area firms (those that have 
restructured) to keep their workspace and workforce, but there 
are no longer any attempts to help them cope with the global 
changes which present the true long-term threat to their 
prosperity.
The loss of proactive loss has been compensated some what
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by the entry of the better resourced, better bounded county 
into this policy domain. The County's central initiative has 
focused particularly on industrial restructuring.
XI-C. INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING
The results of the analysis undertaken by the County's hired 
consultant on the textile and clothing industry showed that 
the methods of production currently used by companies were 
inappropriate for expansion into the export sector and thus 
fixed the industry to the UK market with its limited customer 
base and strong retail sector. To better understand how the 
county might assist the industry, a party of officers, local 
manufacturers, trade unions, NEDC (the National Economic 
Development Committee), academic representatives and training 
agents went on a learning expedition to Aschaffenburg, 
Germany, where there is a strong clothing industry and 
vocational training school. They discovered that their German 
counterparts did not invest more than Nottinghamshire firms 
and thus, with comparable resources, firms in Nottinghamshire 
could compete at a similar level to the German firms197.
The Work and Technology Programme emerged from the
197 There are a number of cultural differences between 
Germany and the UK which might hinder (but not necessarily 
undermine) Nottinghamshire initiatives. In particular, the 
Germans receive obligatory training before entry into the factory 
and the training is universal (providing broad skills) and lasts 
for two years. In the UK, training (if you can call it that) 
consists of one week sitting next to a professional, a situation 
which tends to promote a high turnover rates and work 
absenteeism; costs which are often overlooked by accounting 
techniques used to assess Taylorist work practices.
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findings of that trip. This programme would provide the 
necessary technical support to firms that wish to move from 
mass production methods of work organization to a teamworking 
framework which is better suited for higher quality good 
production. The programme is primarily funded by the County, 
the two TECs, and with some smaller contribution by the NCC 
and other district councils. Due to the uneasy political 
situation— the bickering between city and county which has
been exacerbated by the review of unitary status the NCC was
only brought in as a minor partner so that the County would 
maintain full control.
To implement the policy, a network of technical and 
training staff at Nottingham Trent University, the Fashion 
Centre, and a few further education colleges has been
established; representing a potentially important training
network. The funding partners meet every two months. Every
second meeting of this steering group would be followed by a 
wider advisory group which included trade unions, industry 
associations and participating companies. Hence, an integral 
part of this programme is institution-building, creating 
networks of local actors in pursuit of goals regarding the 
governance of industrial restructuring. The programme, 
initiated in May 1992, centres on the following objectives:
To raise awareness of new production methods through 
company visits, seminars and publication of relevant 
materials.
  To create a technical databank, based on case
studies of multi-skill approaches from clothing 
companies in several European countries and to use 
this databank to assist companies in the design and 
implementation of teamworking.
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  To develop innovative training methods appropriate
to new forms of work organisation, and to deliver 
such training through programmes designed in 
association with a range of local colleges and 
agencies (Totterdill, 1992, p.40).
Although the county would prefer to work with SMEs since 
larger firms usually have sufficient resources to help
themselves, SME participants are the hardest to recruit from
the public sector--they are highly suspicious and operate on 
the margins thus leaving few resources for change and 
innovative practices. Given these conditions, the project set 
out to gather a representative spectrum of companies in the 
pilot projects which could show by example the success of 
these practices and provide data for comparison and learning; 
to improve the policy as it moved forward. Personal
solicitation would be used to contact potential SME 
participants. Although this project is a county initiative, it 
needed to resource the initiative by expanding the 
partnerships to the TECs and may further expand it to the East 
Midlands. The EU will be approached for matching funds to add 
value to the exercise.
Clearly, the Work and Technology Project, like the
original Fashion Centre, represents an important initiative 
for the industry. First, it encourages industrial 
restructuring in terms of both modernizing firms to meet new 
competitive conditions and breaking free of the past 
restrictive retail structure by focusing firms toward export 
promotion. Second, it offers important incentives for 
institution-building and institutional learning on several
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levels: 1) among local institutions t h r o u g h  the advis o r y
committees; 2) implementing the policy through a network 
rather than a centralized support structure which increases 
opportunities for experimentation, tailorization, and 
learning; 3) integrating training into the restructuring 
process; and 4) by designing a programme to encourage 
networking among the firms themselves, fostering further 
changes in the industrial structure.
Although these have been important attempts to build a 
local institutional environment with can effectively support 
industrial change and institutional learning, the initial 
learning process took on a personal rather than institutional 
character. Knowledge, ultimately, is contained in personnel. 
In this particular instance, the County's consultant, and 
later director of the Work and Technology Programme, was one 
of the key participants in the NCC in the design of the 
Fashion Centre and quite well known in Europe; having been a 
frequent visitor to important textile centres such as CITER. 
He was able to maintain the knowledge gained from the Fashion 
Centre experience regarding the Nottingham Textile industry, 
(and the understanding of why the early policies of the NCC 
were unable to achieve similar goals), and bring that local 
knowledge directly into the policy design. Institutional 
learning must start with an appreciation of personal 
knowledge. This example is excellent proof.
We now turn to the last section to make some initial 
conclusions regarding the role of networks, learning and 
institutions in Nottingham.
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III. NETWORKS AND CONCLUSIONS
Although they remain highly competitive, the NCC and the 
County are still the central actors in the textile policy 
network. Table 6.1 compares the centralization figures for the 
general exchange networks with policy networks.
Looking at the centrality scores, only one conclusion 
emerges— no network has materialized in support of local 
industrial policy. The high total centralization score for 
exchange networks indicates that information is not shared 
among these actors but distributed through a few central 
points, notably the local authorities. The low score for 
policy networks indicates multiple but isolated policy 
networks which form around specific policies or projects; 
hence the diverse components of governance and the range of 
initiatives targeted at the industry remain unlinked and 
uncoordinated.
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Table 6.1
Centrality Measurements of Policy and Exchange Networks
In Nottingham
Organization Exchange Policy
Network Network
Centrality Centrality
NCC 100.00 50.00
County 95.65 50.00
Greater Nottingham TEC 84.65 50.00
Nottingham Trent University 78.57 50.00
CBI 78.57 5.00
DTI 73.33 45.24
DE 73.33 47.50
Chamber of Commerce 73.33 41.30
Fashion Centre 70.97 48.42
University of Nottingham 70.97 45.24
NDE 68.75 45.24
North Nottinghamshire TEC 66.67 43.18
KIF 64.71 47.50
CAPITB 64.71 45.24
KLITRA 64 .71 43.18
LMDC 64 .71 46.34
DOE 62.86 50.00
GMB 61.11 48.72
KFAT 61.11 43.18
LMMA 55.00 44.19
Total Network Centralization 64.% 11.93%
Comparing the Nottingham policy network centrality scores 
of the most central actors with those of Prato, this 
conclusion is strengthened. In Nottingham, the NCC, the 
County, the Greater Nottingham TEC, and Nottingham Trent 
University were given a score of fifty, indicating that 
interact with about half the range of actors within the policy 
process and participate in about half the initiatives. In 
Prato, the City, Region, three employers associations and the 
Chamber of Commerce all received scores of 100 in both 
exchange and policy networks meaning they are linked to all 
other principle actors and participate across policy 
initiatives. Hence, Prato possess a strong central network
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which can integrate and coordinate the various resources, 
projects, and support mechanisms, and supports a collective 
local learning process. In Nottingham, conversely, a learning 
structure regarding the local governance of the textile 
industry is only nascent at best, and depends probably too 
much on public sector leadership and information brokerage.
The conclusions are supported by the results of 
multidimensional scaling198 (figure 6.1) of policy networks. 
While the principle actors identified by the centrality 
measures do appear as the central network, no discernible 
pattern emerges concerning the placement of the other local 
institutions. Each organization participates only in the odd 
policy and thus are scattered haphazardly around the central 
actors. Within the policy areas, these groups remain unlinked 
as they do not interact. Hence, no real policy networks can be 
identified.
198 MDS was used rather than structural equivalence measures 
employed to evaluate Prato's networks because it produced more 
interpretable results. Given the higher number of institutions 
in Nottingham, the block model is exceptionally large and 
difficult to interpret.
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Figure 6.1: Policy Networks in N o t t i n g h a m
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To cope with this severe institutional weakness, both the 
city and the county concentrated on two types of policies; 
institution-building and providing services to specific firms 
or firm types (designers, dyers and finishers) which could be 
accomplished using only public resources. Table 6.2 looks at 
policies by type of network.
Table 6.2
Local Initiatives Toward the Textile Industry in Nottingham
by Dominant Network
INTERGOVERNMENTAL NETWORKS PRIVATE SECTOR NETWORKS
1. Business Support
2. Training
3. Dyeing and Finishing
4. CSF Committee (chapter 7)
1. Training
INTERGOVERNMENTAL/PRIVATE 
SECTOR PARTNERSHIPS
INTRAREGIONAL FUNCTIONAL 
NETWORKS
1. Lace Market Strategy 1. Fashion Centre
2. Work and Technology 
Project
Again, the dominance of the public sector within the policy 
process stands out. In Prato, leadership was shared between 
the public and private sector. Even when private sector 
representation is more developed in Nottingham initiatives, it 
often comes through Quangos (TECs) rather than solely private 
sector representatives or, as in the case of the Lace Market 
Strategy, through private sector actors (property development 
firms) with no linkage at all to textile production.
Given the centrality of the public sector, one potential 
policy tool they could develop is that nodality; using their 
central position as a broker between the various institutions. 
There is evidence that they have, out of necessity, been
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developing this role. One local authority respondent noted:
What we do is we know the Polytechnic has an expert in it 
and we will pay for experts at the Polytechnic to go and 
give consultancies for instance. So our role in many ways 
is a broker because that's what we're good at and capable 
of doing. . . .We do quite a lot of things and its both a 
pragmatic approach to partnerships, its a way of getting 
things done, its a recognition of local authorities were 
never all powerful even if they thought they were.... I
say its more effective you take people with you and get
them to support your policy objectives. Its much easier 
to get the thing working properly than if your trying to 
impose the local authorities own model.199
Given the lack of private sector leadership and the 
burden of increasing financial constraints, Nottingham has 
used its role as broker among various networks to try and 
encourage collective responses to industrial decline. During 
phase I, many of the policies were provided publicly rather 
than collectively and relied on informal input from various 
groups. The absence of collective representation of textile 
and clothing firms demonstrates a severe institutional 
weakness that constrains policy learning and development. The 
major lesson learned was pragmatism when dealing with central 
authorities. Since the centre maintained their hold on power 
and resources, and the local authorities were unsuccessful in 
encouraging alternative, horizontal networks, local 
authorities had to learn to work with in more constrictive, 
more central dominated structures in order to achieve at least 
a minimal textile strategy.
This policy environment (dearth of resources, growing 
central control) stunts policy learning. As resources 
declined, and no alternatives emerged from the private sector,
199 I n t e r v i e w  21.
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policy became oriented to those which could meet central 
funding criteria, which set increasingly tighter constraints 
on the types of policies which could be pursued. Thus, the 
ability to learn from problems and shortcomings of earlier 
policies to inform later policies was completely squashed as 
funding requirements drove policy design. In fact, the NCC's 
policies made a 360% turn--starting with basic policies such 
as site provision and ending with similar policies (the Lace 
Market Strategy was about site provision). The focus of policy 
moved from building institutional mechanisms to provide long­
term support for industrial growth to maintaining appropriate 
workspaces for individual firms.
The County, alternatively, with greater resources, 
including the incorporation of key personnel involved in the 
original Fashion Centre and other phase I policies, seems to 
be building a learning capacity. The early evidence suggests 
that their policies have had some success encouraging the 
internal restructuring of firms to embrace team-working 
methods of production. 200 . In terms of the character of its 
relations with its partners, the County also seems to be 
promoting an environment where trust and knowledge can 
flourish. In particular, the County is known to delegate more 
responsibility, while the city tries to keep a greater deal of 
control over joint policies. One respondent noted: "They've
[the County] got a much broader view of life. It may have 
something to do with geographicness. They don't see a need to
200 These initiatives have had a particularly good effect on 
the workforce as absenteeism, and worker turnover has 
dramatically declined (Interview 39).
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own everything. They are much readier to share."201 The
ability to share signals a greater propensity toward
institutional learning.
Although the county seems to be developing a stronger
institutional infrastructure, it is still limited. One
respondent, when asked about partnerships, replied:
They have been important but they' re have not been 
partners on a regular basis. Partners have swapped and 
changed through it. There has obviously been individual 
partnerships with individual companies. Where we have 
tried to introduce teamworking or whatever into 
individual companies. There are 7 or 8 companies that we 
have close links with.202
Hence no central network has developed nor has private 
leadership been stimulated. Thus the public institutions still 
remain the leaders of the policy process; no thicker 
institutional infrastructure has yet developed in the area of 
local industrial policy.
This chapter has outlined the policy support generated to 
encourage industrial restructuring in Nottingham. These 
conclusions will be deepened in chapter eight when a direct 
comparison is made with Prato's experiences. The next chapter 
looks at how the EU has affected the local policy environment 
and local institutional capacity.
201 Interview 38.
202 Interview 39.
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7. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND LOCAL 
INSTITUTION BUILDING
INTRODUCTION
The Single European Act and the Maastricht Treaty herald a new 
period in European Integration and an expanded interest in and 
financing of regional and local economic problems. As the EU 
has increased both its regulatory powers and its funding 
capabilities, local and regional governments have not been 
slow to organize at the European level. Through regulations, 
funding opportunities and so on, european integration is 
fundamentally altering local government's role and 
relationships with higher levels of government and other local 
political, economic and social actors because it is the main 
agency through which European programmes are channelled 
(Bennett and McCoshan, 1993).
This process of an increasing involvement in and 
orientation towards Europe in a variety of ways can be 
conceptualized as the europeanization of local government. 
This chapter explores the interaction between europeanization 
and local institution building in the field of economic 
development. Section I defines europeanization and establishes 
some techniques for measuring it. Section II reviews the 
evolution of European regional policy, which has been the
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primary instrument europeanizing local government. Section III 
looks specifically at the financing and implementation of the 
Community Support Frameworks in Prato and Nottingham and how 
it has directly affected these two localities. Finally, 
section IV looks at specific EU programmes toward the 
restructuring of the textile and clothing industry and their 
relationship to Prato and Nottingham. Sections III and IV 
examine the effect of europeanization on network-building, 
testing the hypotheses that strongly networked localities will 
better exploit European opportunities, but no matter the 
institutional starting point, europeanization should encourage 
the building and strengthening of networks and institutional 
capacity within localities.
I. DEFINING AND MEASURING EUROPEANIZATION
Europeanization refers to the increasing range of activities, 
programmes, networks and initiatives in which local government 
is involved that have a European dimension (Dineen, 1992)203. 
The increased involvement of local and regional authority in 
european-oriented activities is a function of two parallel and 
mutually reinforcing trends; the desire on the part of the EU 
to deal with subnational government and the desire on the part 
of subnational governments to deal with the EU. Subnational 
authorities' objectives for working with the EU are to enhance 
its resource base (finances, information, knowledge) in
203 Dineen was referring to the Europeanization of 
universities but his conception is quite suited to local 
government as well.
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increasingly difficult economic times, and gain influence on 
the EU policy process in order to circumvent or roll back 
central government and European policies that undermine or 
constrain local government activities. The EU, concurrently, 
also has two reasons for deepening its relationship with 
subnational government: i) subnational government can provide
the EU with necessary information concerning both policy 
objectives and the success (or lack of success) of policies 
which are already in process which can counterbalance the 
national biases inherent in the information provided by the 
national government; ii) subnational authorities can provide 
the EU with the institutional capacity it lacks to monitor and 
regulate the implementation of EU policies and regulations, 
especially in federal and regional countries when the laws, 
regulations, and decisions impinge directly on state or 
regional laws as well as national /federal laws (Goldsmith,
1993).
John (1994a) outlines four stages in the europeanization 
process204. The first stage, minimal europeanization, refers 
to local authorities who are only involved in information- 
related activities including monitoring, implementing and 
responding to EU directives and legislation, managing European 
information, and communicating this information to the 
community at large. Many local authorities have developed this 
capacity to some extent. For example, a 1992 study conducted 
in Britain found that around 60% of English and Welsh
204 I have altered somewhat the names John assigned to each 
stage, but the content remains the same.
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authorities had hired staff specializing in European issues 
(Goldsmith, 1993, p.692).
The second stage, financial europeanization, refers to 
the ability to maximize european funding and use those 
resources to assist economic development. Local authorities 
most developed in this area are often objective 1, 2 and 5b 
regions. Related to this, the third stage, local networking, 
comprises the building of strong local linkages with other 
local organizations participating in the EU. EU funds can be 
used as an effective incentive to leverage private sector 
funds to further development projects (Benington and Harvey,
1994).
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Table 7.1
Average Contribution of the Private Sector to the CSFs by 
Country 1989-1991 (in percent)
Private 
Sector %
Total Obj. 
1
Obj.
2
Obj. 
3/4
Obj. 
5b
Country
Germany 23.7 ---
3 . 0205
0.47 47.3
France 17.4 8.7 26.6 0 29.5
Italy 12.2 6.4 49.8 0 49.6
Netherlands 9.2 --- 24.3 2.7 5.3
Belgium 11.9 --- 21.6 0.13 26.2
Luxembourg 7.2 --- 0 0 21.8
UK 14.1 26.9 19.9 0 8.5
Ireland 27.7 27.7 - — --- — -
Denmark 16.6 --- 41.8 0 30.2
Greece 2.7 2.7 - — --- ---
Spain 14.8 16.1 13.0 0 14.1
Portugal 6.5 6.5 --- --- ---
EU12 13.8 13.6 21.1 0.36 25.8
Source: Author's elaboration of CEC (1992a).
Some crude indicators are available to measure the amount 
of participation of local actors in the European development 
process (table 7.1). Using the publication, The Community's 
Structural Interventions (CEC, 1992a), I created a regional 
data bank on the financing of the Structural Funds covering 
the years 1989-1991. We can operationalize local actor 
participation as the percent of private sector financial
205 Includes figures for 1989 only
298
contribution to the CSFs206. The private sector was found to 
participate financially to some extent in the majority (84.7%) 
of all regional initiatives (CEC, 1992a). Compare this with 
private sector financial participation in the Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs), the first major 
implementation of the integrated approach (see section III), 
in which private capital was only involved in 28% of the 
individual interventions (Bianchi, 1992a, p.61).
Comparing these results briefly to the data available on 
the IMPs, an important finding emerges. Private sector 
participation in EU projects has not just increased in terms 
of the number of projects in which it funds, but it has 
increased as a percentage of overall funding. The overall mean 
participation of the private sector for the IMPs was
11.7%207, compared to 13.8% in the Structural Funds. To 
strengthen this overall trend, updated figures were available 
for the Portuguese CSFs expenditure (1989-93). According to 
data from the Ministry of Planning and Territorial 
Administration (1994), private sector contributions comprised 
28% of total costs, which demonstrates an increase from the 
1989-91 period (6.5%). Thus, these data suggest, the longer a 
country's involvement with the EU funding, the greater their
206 Clearly this is inadequate for a comprehensive 
understanding of local participation in the design and 
implementation of EU policy. However, it is the only indicator 
available to compare across all European regions. Anything else 
requires in depth case study analysis.
207 The research on the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes 
conducted by the EC and the Regions Project, 1990, at the 
European University Institute, under the directorship of Dr. 
Robert Leonardi, was financed by the Commission of the European 
Communities, grant no.88-88001.
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ability to leverage in private funds. In other words, 
financial europeanization is an important step toward 
promoting networking.
Finally, the last stage is full europeanization. Local 
authorities which have reached this stage actively participate 
in transeuropean collaborative networks, projects, and 
lobbying efforts, advise the EU on implementation issues, and 
try to make their own policies more European. This represents 
a movement from reactive to proactive policy in the area of 
Europe; a clear sign of institutional capacity building. The 
numbers of regions and localities falling into this category 
are increasing but still probably remains quite small.208
Europeanization helps build local development capacity 
both directly, by providing increased resources, and 
indirectly, by promoting inter, intra, and transregional 
networks that support development efforts. The primary 
instrument which has encouraged the europeanization of the 
local authorities has been EU regional policy. Let us examine 
the evolution of this policy to see how it has stimulated 
local governments to increasingly follow the path outlined 
above.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF EUROPEAN REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICY
Over time the scope and objectives of European regional policy 
have evolved in a manner that is favourable to local and
208 At present, there is no way to test this proposition. It 
is, indeed, a fruitful direction for future research.
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regional actors. This evolution can be interpreted as
attempts to improve the adaptive capacity of regional 
economies adversely affected by processes of economic 
transformation or to increase the growth potential of 
backward economies (Cheshire, et al., 1991, p.169).
A European regional policy can be said to have been 
emerging since the 1960s. Although Italy was the only country 
of the original European Community with serious regional 
problems, the Treaty of Rome did indicate a general goal to 
reduce regional disparities209 while loans from the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) were given to underdeveloped regions and 
exceptions under competition policy were allowed in pursuit of 
regional development objectives. Additionally, the European 
Social Fund (ESF) established in 1957 and the European 
Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund established in 1964 
provided development assistance to depressed regions afflicted 
with particular industrial or agricultural problems. In 1965, 
a major report on regional problems was submitted to the 
Council of Ministers from the European Commission which was 
followed by the creation of the Directorate General for 
Regional Policy, DG XVI, in the 1967 Merger Treaty.
With the first enlargement of the EC in 1973 (to include 
Britain, Ireland, and Denmark), the political balance changed 
to the advantage of regional policy (Chesire, et al., 1991).
209 In Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome, the signatory 
countries agreed to "promote throughout the Community a 
harmonious development of economic activities, a continuous and 
balanced expansion." In the preamble of that treaty the 
commitment to regional development is much more pronounced, 
stressing the goal of "reducing the differences existing between 
the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured 
regions".
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The negotiation process for enlargement moved regional policy 
from the back burner to centre stage in terms of priorities 
especially as two of the new countries had strong reasons for 
backing such a policy. Ireland saw regional policy as a way of 
overcoming its poor, peripheral position. Britain, with a 
small highly efficient modern agrarian sector but severely hit 
by problems of deindustrialization and industrial decline, 
viewed regional policy ass l)a way to cope with 
deindustrialization which had a strong spatial dimension; and 
2) as way of counterbalancing the costs of the Common 
Agricultural policy to which Britain would be a net 
contributor.
The result of this new political balance was the creation 
of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF)210 in 1975 
which gave the EU "a financial instrument for explicit 
regional intervention.H (Croxford, etal»..1987, p.25, emphasis 
added) Although the seeds for the establishment of a regional 
policy were planted, initially, the ERDF was predominantly 
concerned with just financial transfers, primarily providing 
grants for infrastructure investments. These funds were 
allocated in accordance with national quotas whereby each 
member state received a guaranteed level of support although 
more assistance was directed to member-states with GDP per 
capita below the Community average. This system of guaranteed 
quotas put complete discretion concerning regional policy in 
the hands of the member-states; the Community was without real
210 The ERDF was set up by Council Regulation in 1975 but was 
only given a solid legal foundation in article 130C of the EEC 
treaty by the Single European Act (Lowe, 1988, pp.504-505).
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influence.
The only clearly European element to regional policy in 
these first years of the ERDF was the concept of additionality 
which was the requirement that EU funds must be additional to 
already obligated national expenditures (Cheshire, et al., 
1991 )211. These funds were not allotted to replace national 
investment but to supplement it. In addition, there were no 
instruments to coordinate the various project expenditures 
which resulted in the funding of individual, unconnected 
projects which discouraged synergetic, integrated development 
strategies (Croxford, et al., 1987). However, since the power 
to distribute funds remained rooted in the nation-state, there 
was no real incentive for local authorities to interact with 
European institutions. In other words, europeanization is a 
function of the degree to which European institutions have the 
power to allocate European funding.
Since its inception, the ERDF has undergone a number of 
reforms which have moved it toward a true regional development 
strategy (Nanetti, 1990). These reforms have had a distinct 
europeanizing influence. The first reform in 1979, established 
a non-quota section of the Fund that the Community could use 
to help alleviate regional problems that emerged as a by­
product of other community policies especial regarding 
industrial restructuring which by now had become a fundamental
211 Needless to say, the additionality clause has not always 
been observed.
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problem within many EU economies.212 The non-quota section 
had three features which differentiated it from the quota 
measures (Cheshire, et al., 1991). First, these programmes 
were multi-annual rather than yearly. Second, financial 
assistance could be provided to a broader range of initiatives 
(such as support to SMEs) than just infrastructure projects. 
Finally, the money could be allotted to areas that were not 
designated by national governments as special assistance 
areas. Thus the EU now had some discretion, although still 
minimal, in how its funds could be spent.
In 1984 a second reform of the ERDF replaced a quota 
system with indicative ranges (minimum and maximum allotments) 
for each member-state. To receive funds over the minimal 
allotment, national governments had to submit sufficient 
applications that met both the priorities and eligibility 
criteria established by the Commission. The national 
allotments comprised 88% of the development funds leaving 12% 
to be distributed, at the ERDF's discretion, to the region's 
most in need. Furthermore, the financing of individual 
projects was replaced by the 'programme approach' which also 
provided the means for the Community to monitor more closely 
the use of the funds and manage the problem of additionality. 
This reform of the structural funds signalled new ambitions on 
the part of the Community; to promote internally generated 
development rather than simply transferring funds in an ad hoc
212 The non-quota section covered areas dependent on 
declining industries including ship-building, fishing, iron and 
steel, and textiles and clothing.
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fashion.213
The programme approach has two forms: National Programmes 
of Community Interest (NPCIs) and Community Interest 
Programmes (CIPs). NPCIs are initiated by the national 
authorities within the member-states themselves. CIPs, which 
replaced the non-quota section of the ERDF, originate in the 
Commission and cover parts of more than one member state. The 
advantage of the programme approach is that it permits a more 
broadly based consultation among regional, national and 
Community authorities on regional strategies and priorities 
and offers provisions for monitoring the operations (CEC, 
1987a). A commitment between authorities (or partnership as it 
is referred to) is put on a contractual basis (the programme 
contract) where the obligations of each party are made 
explicit. The program contract, negotiated among the EC, the 
Member-State and the Region, is legally binding under 
Community Law (Nanetti, 1990). This partnership contract puts 
the region or relevant subnational authority on an equal 
contractual basis with the EU and the state in the design, 
financing, implementation and monitoring of EU regional 
policy. And it is this contract, which is one of the most 
important instruments of the europeanization of local 
government.
Between 1979 and 1987, changes within the EU framework 
were catalytic in terms of moving regional policy forward. The 
entry of Greece (1981), and Spain and Portugal (1986) had
213 The promotion of endogenous development signals a change 
in predominant model of regional development (chapter 1).
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dramatically augmented the magnitude and diversity of 
structural problems within Europe. The 1985 white paper, and 
the commitment toward the 1992 programme of full market 
liberalization demanded greater attention to problems of 
social and economic cohesion, if all regions were to exploit 
the opportunities presented by the single market. In fact, the 
Single European Act placed the goal of achieving social and 
economic cohesion directly into the treaty.214
Europeanization was further increased in the 1988 
reforms215 of the Structural Funds which led to a 
substantially increased budget (Figure 7.1) and a higher 
degree of co-ordination among the various policy instruments 
used to promote regional development (hence the new reference 
to the Structural Funds which indicates a mandatory 
coordination of the three funds). The coordination of these 
funds would be accomplished through the development of a 
single overarching development plan known as the Community
214 Article 130C of the EEC Treaty declared that the aim of 
the European Union is to "redress the principal regional 
imbalances in the Community through participating in the 
development and structural adjustment of regions whose 
development is lagging behind and in the conversion of declining 
industrial regions."
215 While these will be the last reforms discussed since the 
study stops at 1992, a number of further changes have also 
occurred. The Maastricht Treaty has inserted several new 
components that reflect a growing institutionalization of these 
ideas including the Committee of the Regions which must be 
consulted before implementing decisions relating to the ERDF and 
a special Cohesion Fund, targeted at Greece, Portugal, Spain, and 
Ireland. Additionally, the Structural Funds have been reformed 
for the 1994-1999 period which will double available finances, 
add another fund (Fisheries Guidance Instrument), reinforce the 
partnership agreement by including a wider range of social and 
economic groupings, reorganize funding eligibility to cover 
serious problem areas, and include an environmental impact 
assessment from the planning stages (CEC, 1993a).
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The Growth of the Structural Funds 
% of Total EU Expenditure, 1975-1993
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Source: CEC, 1993a. 1993 figures from 1993 budget.
Figure 7.1
Support Framework (CSF). These changes demonstrate the 
recognition of the growing political importance of the EU's 
redistributive function both as a mode of political exchange 
and as a development agency seeking to address the gap in the 
economic and social well-being of the European regions. The 
reforms also signal a fundamental transformation in the 
quality and quantity of EU policy interventions aimed at 
deepening economic integration and redressing economic and 
social disparities and thus represents a necessary complement 
to the creation of the Single European Market (Chesire, et 
al., 1991). Furthermore, the Consultative Council of Local and 
Regional Authorities was also established in 1988 which would
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be consulted on all issues dealing with regional 
development216.
Beyond just doubling and coordinating the funds available 
to make a genuine impact on regional economic development, the 
reform has given even greater discretion to the EU to identify 
priority regions and to concentrate on a limited number of 
clearly-defined goals. Five objective regions were delineated 
to be the recipients of the Community's policy.217 
Integrating the lessons learned from earlier reforms, the 
funds would be allocated on the basis of the programme 
approach, projects would be established on the basis 
partnership between various levels of government, and 
mechanisms for the monitoring and evaluation of programs and 
the dissemination of innovation and new experiences would be 
set into place (Lowe, 1988, Nanetti, 1990). By doubling the 
funds, concentrating on serious problem areas, and 
incorporating the local authorities into the policy process, 
it was believed that the EU funds could make a significant 
impact on the structural problems as well as build in adequate 
flexibility to allow policies to adapt to the specific 
problems faced by individual regions (Lowe, 1988).
The 1988 reforms gave the EU full discretionary powers to
216 The Committee of Regions established by the Maastricht 
Treaty has taken over this function.
217 These regions includes Objective 1 regions, defined as 
those regions whose regional GDP is below 75% of the Community 
average, are the less favoured regions requiring development 
assistance and structural adjustment. Objective 2 regions are 
those in industrial decline. Objective 3 regions are experiencing 
severe long-term unemployment. Objective 4 regions have problems 
with youth employment. Object 5 regions are rural and 
agricultural areas.
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select those regions which would be eligible for European 
regional assistance, which now represented substantial 
financial transfers. Therefore, the EU has become a critical 
actor in the development process. Local authority European 
activity has been in response to these reforms.
Concurrently, the regional and local authorities have 
been given a greater say in development policy and direct 
links into the Brussels bureaucracy. This has occurred through 
the programme contract which provides subnational authorities 
with some direct contact with Brussels and by a second, less 
obvious way, the politics of designating regions as eligible 
for EU funds. Chesire, et al. (1991) note that all aspects of 
this process, including the technical criteria used for 
designating objective regions, is the product of political 
horsetrading. The presence of statistical criteria plus 
optional criteria makes the decision process both highly 
political and highly complex. For example, Northern Ireland 
was designated as objective one although its GDP was 85% of 
the EU average in 1985, well above the 75% ceiling established 
by the EU (ibid.). In these cases, the local authorities often 
play an important role in this political process218.
Additionally, the CIPs, which have been growing in scope 
and number, allow these authorities to apply directly to 
Brussels for financial assistance. Since most of these 
programmes require either European partners and/or local
218 For a discussion of how problems with defining and 
measuring GDP, the chief technical criteria for designating 
objective 1 regions, resulted in the misrepresentation of the 
economic position of certain poor peripheral areas in Scotland, 
see Gaskell (1993).
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partners to make an application, the deepening of 
europeanization takes on two new features: increased ability 
to network on a transeuropean level and the need to bring more 
local private sector actors into the european regional
development process. These efforts are not solely focused on 
gaining access to established policies and financial 
assistance but in actually creating new opportunities. For 
example, the UK based Coalfields Community Campaign was 
actively involved in a European lobbying campaign which 
resulted in RECHAR, a European programme to help mining areas 
in decline. These types of lobbying efforts help to by-pass 
blockages created by national governments and/or put 
additional pressures on the national government in important 
policy areas (Benington and Harvey, 1994).
In 1991, there were 12 CIPs that came under the
discretion of the ERDF (CEC, 1991c). These include INTERREG 
which assists border regions and STRIDE which supports
research, development and innovation. There are a large number 
of other Commission initiatives which are also available to 
subnational governments. Leonardi (1995) identified 50
community initiatives aimed at stimulating development through 
network creation; most of which require european partners. 
These initiatives cover many specific areas of activity 
including assistance to small firms (BC-net which acts as a 
marriage bureau among firms to enhance collaboration), 
vocational training (NOW which focuses on training for women), 
research and development (ESPRIT for telecommunications), 
among many others. These programmes are available to a range
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of local actors; not solely local authorities. Hence these 
programmes often help europeanize local actors (universities, 
Chambers, etc.) and thus increases the potential for local 
institutional capacity building.
An additional incentive to interregional and 
transregional networks, according to Goldsmith (1993) may be 
the lack of congruence between the territorial units used by 
the EU known as NUTS (Nomenclature of Statistical Territorial 
Units) which would be those eligible for funding, and the 
actual designations within each member state. This situation 
has encouraged local authorities to work together if they are 
to be eligible for EU funding opportunities. For example, 
three counties in the Southwest region of England (Avon, 
Gloucestershire, and Wiltshire) made a successful joint bids 
for the new KONVER programme, which helps regions that are 
overly dependent on the defense industry.
Subnational governments' role has been increasingly 
institutionalized within the European Regional Policy 
framework. The local and regional level are stressed in both 
the Community Support Frameworks as well as in the myriad of 
Community programmes which specifically attempt to stimulate 
development through local and european networking activities.
Summing up thus far, we have defined europeanization and 
shown how the development of regional policy has been a key 
instrument encouraging europeanization. The next task is to 
examine our two cases to gauge the degree of europeanization 
and what influence europeanization has had on the functioning 
of institutional networks and the building or strengthening of
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their economic development capacity.
III. EUROPEAN REGIONAL POLICY AND EUROPEANIZATION IN
NOTTINGHAM AND PRATO
This section will examine both cases in relation to the four 
stages of europeanization. To begin, both cases easily fall 
into the category of minimal europeanization. Several years 
ago, Nottingham City Council set-up a European office with a 
staff of three to manage european issues. Although Nottingham 
can use the County as its interface and has done so, it often 
prefers to go it alone; setting up a separate Brussels office 
for example when the county had already established one as 
part of an East Midlands office.
In Prato, the structure is a bit different. Since Tuscany 
is a region with distinct political powers, it represents the 
main interface with the Community. The region of Tuscany is 
very European oriented (Leonardi and Nanetti, 1994). In 1983, 
a bureau of Community Policies was established within the 
regional president's office. Nanetti (1994) noted that the 
single office proved difficult to manage politically so it was 
transformed into an office whose main purpose was to 
coordinate large, multi-dimensional projects. For more 
specific areas, the corresponding department of the regional 
administration became the main instrument for managing EC 
policies. Indeed, Tuscany generally, and the Prato textile 
industry, specifically, have a long history of involvement in 
European programmes; receiving support from the non-quota 
section for textiles and the Integrated Mediterranean
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Programmes in the 1970s and 80s.
Having established that both meet the minimal 
europeanization criteria, the next step is to assess the 
degree to which the cases meet the criteria for stage two 
(financial europeanization) and stage three (networking). The 
inquiry will be carried out in two steps. First, an analysis 
will be conducted of CSF funding within the two greater 
regions— East Midlands (or Eastern England depending on the 
data) and Tuscany to measure each area's ability to maximize 
EU funding and empower private sector participation. The NUTS 
2 or regional level data is used because comparative data in 
unavailable at lower units of analysis. Step two is an in 
depth examination of how the funding was used and what the 
priorities were regarding distribution and compare this to 
what we have learned in earlier chapters about the strength of 
local networks. This analysis can suggest the degree of 
integration of European policy and programmes with more 
general policy initiatives. The more overlap, the greater the 
degree of Europeanization at the networking stage.
Both cases also seem to fall easily into the category of 
financial europeanization. Both are objective 2 areas and thus 
are in a position, at least in theory, to tap into a wide 
range of European funding. Table 7.2 shows the funding 
patterns of the CSFs within the regions with Objective 2 areas
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Funding of UK and Ita lian  CSFs (1989-91) 
In Regions with Objective 2 areas ( in  percent)
novate Sector 
X Contribution
Stlonal/M alic  
X Contribution
Total BJ 
X Contribution
ERDF 
X Contribution
ESF
X Contribution
EAGGF 
X Contribution
Plodoont 36.6 35.5 27.9 2 .9 9 .7 0.9
te l I*  0 ‘Aosta 0 0 141 2 1 95 B 5 00
Liguria b .b S.5 31.1 2 .1 S.1 0.0
Lotion* 7.1 51.6 41.9 2.1 30.2 0.1
Vanato 36.0 36.5 27.4 6.9 13.9 6.9
Tuscany S3.8 B.B 9 .1 8.7 7.0 4.1
IJtirla 13.6 46.1 40.3 <6.9 13.9 9.5
Marches 37.6 36.4 S.O 6.3 S.7 0.1
Lazio 23.1 44.2 32.7 6.0 S.O 7.3
ITALY (OBJ. 2) 27.3 41.3 31.4 9.1 S .3 1.1
ITALY (TOTAL) S.2 43.9 36.9 * .7 S.1 9.1
North 9.0 54.7 36.2 S.1 S.1 0.1
York, and Huti K ) B  4 9 1 B  7 4 9 01
East Midlands 11.7 51.4 17.2 S.2 9.9 0.9
last Midlands 4.5 23.5 24.9 20.6 3.7 0.1
Northwest * .4 47.4 9 .2 22.3 S.1 0.1
teles 74 499 403 B 0 9 3 09
Scotland S.2 47.1 9 .9 Z7.3 4.3 2.1
IK (OBJ. 2) S.7 46.2 34.6 9 .0 7.9 0.2
IK (TOTAL) 15.2 43.0 9 .2 9 .2 9.9 0.7
Source: CEC (1992a), elaborated by the author.
Table 7.2
in Britain and Italy after the 1988 reform219. The table
219 Some statistics do not correspond to those found in Table 
7.1 because these figures were calculated differently. Table 7.1 
uses national data. Table 7.2 uses regional data. For instance, 
the figures for objectives 3/4 for the UK were only provided on 
a national basis and thus were not included in the total country 
figures. For Italy, some of the data was partially national, and 
partly regional and thus only the regional data was included in 
these figures. Second, a few of the programs covered two regions.
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demonstrates some interesting differences between countries 
and regions. Italian Objective 2 areas have a higher 
dependence on the private sector (27%) than the British (15%). 
As a result, British projects depends more on public and EU 
financial assistance than do their Italian counterparts. 
Tuscany and the East Midlands mirror their respective country 
profiles: in fact they represent extreme cases.220 Tuscany
has an overwhelming reliance on the private sector (54%) and 
receives quite a small amount of total project costs from the 
EU (20%). The East Midlands, alternatively, has a low degree 
or private participation (12%) and a particularly high 
dependence on the central government (51%) and the EU 
(37%).221 This figures reflect what we know about these two 
regions; Tuscany has a highly developed, institutionally 
strong private sector well integrated into the development 
support environment while the East Midlands is dominated by 
public institutions.
Although it might be initially concluded that the East 
Midlands has been better at exploiting EU funding 
opportunities, suggesting that the initial hypothesis which
When this occurred, the finances was evenly divided between them. 
Finally, some of these regions also include objective 3/4 and 5b 
areas and these finances are included in the regional figures.
220 Actually, since objective 3/4 monies in Britain were not 
broken down by region, these funds were not included. However, 
since there are no cases in which private sector funds were used 
to fund training policies, the importance of the private sector 
in Britain is somewhat exaggerated.
221 These figures do not include all transfers from the EU 
to these regions. Tuscany still received IMP transfers as well 
as funding from the EU textile policy during these years. The 
East Midlands receives additional support from RECHAR, the EU 
programme aimed at declining coal mining communities.
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stated that the networked region would be more capable in this
regard, looking deeper into the specific dynamics of EU
funding organization in Britain, the picture changes somewhat.
Specifically, British local authorities, unlike their Italian
counterpart, have faced important restraints in their bids for
ERDF funding. There has been a long running problem between
local authorities, the Commission, and the Centre regarding
additionality. According to the EU, any funds provided through
the Structural Funds should be additional to central
government funding. Theoretically, local governments should be
able to obtain and spend money from both sources. In practice,
the expenditure levels that the central government sets on
local governments puts restrictions on EU spending as well,
forcing local governments to choose between funding sources
which are more advantageous rather than combining them for
more ambitious projects.
As a result of this situation, the government programmes
have been more attractive than many of the Community
programmes since they pay a higher percentage of the overall
project costs (75% compared to 50% offered by the EU for
objective 2 regions). It is no surprise that ERDF monies in
the UK are traditionally underspent. The departments have to
actively go out and promote EU funds and persuade local
authorities to put in bids to maximize grants.
It is in the interest of ... the partnership that the 
money is spent, that we are all working together. In 
other grant regimes, you apply for it and nobody will 
chase you. We have to promote. We are actively 
persuading them to put in bids to maximize the grant. We 
are proactive in this area. Its central government
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policy to take up or maximize the ERDF grant 
effectively.222
Only very recently, has the government removed the across the 
board expenditure levels so benefits can now be felt in 
relation to the grant.
Additionally, looking at how funding was allocated within 
the specific CSFs in Tuscany and Eastern England. Table 7.3 
(Tuscany) and Table 7.4 (Eastern England) show some 
interesting differences which shed crucial insights for 
assessing the hypothesis. Again the greater importance of 
private sector participation is underscored in Tuscany. They 
play a substantial role in the provision of business support, 
tourism, and general support to the industry. Of great 
interest is the almost complete absence of government 
financial support in the area of business development in 
Tuscany (83% is funded from the private sector) while in 
Eastern England the public sector provides the greatest 
amount(75%).
222 Interview 40.
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Table 7.3
Distribution of Financial Responsibility by Type of Measure 
in the CSFs for Tuscany(1989-93)
Funding
Source
% EU %Public %Private
Years 1989-
1991
1992-
1993
1989-
1991
1992-
1993
1989-
1991
1992-
1993
Measure
Business
Support223
5 9 7 12 88 78
Infrastruc.224 12 32 42 40 46 27
Tourism 13 10 10 18 77 72
Environment 15 31 58 25 27 44
R&D, Voc. Tr. 45 45 55 55 0 0
Technical
Assist.
45 45 55 55 0 0
Total225 9 14 24 18 67 68
Source: 1989-91: CEC (1990), elaborated by author
1992-93: Regione Toscana (1993a).
The information furnished by the Tuscany CSF (CEC, 1990) 
indicates that other public bodies (including the subnational 
authorities) provided 53.4% or the majority of the public 
funding tranche, thus indicating the important financial 
responsibility of the subnational government. In the UK, such
223 For Tuscany, this category was entitled development and 
strengthening of SMEs. For Eastern England, it is labelled 
business development.
224 For Tuscany, this category was identified as support 
structures for economic activity. For Eastern England, it 
represents the merging of two categories— facilities for the 
development of productive activities and transport facilities.
225 Discrepancies between this table and table 7.2 are 
attributable to the problems in the earlier data sets used. The 
figures in tables 7.3 and 7.4 are more reliable. The trends in 
each in terms of the general participation levels is similar in 
each table. So although table 7.2 uses an imperfect data set, the 
information concerning general trends is still useful.
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information was not available. Clearly, in Tuscany, 
development planning is truly a locally-driven endeavour. 
Looking at England, we shall see that it clearly is not.
Table 7.4
Distribution of Financial Responsibility by Type of Measure 
in the CSFs Eastern England (1989-93)
Funding
Source
% EU %Public %Private
Years 1989-
1991
1992-
1993
1989-
1991
1992-
1993
1989-
1991
1992-
1993
Measure
Business
Support
35 35 40 40 25 25
Infrastruc. 33 33 68 68 0 0
Tourism 33 36 41 44 26 20
Environment 50 50 50 50 0 0
R&D, Voc. Tr. 22 26 27 32 50 42
Technical
Assist.226
0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 34 35 52 52 14 13
source: iy«y-y 1: CEC (kiyyla), elabora Led by author•
1992-93: DOE 1991), elaborated by author.
Again, Eastern England appears stronger in terms of its 
ability to maximize EU funds (34% of total costs as compared 
to 9% in Tuscany). Looking at the actual amount of money spent 
by the EU for these initiatives, in Tuscany, the EU provided 
41.78 MECU to the new initiatives from 1989-91 while in 
Eastern England, they provided 57 MECU in the same years (CEC, 
1992a). The total costs of these projects, however, were, in 
Eastern England, 168.3 MECU while Tuscany spent 436.71 MECU 
(CEC, 1992a). Although the EU provided both a higher sum of
226 Money will be allocated if it is later required but none 
was put down initially.
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money as well as a higher percentage of the total costs in 
Eastern England, Tuscany was the real winner in its ability to 
use EU funds to successfully leverage in private funds for 
larger development policies. This difference is potentially 
explained through the higher dependence of British local 
authorities on central funding for development projects 
(chapter 3). In Tuscany, alternatively, comparatively little 
central funding is diverted to the region specifically for 
development purposes (chapter 4). In sum, strong institutional 
networks in Tuscany were able to bring EU funding into an 
already developed funding regime and policy process, allowing 
for greater expenditure and a greater integration of resources 
than that found in the East Midlands. In the East Midlands, 
public funding sources compensate for the inadequate 
development of the private sector forcing localities to adapt 
their policies to meet the requirements of centrally- 
determined funding criteria.
Between 89-91/92-93, there is minimal change in the 
division of labour between the three funding providers in 
Eastern England in these policy areas. In Tuscany, however, 
there is a small change. The EU increased its share from 9% to 
14% while the Italian public sector decreased its contribution 
to the programmes from 24% to 18%, dramatically increasing the 
weight of European funding for development projects. The 
decreasing role of the central state reflects its small role 
in Tuscan development as compared to the dominant role of the 
central government in the East Midlands situation.
Looking at the different priorities given by each region
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to these various programs we can again see distinct 
divergences. Table 7.5 holds the relevant information. Tuscany 
has concentrated primarily on business support which may be 
explained by the sheer amount of private funds that were 
contributed and the strength of public/private collaborative 
networks. It grows in priority between 89/91 and 92/93 from 
47% of total funding to 59%. Infrastructure, which received 
substantial support (34%) drops drastically to only 9% of 
funding in 92-93. Clearly, the strong public/private 
institutional networks have influenced Tuscany's funding 
priorities; allotting most of the funds to vital business 
services. As discussed in chapter 1, internetworked business 
support services are one of the most important tools to assist 
industrial adjustment.
Table 7.5
Percent of Total CSF Funding by Type of Measure 
in Tuscany and Eastern England________
Region Tuscany Eastern England
Year
Measure
1989-
1991
1992-
1993
1989-
1991
1992-
1993
Business Support 47 59 19 26
Infrastructure 34 9 45 42
Tourism 18 23 19 14
Environment 6 6 9 9
R&D, Training 2 2 17 9
Technical Assist. .3 .8 0 0
Source: 1989-91: CEC (1990 and 1991a).
1992-93: DOE (1991) and Regione Toscana (1993a) 
elaborated by the author.
In Eastern England, we do see a greater expenditure on
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business support moving from 19% to 26% of total funding, 
reflecting the central government's emphasis on creating a 
climate for business but it is still way behind Tuscany. 
Infrastructure funding remains the major recipient of EU 
funds, clearly highlighting the dominance of central agencies, 
which work under a government-issued free market ideology 
which stresses the traditional state role in economic 
development (minimal intervention with a focus on 
infrastructure provision). Support for vocational training 
drops from 17% to 9% which may be explained by the development 
of TECs, which have been key players in training provision 
since 1989 but their status regarding access to EU funding was 
initially unclear.227
Tuscany's ability to leverage in private funds is a 
function of the strong local networks that provide the 
foundation for policy design and implementation. When working 
out the CSF design, the Region acted in regular consultation 
with the Consulta Economica.228 Planning for the application, 
design and implementation of EU funding is indeed a community 
event in Tuscany; the networks which coalesce around general 
development policies are the same networks which are involved 
in EU policy.
In Eastern England, the situation in very diverse. The 
central government departments run the show. The CSF for 
Eastern England partnership includes all local authorities,
227 The TECs are now eligible for EU funding. In fact, a TEC 
sits on the partnership community in the Eastern England 
partnership.
228 Interview 1.
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' TABLE 7 * S  i B m m m m .
EAST MIDLANDS REGIONAL PARTNERSHIP FOR 
THE•STRUCTURAL FUNDS :'
DOE; East Midlands Regional Officer
Programme' Secretariat
County councils; Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire,
Lincolnshire 
City councils : Nottingham
District councils; North East Derbyshire, Bolaover,
West Lindsey, Mansfield, Newark and 
Sherwood, Bassetlaw, East Lindsey, 
AshfieId
Borough councils; chesterfield
DOE: HQ, Policy Division
Department of Employment Training Agency 
Employment Service-— East Midlands 
DTP
DPS 3(C)
European Commission (DC XVI)
British Waterways
British Rail
Yorkshire Water
Anglian Water
Severn Trent Water
British Coal Nottinghamshire Group
British Coal Enterprise
East Midlands Chamber of Commerce 
National Trust 
East Midlands Tourist Board 
North Nottinghamshire TEC 
Rural Development Commission
Source: DTI, 1992. 
the regional Government departments, and a range of other 
actors including British Gas and British Coal enterprise (See 
Table 7.6 ). All the partners are eligible for funding.
Whereas in Tuscany, the region meets with local actors to 
design policies to meet the needs of subregional economic 
units, in Eastern England, the centre meets with mostly
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regional actors which have no real mandate to design policy 
for objective 2 areas which are subregional. Besides the local 
authorities, the main partners represent utilities, quangos, 
and central government agencies. With the exception of the 
local authorities, there is no direct involvement of local 
social and economic actors in the policy partnership. The East 
Midlands Regional Partnership for the Structural Funds looks 
nothing like the local networks which are involved in local 
development policy. Is it any wonder that UK policy reflects 
central government criteria and has difficulty leveraging in 
private financial support? Given this type of partnership 
structure, British authorities face serious impediments to 
networking among local actors in the elaboration of EU 
development plans.
Being seriously hampered in their ability to build 
european-oriented local networks, Nottingham has tried to 
overcome this limitation by networking with other local 
authorities both across Britain and Europe as a whole. In 
John's (1994a) stages (section I), Nottingham could be 
considered quite Europeanized while Prato much less so. This 
suggests that John has not offered distinct stages of 
europeanization which follow a specific order but alternative 
strategies for tapping into European resources and managing 
local economic problems.
To begin, Nottingham was instrumental in the creation of 
LATC (Local Action for Textile and Clothing), a British 
network of local authorities heavily dependent on the textile 
and clothing industry. LATC fulfils three crucial functions:
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1) it provides an important forum for the exchange of dialogue 
and information on common problems and solutions; 2) it 
lobbies both the UK and Brussels in areas of mutual concern; 
and 3) it acts as a common clearinghouse for data collection 
and dissemination. In fact, LATC prepared the argument for 
including Britain in RETEX, the Community's new Textile CIP. 
(See section IV)
Nottingham City Council has also been quite active on the 
European front. Several years ago the NCC established a 
European team, consisting of three people, within the 
Development Department. At that time, European linkages were 
minimal; just a few twinnings with Karlsruhe, Ghent and Minsk, 
which had primarily a civic rather than economic remit. The 
European team aimed to turn those relationships into working 
practical arrangements that could assist area businesses and 
institutions. Working with Karlsruhe, a four cities 
partnership was established with Nancy in France and Halle in 
former East Germany to establish common economic development 
initiatives. This has been a key lever to try and encourage 
inward investment and trade links. Nottingham has also joined 
the Eurocities network set up in 1986 by Birmingham and 
Barcelona to share experiences and develop common approaches 
to shared problems. At present, the city is considering 
joining ACTE which is a European network of textile and 
clothing regions. The county is a member and so the city is 
presently represented through them.
However, building networks is a difficult task. One 
Nottingham experience can prove quite instructive in the
325
practical problems of building and maintaining european 
networks. In the early years of the Fashion Centre, relations 
were established with a successful textile centre in Emilia- 
Romagna known as CITER. These linkages have been severed. 
While none of the respondents could explain exactly why, the 
answer seems to lie in the fact that almost all of the people 
on the existing team were no longer working for the city 
council, thus personal linkages, which are key elements at the 
start of any networking endeavour, were broken without having 
first established the institutional links that cement the 
network through the mutual benefits the network brings. 
Presently, the County is now trying to resurrect this lost 
opportunity.
Another 'lost opportunity' on the European front requires 
our attention; the creation of two competing offices in
Brussels. The county, as part of the Federation of East 
Midlands Authority, was an active participant in the 
establishment of an East Midlands office in Brussels. The 
city, alternatively, spearheaded the creation of a
Nottinghamshire office which comprises a partnership of the
eight local districts, the Greater Nottingham TEC, Nottingham 
Trent University, the Chamber of Commerce, and Clarendon 
College. This is the most pronounced division of interest 
within the entire UK (John, 1994b). Although the threat of 
unitary status may have been an impetus for the city to create 
its own office, recent information from the Local Government 
Commission suggests that the two-tier authorities will remain 
in Nottinghamshire. Ironically, the creation of a
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Nottinghamshire office represents the successful consolidation
of local economic development networks; those actors involved
were identified earlier as being the central economic
development players. Hence, the evidence provides support for
the hypothesis that the EU would stimulate increased
networking efforts.
Prato, alternatively, has yet to develop significant
European linkages. There are some twinning arrangements with
French, German and Austrian counterparts but these still
remain cultural rather than economic in orientation. They
participate in ACTE and, through the REMTEX initiative
(section IV), have visited other textile regions in France and
Spain. As one participant noted: "Prato does not have a
permanent relationship with the EC beyond Objective 2 money.
We have not really created anything permanent."229
Recognizing the need to create European links, a creative way
of building European networks is currently being explored;
exploiting the European elections. The mayor of Prato, Claudio
Martini, was put on the PDS list for the 1994 European
elections. As mayor Martini commented:
It is an extra opportunity that the PDS offers the 
city....We will use the eventual electoral campaign 
... for knowing better the EC and for it [ EC ] to know us 
better. In the end, we will bring home at least contacts 
and useful relations (cited in Toccafondi, 1994).
How can we explain this discrepancy; on one hand
Nottingham has created more extensive transeuropean networks
while, on the other hand, Prato seems better able to tap into
a wider range of European funding. The explanation comes
229 Interview 2.
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partially from the presence of elected regional government. 
Entrepreneurial regions are better able to tap into Europe 
through direct institutional channels (i.e. Council of 
Regions, Committee of Regions, partnership contracts, MEPs) 
Although some of these channels are available to localities, 
the localities do not hold the same weight within these 
institutions. The Structural Funds, in particular, are 
explicitly targeted towards NUTS 2 regions. Thus, elected 
regions can speak authoritatively for a substantial population 
of Europe, and the EU listens. Localities lack this presence 
and, perhaps, this legitimacy.
In fact, local actors in Nottingham are aware of the 
debilitating absence of regional structures. Given the strong 
regional presence of the industry, there may have been strong 
pressures toward regionally-based networks and activities. 
However, the lack of politically independent and capable 
regions successfully precludes the development of that option. 
One respondent, discussing applications to RETEX, a European 
Union initiative supporting the textile and clothing industry, 
noted:
In my opinion, if we had gotten our act together and put 
in a global application on behalf of the whole of the 
East Midlands, sorted out various shares between the 
various local authorities in terms of their 
contributions, we would have gotten a lot of money, but 
we failed.230
Difficulty co-ordinating region-wide activities is a 
problem that besets all English regions. The priority given to
230 Interview 29.
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urban rather than regional development since the 
Conservative's return to power in 1979 has encouraged 
competition among localities, thus effectively undermining 
attempts at regional collective action (Anderson, 1990, 
p.254). The two Brussels offices, one for the region the other 
for local Nottinghamshire authorities, is yet another 
distorted outcome of the Centre's constraining hand. An 
elected region may have been able to manage the competition 
between authorities and foster the integration of their 
resources to deal with common problems.
To make-up for their weak public-private networks and the 
absence of effective regional representation, Nottingham has 
attempted to build broader transnational and transeuropean 
networks to fill in the blanks. However, these should not be 
seen as substitutes for an effective local/regional networking 
system but as additional to them. The region presents an 
important focal point for this type of activity and its 
absence is felt in the English institutional structure. It is 
no wonder then that Nottinghamshire has started to act in 
concert with other East Midland counties in promoting regional 
activities such as a common Brussels office and the 
establishment of a regional venture capital agency. However, 
the city-county animosity still wastes resources and hinders 
Nottingham's ability to fully take advantage of those 
opportunities which would be better developed on a regional 
scale.
Although these cases have proven to be quite different in 
their relationship to Europe, europeanization and the EU
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funding programmes have stimulated convergence in certain 
areas. In both cases, relations with the EU have fostered 
increased partnership activity, an increased understanding of 
the local economy and the European environment in which they 
function231, and the strengthening of the role of the local 
authorities within the development process because it is a 
vital transmission point for EU resources to local actors.
Both localities face similar restraints to networking. In 
particular, networking in Europe can be quite costly 
especially when most public authorities are trying to make 
cutbacks•
The problem is getting money to go to Europe to establish 
links. European trips are seen as jaunts and it can be 
difficult to justify the expense to other departments. I 
go to create and pursue European contacts but they are 
also potential customers and suppliers.232
The European Union does provide funds to support these 
networking endeavours but it only covers part, rarely all, of 
the costs. For example, the EU provided 50% of the funding 
for a European Conference on Textiles and Clothing held by the 
Nottinghamshire County Council233 (Nottinghamshire County 
Council Economic Development Committee Minutes, 22 June 1992).
231 Applications for CIPs, and bids for recognition of being 
an objective region, require that localities can present an 
accurate economic picture of themselves, their economic 
difficulties and the potential solutions for these problems 
within a European context. Additionally, CIPs usually require 
partners in analogous regions. Thus, local authorities must 
develop a fairly detailed understanding of their economy, and its 
insertion into both wider markets and its relationship with 
social processes; which— even if the bid fails— remains a 
positive contribution for overall development purposes.
232 Interview 24.
233 Nottingham, Nottinghamshire and Prato were participants.
330
While networking does have many benefits, such as information 
sharing and learning from each other's problems and solutions, 
and awareness of other markets, for local authority budgets, 
it can be a difficult decision, especially when the returns 
are rarely measurable in any real, quantitative way.
Despite this relative dearth of European links, 
especially when compared to Nottingham's activities, it is 
Prato, with strong collaborative networks, which has probably 
benefitted more from the EU. Besides the CSFs, Prato has 
substantial support from older EU textile support initiatives, 
the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, Perifera, and will 
benefit from the new RETEX project for the textile industry 
(Regione Toscana,1993). Nottingham receives money from RECHAR 
(for the coal industry) but failed in its attempts to win 
Perifera funds. The story regarding RETEX and REMTEX, the two 
recent EU programmes established for the textile and clothing 
industry, in Nottingham and Prato provides further insight 
into the effects of different institutional structures on the 
ability to maximize European resources.
IV. RETEX AND REMTEX: EU SUPPORT FOR THE TEXTILE INDUSTRY
RETEX was approved on 13 May 1992 under Article 11 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) 4253/88 "to help prevent the economic and 
social disintegration of entire regions,"(CEC, 1992B, p.2) and 
is administered by DG XVI, the Directorate General for 
Regional Policies. Its main objective is to encourage the 
diversification of regions which are highly dependent on the
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textile and clothing industry. It differs from other similar 
community initiatives because it provides aid to all sectors 
as well as viable textile companies. Thus, it is actually a 
regional rather than sectoral programme. The initiative was 
designed as a complement to the CSF's, not as an independent 
programme. Eligible regions include those which are overly 
dependent on the textile and clothing sector, are designated 
as Objective 1 (backlagging) Objective 2 (in industrial 
decline), or Objective 5b (rural areas requiring 
diversification) regions and those where textile and clothing 
firms provide a large percentage of jobs to the regional 
labour market (at least 2,000 jobs and a level of employment in 
textiles and clothing that is greater than 10% of total 
manufacturing employment). Eighty percent of RETEX funds are 
earmarked for Objective 1 regions; the remaining 20% will go 
to Objective 2 and 5b. The available budget was 100 MECU 
through the end of 1993. It is expected to continue from 1994- 
1997 with a budget of 400 MECU drawn from the Structural Funds 
allocations. Of particular importance, the EU does not decide 
the regions eligible for RETEX funds; that responsibility 
falls to the Member-States.
Despite the fanfare and high hopes at the beginning given 
both Nottingham and Nottinghamshire' s clear eligibility and 
their active involvement in lobbying the EU for a textile 
programme through ACTE and LATC, RETEX did not prove to be a 
lucrative pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. The British 
Central government decided that RETEX should be administered 
nationally rather than regionally. Local authorities supported
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regional distribution because that would guarantee them access 
to some of the pot; this way they all compete nationally for 
minimal funding. The UK has four million pounds available in 
the first period. This, according to one official, was 
inadequate to distribute regionally.234 As for the UK, it is 
politically against Commission initiatives in general because 
it does not like the Commission being in charge. The entire 
programme was politically sensitive in the East Midlands 
region because a number of areas in Leicestershire and 
Derbyshire that are highly dependent upon textile and clothing 
production are not objective 2 areas. The British Government 
lobbied to expand the eligibility criteria but was 
unsuccessful for the first instalment. RETEX was also not 
enthusiastically received by the Knitting Industries 
Federation (which also happens to be located in 
Leicestershire) on the grounds that it was too disruptive of 
market forces (KIF Bulletin, 1992).
Despite the lack of substantial funding, the RETEX 
initiative did have two positive effects in Nottingham: it 
stimulated networking on a local and European scale in the 
search for potential programme partners and it has stimulated 
a more concentrated approach to an industrial strategy.
The impetus behind the development of such a strategy has 
very much been the fact that we know that if we do that 
strategy now we can actually implement it with the help 
of our local partners through funding from the 
Commission.235
234 Interview 35.
235 Interview 20.
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Given the lack of resources at the local level, projects were 
generated and then funding was sought. Thus, funding was the 
critical criteria determining which policies were implemented 
and which were not. This has pushed the NCC toward the UP in 
early years and European funds presently.
In Prato, however, there was no question that they would 
be RETEX recipients which, again, highlights the importance of 
both strong collaborative networks and an independently 
elected regional body. In Tuscany, only two regions were 
eligible for the 1993 RETEX bids, Prato and the mountain 
community of Garfagnano.236 The Consulta Economica drew up 
the proposals for projects, which were presented by the Region 
to the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Crafts and accepted 
into the overall operative programme established by the 
Community Support Framework. Thus, the programme was easily 
integrated into both the established local decision-making 
structures and the overall funding regimes. Unlike 
Nottingham, complete support for the programme emerged from 
all involved parties. The money is to be used to provide 
technical support to SMEs, encourage SME collaboration in the 
areas of research and development, buyer-supplier relations, 
and commercialization and product diversification, and the 
reclamation of abandoned industrial sites (Regione Toscana, 
1993). Compare these to the projects submitted by Nottingham 
city council which cover the conversion of workshops into a 
day nursery and the provision of space for designers to
236 When the criteria was extended in the 1994-97 funding 
period to include non-objective areas dependent on the industry, 
the list was expanded.
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display their wares; useful but not the stimulant to
industrial adjustment that Prato's policies can be.
Having more developed institutional infrastructure, Prato
was better able to take advantage of the EU news funding
opportunities. The same pattern is reflected in the REMTEX
project. Recognizing that local networks are vital
infrastructure in regions facing industrial adjustment but
they are difficult to build, the EU, through DG V (Social
policy), launched the REMTEX initiative (Consortium for
Research on Employment Prospects in the EC Textile and
Clothing Sector). The REMTEX objectives were:
to inform policy-makers; to enhance communication between 
local groups and the EC; to generate a collaborative 
approach to the formulation of local level strategies; to 
encourage the take-up of existing programmes within a 
local strategic framework supported by partnership; to 
stimulate discussion about the effects of restructuring 
and possibilities for reconversion; to act as a catalyst 
for local economic diversification initiatives and local 
employment action (DG V, 1993, p.l).
REMTEX stresses the local approach which is primarily
concerned with capacity building and stimulating a joint
approach to local problems. Clearly aimed at promoting local 
networks, nineteen zones were selected for two round table 
discussions among public authorities, training agencies, 
business and trade association leaders, and all other relevant 
actors within the textile and clothing industries to evaluate 
their area's industry, especially its employment potential, 
and develop a common vision and coordinated development plan. 
A minimum of two regions were chosen in 9 countries and
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represent the range of regional categories.237 Prato and the 
East Midlands were both selected. Different geographical areas 
were chosen as a result of the differing structure of interest 
representation. The Commission required representatives that 
could speak for a given area; in Italy, the associations were 
organized provincially, in the UK a general regional level was 
the lowest that could be identified.238 Two round tables were 
to be organized; the first would focus on restructuring of the 
industry and the second concerned reconversion and thus would 
include participants from other industries. REMTEX, was an 
unusual European project in that it offered no funding 
resources to the participants.
In the East Midlands at the time the research was 
conducted, REMTEX I was organized but REMTEX II had not 
occurred and there were doubts among the respondents that it 
would. The participants included KIF, DG V, three business 
executives, the Nottingham Fashion Centre, three consultants, 
North Nottinghamshire TEC, CAPITB, KLITRA, KFAT, TUC, GMB, 
Leicester Polytechnic, Nottingham City Council, and 
Nottinghamshire County Council. Brussels felt that, overall, 
REMTEX I was successful because it increased overall awareness 
of the industry and introduced them to what could be done at 
the local level.
In the East Midlands, however, doubts were expressed by 
the participants. Many had already been involved in local
237 The exception is Ireland where no subregions could be 
identified.
238 Interview 42.
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initiatives so the idea was nothing new. Aside from diverse 
opinions as to where the industry239 should be going that 
would not be resolved at a single roundtable discussion, the 
difficulty with this group is that each has a different 
geographical and functional remit. Although they are all 
interested in the textile and clothing industry generally, 
political turf battles and genuinely divergent views regarding 
how best to restructure the industry prevented the emergence 
of a common industrial purpose or a shared identity. In fact, 
a number of participants were also involved in different 
projects for different fashion resource centres; all competing 
for dwindling funding. The lack of a regional body undermines 
an exercise of this sort because there is no institutional 
capacity nor political leadership to turn dialogue into 
political activity at the regional level. All these groups had 
some prior linkages, and this did not seem to strengthen them 
in any concrete way.
Conversely, Prato's REMTEX experience was more fruitful. 
On some level, it could be considered another meeting of the 
Consulta Economica, given both represent political roundtables 
to bring local social and economic actors together and the 
same actors were involved in both (subnational authorities, 
business and trade associations). Ergo, many of the issues 
addressed were part of a long-running dialogue within the 
textile area as to how they could best manage the crisis. In
239 The public authorities focus on the industrial structure. 
The LMMA want national tariffs as they view the main threat as 
lower-priced foreign imports. The KIF opposes initiatives which 
run contrary to free market forces and supports technology and 
automation as the way forward for the sector.
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Nottingham, an ongoing discursive process surrounding the
future of the industry had yet to be established. A study
undertaken by CERRM (Centre Europeen de Ressource sur les
Reconversions et les Mutations) for DG V on five of the REMTEX
roundtables, assessed the Prato experience:
The work reflects an agreement within the region on the 
broad outline of an appropriate response to the 
development issues that face both the textile industry 
and the region. The local partners have agreed on a 
common program of activity, given priorities to a number 
of interventions, and committed themselves to provide 
financial support (1993, p.7).
In fact, the final Commission report on the REMTEX project
noted that Prato was the only one of the nineteen zones in
which a strategic vision for the industry was emerging. They
note:
Only in Prato had the beginnings of a strategy emerged. 
This covered a vision for development in areas associated 
with the strengths of the local textile and clothing 
producers which would be suitable to the needs and skills 
of existing labour in addition to being sensitive to the 
needs of the textile and clothing employers. It is 
significant that progress had been made in this area 
precisely through the perception of restructuring and 
reconversion as parallel and interrelated processes. 
Interest was generated from all actors by making explicit 
the links between current restructuring experience and 
possibilities for future diversification. In other areas, 
strategy formulation was seen not as a legitimate local 
process but as prescriptive guidance determined elsewhere 
and at a macroeconomic level (DG V, 1993, p.66).
The culmination of this strategy would be to create a new 
development agency for economic development in Prato to help 
the industry successfully answer current and future challenges 
while simultaneously promoting the expansion of the non­
textile economy.
Despite the overall success of REMTEX, we must question
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the degree to which the expressed commitment to reconversion 
will be honoured. Although the representatives of the non­
textile economy (i.e. Confesercenti) are included in the 
dialogue, chapter 5 demonstrated that they tend to be 
marginalized when it came to actual involvement in policy. The 
same EU study noted that, although they did achieve a well- 
rounded strategic vision for the region, the roundtables were 
dominated by textile and clothing interests; which resisted 
the diversion of too many resources away from the industry 
toward diversification (DG V, 1993, p.65).
All in all, the REMTEX project highlighted the different 
institutional matrices found in each case. By building on 
already we11-developed institutional networks and a growing 
cross-community dialogue, Prato was able to exploit, albeit 
with some political difficulty, the REMTEX opportunity and 
move the dialogue forward in a positive, strategic way. In the 
East Midlands, the absence of any prior or subsequent 
institutional context for industrial dialogue, hindered the 
possibilities of the REMTEX experience. Although many of the 
those interviewed indicated the growing need for some regional 
body to better manage the problems of the industry and the 
economy generally, each returned to their separate turfs and 
continued on with what they were doing within their own 
narrower borders.
In sum, Prato has a much more developed networking 
capacity which has been deepened as the result of interaction 
with Europe. They were shown to have better exploited their 
European opportunities thus supporting the hypothesis that
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strongly networked localities would find it easier to maximize 
on Europe. Tuscan authorities, with strong local networking 
structures, was able to leverage in private funds which 
surpassed the public contribution. The presence of the region 
and active local authorities had encouraged the build-up of 
important interest groups which provide the foundation for 
private institutional capacity. Networks in Nottingham are 
much weaker and do not seem to be able to exploit the 
resources provided by Europe to build these stronger. Although 
the local authorities had been proactive in the area of 
development policy, the lack of a regional representation 
inhibits Nottingham and Nottinghamshire's ability to attract 
EU funding outside the CSF framework and to leverage in 
private funding as well. UK policies, dominated by the centre, 
hampers the development of local/regional private sector 
institutional capacity. Thus local authority horizontal 
networks are developed among other local authorities (both 
within the UK and across Europe) to bring in resources which 
can compensate for their lack of local private resources and 
expertise•
In both cases, the influence of the EU has strengthened 
the local government's position. Since they represent the main 
conduit to European funds, and the natural point to integrate 
private and public resources for mutual benefit, their 
potential as a local partner increases. Thus the second 
hypotheses, which stated that, no matter the starting point, 
the EU would encourage network building, has been 
corroborated.
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8. CONCLUSIONS: INSTITUTIONAL NETWORKS AND 
INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING
INTRODUCTION
I have tried to show that subnational institutions can, to
widely varying degrees, help moderate the process of
industrial restructuring and promote local economic
development. I have hypothesized that at locally governing the
economy will be most effective if a locality:
possesses (or is able to build) thick institutional 
networks linking up public and private resources at 
multiple levels of interaction and if
those networks have a learning capacity whereby 
institutional relationships and policy support adapt 
to meet changing politico-economic conditions.
This institutional capacity is shaped and conditioned by and 
may conflict with:
the structure of the State and the territorial and 
functional division of power and resources
the structure of the industrial sector and its 
boundedness to the political administration
the manner in which the locality is effected by and 
can take advantage of the policy environment of the 
European Union
This final chapter evaluates the validity of this 
theoretical framework for understanding how events unrolled in 
our two cases. It is subdivided into three sections. Section 
I compares the effects of structural factors on local
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capacity. Section II, relying on the indicators of learning 
established in chapter 2, first assesses the learning capacity 
of each case study, and then draws more general conclusions 
regarding institutional networks and learning capacity. 
Finally, section III discusses the general theoretical 
implications which emerge from these conclusions.
I. STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS AND LOCAL INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY
The ability of local authorities to respond to industrial 
decline is shaped by two competing but concurrently 
intersecting influences; subnational institutions and 
national/international structures. These structures set the 
parameters of local activities while the local institutional 
architecture, which develops partially in response to these 
structural constraints, shapes local capacity to act. In other 
words, strong local institutions may find alternative routes 
to accomplish objectives which circumvent (or at least 
mediate) debilitating constraints or may harness new 
opportunities which emerge from structural conditions. Using 
the two cases as the empirical foundation, this section draws 
general theoretical conclusions regarding how state, 
industrial, and European structures have impeded or 
facilitated local capacity to manage industrial change. Each 
structure will be examined individually.
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I-A. STATE STRUCTURE
There is clear indication that state structures have a 
significantly impact on the shape of local networks and the 
development of a subnational economic governance capacity. The 
empirical evidence suggests that three interrelated factors 
are particularly influential: the degree of resource
dependencies among tiers of government, the extent of 
centralization within the state, and the presence of regional 
government.
Resource dependencies, or interdependence (even if 
asymmetrical), are a function of the way in which powers and 
resources are allocated between Central and subnational 
government and between the public and private sectors and thus 
establishes the measure of autonomy local actors enjoy. This 
research provides support for the theoretical assumption that 
interdependence, as opposed to autonomy, is the foundation of 
network development. Multiple networks were better developed 
in Prato, although the city possessed only limited functions 
in the field of economic development (functions which it 
shares with other levels of government) and no real powers at 
all in the area of industrial assistance or local taxation. 
Thus, intraregional functional networks provided the locality 
alternative channels to pursue policies that were legally 
forbidden to local authorities acting independently while 
intergovernmental networks were crucial for channelling 
resources and coordinating policy to temper the negative 
externalities of competition. In Nottingham, alternatively,
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the historical legacy of the dual polity, local taxing powers, 
and the vagueness of the initial laws concerning local 
development provided a relatively greater scope for local 
policy autonomy. As the laws governing economic development 
became more precise, they became more restrictive. These new 
constraints have forced local authorities to build links with 
the private sector to obtain resources and competences to act 
in ways which are now prohibited to them; a situation clearly 
parallel to the Italian case. However, if policy constraints 
are encouraging public-private networks, the centralization of 
financial power has increased local dependence on central 
funding with a detrimental effect on network-building; it 
keeps the networks vertically structured and focused on the 
specific central government departments.
If interdependence is the foundation of network 
development, then logically it follows that the centralization 
of power hinders the formation of local networks and local 
capacity. First, increasing dependence on central resources 
coupled with the national shift from regional to urban 
assistance in terms of government development priorities, has 
stimulated competition among localities (of which Nottingham 
and Nottinghamshire are exemplary), thus effectively 
undermining attempts at regional collective action (Anderson, 
1990). This inability to merge a range of subnational 
resources to promote joint development strategies then, 
paradoxically, ties the locality more firmly into the orbit of 
the centre; ergo an institutional vicious circle (dependence 
on central funding--interlocal competition--no collective
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action--need for central funding). Second, the consequences of 
many of the Centre's privatization policies, according to 
Stoker (1991), is that local development has had to rely 
primarily on land use strategies; offices, housing, shopping 
malls and has done little to resolve the serious economic 
problems they were intended to attack. The Nottingham case 
clearly supports Stoker's conclusions as the city's industrial 
support policy devolved from ambitious institution-building to 
stimulate large-scale changes in industrial production 
processes to land-use strategies which depended upon office- 
building schemes to subsidize the provision of textile 
workspaces. Thus, centralization has forced local authorities 
into a limited range of development initiatives; all of which 
conform to the central's ideological conception of the 
appropriate role of the state in the economy. Rather than 
promoting policy learning and policy innovation, the Centre's 
policies have encouraged a minimalist approach to development.
In Prato, alternatively, the range of policy initiatives 
expanded to meet the changing demands required of the 
restructuring process and these initiatives were actively 
supported by the region through financial measures as well as 
through the region's own development initiatives (i.e. 
CESVIT). The wide dispersal of development resources (city, 
province, region, private sector) and the need for new types 
of resources to cope with industrial decline (i.e. stronger 
university links) encouraged network-building on a larger 
scale, and thus in Prato, we saw network expansion to make up 
for declining resources, rather than the institutional vicious
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cycle which developed in Nottingham. Hence, the empirical 
evidence provides support for the first hypothesis that 
centralized state structures limit the development of local 
networks and impede local learning.
Alternatively, the presence of an elected, autonomous 
regional government can make a substantial difference on the 
development, strength and effectiveness of local institutional 
networks, and access to external resources as the Prato case 
demonstrates. Tuscan regional initiatives and regional actors 
complemented local initiatives and broadened the networks in 
which Prato was involved, thus creating access points such as 
CESVIT, for information and technology transfer. The region 
also played an important part in helping Prato access a 
variety of European funds to support key initiatives (i.e. 
SPRINT, CQT). Finally, the Region's choice to deal with the 
Consulta Economica as the voice of the Prato instilled it with 
legitimacy and purpose which compensated for the national 
government's rejection of the Consulta's development strategy 
which had led to a questioning of the role of the Consulta by 
many of its members. Thus, activities of higher levels of 
government can influence the strength and endurance of local 
institutional networks, either positively or negatively.
In Nottingham, although the County's role has grown over 
time, it cannot truly function as an autonomous region. The 
Centre's usurpation of the regional role has hindered access 
to European funding. Furthermore, the presence of a number of 
separate regional offices maintains arbitrary distinctions 
among local networks. Rather than developing a single,
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cohesive network structure covering multiple development 
issues as in Prato, Nottingham has a maze of different 
networks, attached to specific regional offices (i.e. business 
support/DTI, urban funding/DOE, training/Employment 
Department) with no integrating centre, which has discouraged 
the creation of coordinated development strategies. The UK 
government's recent merging of these three departments with 
the Department of Transport into a single regional office is 
an attempt to overcome this problem. It is still in its early 
days, but the prognosis so far regarding these integrated 
offices is that little has changed. The concurrent movement 
toward smaller, unitary authorities within the UK seems, 
therefore, a step in the wrong direction which will only 
further serve to emasculate local authorities and further 
weaken local government as a credible institution of economic 
governance.
II-B. INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE
The degree of state centralization, however, is not the only 
influence on local capacity but dovetails with the degree to 
which the economy is centralized. In terms of economic 
governance, the most important variable is the extent to which 
these two structures are complementary. In other words, local 
economic governance capacity is strongest when economic 
decentralization parallels political decentralization (the 
economy and polity are bounded). In fact, the central 
assumption bolstering the localization/regional resurgence
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thesis is that in many areas the economy is decentralizing 
thus the most appropriate governance level is subnational. It 
follows that where the economy and the polity are centralized, 
then economic governance is potentially most effective at the 
national level.
The empirical evidence does provide general support to 
these assumptions but the picture which emerged in our two 
cases is more complicated than these general assumptions would 
suggest. In Prato, greater economic decentralization parallels 
greater political decentralization. The development of the 
private sector mirrors this dual decentralization; all the 
representative associations have both a territorial and 
functional mandate which has allowed Prato to develop a strong 
system of local economic governance which centres equally on 
private sector representative institutions and cooperative 
intergovernmental networks. Industrial restructuring, however, 
is redrawing somewhat the boundaries between the economy and 
polity in Prato. The Prato textile system is globalizing. 
Although the locality, given its central position within 
international markets, will remain a vital area of governance, 
the effect of globalization is the redistribution of power 
among firms and among their political representatives, 
favouring some and impairing others. In response to the 
expansion of interfirm networks, the local governance system 
is similarly evolving and can now be better characterized as 
a regional governance system. Networks are broadening to 
include regional and national actors, especially in the areas 
of innovation and technology transfer where local networks
348
have p r o v e d  lacking.
In Nottingham, where a high degree of political 
centralization parallels economic centralization, it has been 
difficult to build up credible institutions of local 
governance. The way in which both the political and the 
economic structures have been transforming over the past 
decades, however, have produced contrary influences on local 
capacity. On one hand, state structures have centralized 
while, on the other hand, the increase of quality-driven small 
firms suggests that some economic decentralization has 
occurred. In fact, Nottingham's early initiatives, especially 
the Fashion Centre, can be interpreted as a direct attempt to 
promote economic decentralization in order to establish a 
feasible system of local economic governance. However, given 
that the industry remains somewhat centralized, a lack of fit 
between functional and territorial institutions persists 
resulting in a weak local private sector capacity. 
Consequently, the most successful partnerships have been with 
textile firms; not more representative institutions. Comparing 
the two cases, it does seem that local institutional thickness 
is indeed fostered by boundedness, whereby economic and 
political decentralization occur together thus providing 
support for our third hypothesis. Although institutional 
thickness does matter as Prato's support structures and the 
range of support policies are indeed better developed, 
evidence of some limited learning is still apparent in the 
english case. Thickness matters but it does not guarantee a 
learning, supportive environment; thus the absence of
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thickness may hinder it but it does not prevent effective 
development.
I-C. THE EUROPEAN UNION
Local capacity for economic development, however, has been 
given a boost with the strengthening and enlargement of the 
EU. Chapter seven did provide convincing evidence for the 
fourth and fifth hypotheses that regions with strong networks 
would be better able to maximize European opportunities (Prato 
was able to use European funds to leverage in substantial 
private funds) and that, whatever the starting point, 
involvement with the EU would encourage increased networking 
efforts. Equally, the empirical work makes an important
contribution to our understanding of the europeanization and 
local institution-building in three further ways: 
europeanization strengthens rather than alters local 
conditions, Europe acts as a counterbalance against the 
nation-state, and the role of local authorities within
economic development has been enhanced.
First, europeanization does not change the structures of 
local institutions but, instead, strengthens the structures
which are already in place. EU policy is filtered through
national and local institutions. This is most clearly 
demonstrated by the way in which local networks were enhanced. 
In Prato, European resources were easily integrated into well- 
developed local strategies. This fruitful intersection of 
strong local sectoral networks and effective intergovernmental
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networks (between region, province, and city) encouraged the 
leveraging in and purposeful coordination of both private, 
public and EU funding. EU resources also became an important 
part of local institutional bargaining (as many local 
associations benefitted), providing resources to be 
distributed among the network actors, thus strengthening local 
networks by providing financial incentives for institutional 
learning. In Nottingham, EU funding alternatively strengthened 
the UK trend to build intergovernmental networks rather than 
strengthen local public/private networks. Nottingham and 
Nottinghamshire were quite adept at building national and 
European local authority networks as a conduit to new 
information, new knowledge, and idea transfer. The vertical 
structure of the EU partnerships also discourages local 
network building which is demonstrated by the lower levels of 
private money leveraged into the UK policies and the types of 
policies which emerged. Although Prato discusses expanding 
European links and Nottingham appreciates the value of private 
sector participation, recognition is not equivalent to taking 
appropriate action, especially when national and local 
structures and institutions are pushing the locality in a 
particular way. Thus, in each case, the EU strengthened trends 
that were already in place.
Second, the EU does indeed act as an effective 
counterbalance against the nation-state from the subnational 
point of view. One Prato observer noted:
The impact of the EC on local initiatives is very
important. We could not have done anything without EC
money. They make a decisive contribution. They oblige
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other levels of government to pay up.240 
Thus, in Prato, the EU has been an political effective lever 
that subnational government can use to combat the sluggishness 
of the Italian bureaucracy. Similar effects have been 
experienced in the UK. The Commission refused to deliver money 
from the RECHAR project until the UK government dealt with a 
fairly serious breach of the EU' s additionality requirements.
Finally, europeanization has strengthened the position of 
local authorities in the field of economic development. Since 
EU funds make such an important financial contribution above 
and beyond public contributions and private sector 
participation, the role of subnational authorities has been 
effectively enhanced as they represent the a crucial conduit 
into EU funding regimes. The increasing dispersal of resource 
between tiers of government and the private sector begs for an 
agency which can effectively integrate those resources for the 
good of the whole. The EU, through the establishment of the 
partnership contract, acknowledged that subnational 
authorities were best placed to fill this role.
II. NETWORKS, POWER AND LEARNING
Chapter two argued that learning is a function of past policy 
attempts and their interpretation, institutional capacity to 
design and follow through on new activities, changing ideas, 
and the balance of power among actors; all of which are 
influenced by the networks which surround the policy domain.
240 I n t e r v i e w  2.
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Part A of this section measures the learning capacity, using 
the five variables discussed in chapter two. Part B then looks 
at the learning capacity of different types of networks; 
allowing us to conclude what types of networks best promote 
economic development.
II-A, ASSESSING LOCAL LEARNING CAPACITY
Five variables were established to measure the learning 
capacity of local institutions. Variable one, the presence of 
multiple fora for promoting dialogue, measures the degree to 
which dialogue is promoted among various actors, which is an 
integral part of institutional capacity to design new 
activities and promote a shared understanding of local policy 
successes and failures. Variable two, network change and 
adaptation, identifies changes in the balance of power among 
the actors over time. Variable three, policy innovation looks 
at the evolution of policy over time, how it has been 
interpreted and how local networks responded to new ideas and 
institutional changes. Four, a common understanding of the 
problem, is required for learning to develop because if all 
the players have different conceptions of the problem and its 
potential solutions, conflict rather than dialogue will 
dominate. Finally, the fifth variable, the presence of 
appropriate channels between the private sector, especially 
firms, and the policy process, allows public and private 
sectors to share knowledge, information, policy feedback, and 
other resources which supports the design of new policies and
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the finetuning of those in place to meet development needs. 
These variables are summarized in table 8.1.
Table 8.1
Measuring Learning Capacity In Prato and Nottingham
MEASURING LEARNING PRATO NOTTINGHAM
FORA FOR DIALOGUE 1. Integrated Proj.
2. Ind. Relations
3. Consulta
4. Centro Formaz.
5. EU negotiations
6. SPRINT committee
7. REMTEX
1. Fashion Centre
2. Work & Tech. 
Advisory Board
3. REMTEX
NETWORK CHANGE 1. Expansion to 
University
2. Increasing 
Regional presence
3. SPRINT includes 
many national 
actors and non­
local firms
4. Increasing 
incorporation of 
marginal actors 
into local fora
5. redistribution 
of power among 
associations
1. TECS
2. Changes in 
Trade Unions, 
Training agents
3. LATC/ACTE
4. partnerships 
with firms
POLICY ADAPTATION 
AND INNOVATION
1.Tecnotessile
2.Consortia
3.Integrated 
Project 
4.SPRINT 
5 . CQT
6.Gulliver/ 
Grantessuto
7.CESVIT
1.Fashion Centre
2.Lace Market 
Strategy
3.Work & Tech. 
Project
COMMON
UNDERSTANDING OF 
THE PROBLEM
Present Absent
CHANNELS BETWEEN 
PRIVATE SECTOR AND 
POLICY PROCESS
1.Associations
2.Consortia
3.Research centres
1.TECS
2.Partnerships
3.LMMA
4.Fashion Centre
5.Nottingham Trent
Learning capacity is defined as the ability to adapt both
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policy and institutional relations to meet changing 
conditions. Many of the variables used to measure learning 
capacity capture both components of learning. Fora, a common 
understanding of the problem, and the nature of the channels 
between firms and policy process are crucial for both policy 
learning and for redefining institutional relations. Network 
change focuses primarily on institutional relationships 
(although networks as a source of new ideas has an impact on 
policy learning) while policy innovation measures 
predominately policy learning. Prato is characterized by
multiple fora for dialogue while in Nottingham, attempts to 
establish some type of textile forum have been impeded by the 
weakness of private sector institutions and central government 
policy. Although Prato's earlier fora were either bilateral 
with regard to specific issues (industrial relations) or 
arguably unsuccessful (integrated textile project), the 
economic crisis was adequate incentive to promote multilateral 
fora for specific policy areas (i.e. SPRINT, Centro 
Formazione), and for wider economic issues (Consulta, CSFs). 
Despite many ups and downs, the fora have been able to recast 
the collaborative relationships developed through bilateral 
industrial relations into multilateral networks and, thus, 
have promoted both policy and institutional learning. Prato 
has been rewarded for its efforts by private sector, regional 
and European financial support, and the creation of common 
strategies, all leading to clear signs of renewed growth and 
successful restructuring.
Nottingham fora, alternatively, have been few and, for
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the most part, of questionable effectiveness. The advisory 
committee of the Fashion Centre was abolished when the centre 
was reabsorbed into the local authority. Many of the actors 
which served as formal and informal partners to the NCC' s 
textile initiatives, the trade unions and the industrial 
training boards, were weakened (if not altogether lost) by 
central policies aimed at diluting union strength. In 
recognition of private sector weakness, the NCC encouraged the 
establishment of the Lace Market Manufacturers Association but 
its remit remained limited to combatting office development 
rather than larger issues of local governance and 
restructuring. Although no local forum was established, the 
EU, through the REMTEX programme, tried to encourage a 
regional forum but its one-off nature, and the lack of a 
common definition of the problem among the various groups (see 
below) could not be surmounted. Only recently, through the 
advisory committee of the Work and Technology project has some 
type of fora been reestablished and with the TECS and 
independent firms on board, private sector input has been 
assured. Overall, limited and unstable private sector 
representation has an obstacle to maintaining local fora, and 
establishing cooperative networks among actors relevant to the 
textile industry; hence learning in Nottingham has been 
seriously impeded.
The second variable, network change, can be charted in 
both cases but they were stimulated by different sources. In 
Prato, network change has been stimulated from the bottom-up, 
in response to economic restructuring while conversely in
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Nottingham, network change has often been forced from the top- 
down, as localities are confronted with new rules, new actors 
and the redistribution of political resources emerging from 
national policy. In other words, changes in Prato emerge 
primarily in response to economic restructuring while network 
changes in Nottingham were a consequence of political 
restructuring.
In Prato, local networks have been altered in three 
fundamental ways. First, there has been an increase in weak 
ties, an action intended to stimulate innovation within the 
local system. As industrial relations are no longer the heart 
of local governance, new actors, such as the University of 
Florence and the Province, have been absorbed into general 
information networks while specific actors, such as ENEA are 
part of specific policies (SPRINT). Second, the region, as 
opposed to the locality, is becoming a key arena for 
networking activities. The region is now a critical actor in 
many initiatives both local (SPRINT, the Consulta) and 
regional (EU programmes, CESVIT). Finally, the once more 
marginal actors are being included in network activities 
(Consulta, Centro Formazione) and policy is being developed to 
meet their needs. Support for both restructuring and 
reconversion will be a fundamental feature of the new Prato 
development agency. Thus, network changes have indeed 
reflected changing local conditions, opening up the older 
networks to fill the lacuna that the tighter, smaller, 
industrial relations-based networks could not manage on their 
own.
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In Nottingham, network change has been imposed from 
above. While Prato adapted to new economic conditions, 
Nottingham was a forced conform to political circumstances. 
First, the range of actors in the policy domain has fluctuated 
with the decline of certain actors (trade unions and ITBs) and 
rise of others (TECs, NDE). Consequently, the network which 
supported the Fashion centre, including a range of textile 
actors, was subdivided into a set of smaller, disconnected 
networks with a more limited focus; the Lace Market network, 
a strong but nationally-centred sectoral network among the 
ITBs and KIF, and the network surrounding the counties 
policies. Second, the dominance of central government 
departments keeps networks separate by policy area and thus 
multiplies the number of actors involved in some element of 
economic development. Consequently, network change responds to 
central policy change, as opposed to local need. Thus 
relational changes have not been stimulated by learning, as in 
the case of Prato, but have been imposed by central policies.
Although the third variable, policy innovation, is better 
developed in Prato, there are some interesting similarities 
between cases. First, many of the initial policy ideas sprang 
from party philosophy. Prato's pre-crisis activities conformed 
to the well-known model of endogenous development championed 
by the PDS. The Nottingham Fashion Centre was developed within 
the policy agenda of the Urban Left and represented a real 
attempt to restructure for labour, assist SMEs and encourage 
economic decentralization. Second, intergovernmental networks 
have become increasingly important as a source of new policy
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ideas. In Nottingham, the focus was on interregional (LATC) 
and transregional (Four cities, Eurocities, ACTE) exchanges 
while in Prato, the local actors expanded their involvement 
within the region. The similarity ends here as the way policy 
evolved differs quite substantially.
In Nottingham, the lack of a common understanding as to 
why the Fashion Centre was unable to fulfil its original 
mandate, the loss of the early network which emerged around 
the fashion centre because important actors (i.e trade unions 
and ITBs) were in the process of painful organizational 
changes, the entry of new economic development actors (TECs), 
and the Centre's constant pressure on local finances and 
growing power over the content and tools of local policy, 
ultimately undermined the local learning process and lead to 
policy reversion. Innovative policy practices were supplanted 
by a return to factory units provision and grant assistance as 
key tools to assist textile firms. The new model of 
development was unable to find a real foothold in the city. 
The lessons of the Fashion Centre, however, were not lost but 
were better interpreted by the county. Relying on personnel 
who had been involved in the design of the Fashion Centre, the 
Work and Technology Project supports similar aims 
(restructuring for labour), but follows a different strategy; 
one better suited to the realities of local conditions. Thus, 
the Work and Technology programme thus does represent policy 
learning.
In Prato, there has been much greater degree of policy 
experimentation and innovation. Unlike Nottingham, Prato's
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institutional landscape (at least in terms of actors involved) 
has been fairly stable and the majority of the policies which 
emerged were developed from strong interfunctional networks as 
the locality attempted to get to grips with the economic 
crisis. The range of policies which emerged were all targeted 
at commonly interpreted weaknesses in the industrial structure 
(i.e. quality improvement/CQT, innovation/SPRINT, firm 
size/Grantessuto). Policy learning was a direct result of 
institutional learning. As participants learned to work 
together through various fora, transforming collaborative 
bilateral relations into a multilateral dialogue, a range of 
policies and institutions were generated. For example, CQT 
grew out of the consortia. Having learned the benefits of 
acting collectively to meet well-defined common goals, the 
next step was a consortium of consortia to manage more 
expansive and more expensive projects.
The fourth variable, general agreement regarding the 
problem being addressed, differs in both cases. In Prato, 
there was general agreement both within local networks and 
within intergovernmental networks regarding the problems which 
require attention (smallness of firms, weak innovative 
capacity, weak, non-entrepreneurial public sector, inefficient 
communications system, quality improvement, and some 
diversification) and the belief that economic governance was 
a local task. In Nottingham, the situation could not be more 
diverse. The public authorities see the problem as one of 
industrial structure. The LMMA identifies the main threat as 
lower-priced imports and believes the only viable policy are
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national tariffs. The KIF is opposed to initiatives which 
distort competition (i.e. RETEX), while views technology and 
automation as the way forward for British industry. The 
central government places industrial fortunes to the free 
market, thus has managed to scale back Nottingham's policy 
from innovative and interventive to standard support measures 
such as factory unit provision. Given the wide variety of 
opinions regarding the problems and the appropriate role of 
government, learning, then as a collective pursuit, is weak 
because dialogue has no starting point. Without regular fora, 
or network exchange, it is doubtful that a shared view, thus 
collective governance, will emerge.
Finally, the fifth variable, the presence of adequate 
channels between firms and policy support structures is a 
crucial component of a learning economy as it provides the 
link between political processes and economic activity. 
Without that link, even the most sophisticated institutional 
architecture would be unable to promote development. Looking 
at our two cases, it is clear that Prato, with a strong tier 
of firm associations, has the better articulated channels 
between political processes and firms. In fact, many of these 
associations, especially the UIP, has consistently provided a 
leadership role in the policy support processes (consortia, 
Tecnotessile, SPRINT) as have the craft associations 
(Gulliver, Grantessuto). In Nottingham, these channels have 
been particularly weak. The TECs, in fact, were created 
specifically to improve these channels but the TECs themselves 
are in an odd position. Being neither fully public nor fully
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private actors, TECs have often had difficulty defining their 
role within the community. To fill this lacuna, the LMMA was 
established, but its role remains limited and marginal. 
Partnerships with individual firms has been the recent method 
of choice. Although not the best alternative, given the 
absence of these channels it may arguably be the only way 
forward.
Using these five variables, it has been demonstrated that 
both policy and institutional learning are better developed in 
Prato. The next section looks at why this might be so, by 
examining how different types of networks have encouraged or 
hindered learning in the two cases.
II-B. NETWORKS AND LEARNING
This section assesses how different network structures effect 
learning capacity. It represents a test of our main hypothesis 
that dense intraregional functional networks have the better 
developed learning capacity. Table 8.2 summarizes policy by 
type of network. Prato's policies emerge from primarily the 
same central functional intraregional network while Nottingham 
has a wider range of networks surrounding various policy 
areas, with the greatest number emerging from 
intergovernmental networks. However, categorizing policy by 
territory and dominant actor alone cannot explain why Prato 
rated so much higher on the learning scale because 
Nottingham's main policies were indeed a product of these
3 6 2
Table 8.2
Policies by N e t w o r k  Type in P r ato and N o t t i n g h a m
TERRITORY INTRAREGIONAL INTERREGIONAL TRANSREGIONAL
DOMINANT
ACTOR
Prato Nottingham Prato Nottingham Prato Nottingham
GOVERNMENTAL Aqueduct
Water
Purification
Business 
Support 
Training 
Dying &
Finishing 
CSF committee
LATC (RETEX) ACTE ACTE 
4 Cities 
Network 
Eurocities
SECTORAL Social Fund
Consortia
Tecnotessile
Stitching Up 
Your Future
Training
FUNCTIONAL Consulta
SPRINT
Centro
Formazione
Integrated
Textile
Project
Gulliver
Grantessuto
CQT
Macrolotto 
Transport 
Centre 
CSF committee
Fashion 
Centre 
Lace Market 
Work &
Technology
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types of networks (albeit with a different selection of actors 
for each initiative). In fact, this would seem 
counterintuitive since a wider range of networks potentially 
offers more channels of access to a seemingly larger pool of 
external resources, especially knowledge and information.
Instead, the evidence suggests that the important 
variables are not necessarily who participates or the 
territory those networks cover but learning capacity, the 
ability to adapt policy and institutional relations to meet 
new conditions. Learning capacity is not effected by these 
descriptive categories but is a encouraged or impeded by the 
structure of the networks (density, centralization and shape). 
Prato and Nottingham have vastly different network structures, 
and it is these differences which offer a more convincing 
explanation as to why Prato's learning capacity was so much 
better developed.
Looking at density, Prato's networks, with a density of 
.83 out of 1, were substantially denser than those found in 
Nottingham (.53). Prato's dense networks encouraged the 
development of strong bonds of trust both among individuals 
and institutions, good working relationships that spanned 
multiple policy domains making the central network an 
important focal point for integrating a variety of 
development-related activity, and the creation of a common 
purpose and shared rules of the game even while diversity of 
interests were preserved. Density promotes and sustains 
dialogue and allows for failed efforts without undermining the 
value the participants put on maintaining a running dialogue.
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In Nottingham, lack of overall density among the range of 
actors supported the separation of networks by policy area, 
thus the generation of multiple games (and multiple rules) 
governing institutional interaction. Without commonly 
understood modes of interaction, dialogue and the collective 
creation of a shared industrial purpose, important components 
of learning were seriously hindered.
Variation in the degree of centralization between 
networks in Nottingham (centralization 64%) and Prato 
(centralization 28.6%) is also especially marked. In short, 
multiple leadership roles among the public and private sector 
distinguishes Prato from Nottingham, which depends almost 
completely on the public authorities to act as the animateur 
of development initiatives. Although having a number of local 
'leaders' undoubtedly ensures a high degree of conflict in 
many proceedings, it also offers a range of diverse 
initiatives, learning opportunities, and the need for actors 
to listen to each other. Learning to learn does not emerge 
solely from interacting in the policy process but from 
interacting in multiple spheres of activity. Furthermore, 
since the local leaders are all interlinked through dense 
networks, they each hold adequate power so that even their 
unilateral activities will effect all other institutions; 
hence, the need to sit down and work things out. Multiple 
leadership positions support redundancy, which creates a wide 
range of channels of access for firms and other actors. Thus 
multiple leaders allow for greater access to information than 
in centralized structures.
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Within centralized structures, information is not shared 
and jointly interpreted but transmitted through the actors 
positioned in the centre of the network. Therefore, in 
Nottingham, local authorities which were placed centrally in 
the information networks act as a bridge between actors, 
between policy areas, and between ideas. For learning to 
occur, ideas and information must be shared, discussed, 
debated, argued, and eventually collectively interpreted among 
all those whose actions will ultimately impact on policy 
outcomes. Centralized structures means that interpretation is 
a product of the central actors, and does not emerge from the 
wider community, ergo learning is stunted.
The last structural component, shape, which refers to 
whether a network takes on a more vertical or a more 
horizontal structure, is a function of the way power is 
distributed among network participants. The empirical work 
makes a powerful suggestion regarding our general 
understanding of networks; within vertical networks power 
relationships dominate which results in the suppression of 
local learning capacity while horizontal networks are more 
likely to promote learning241. As Deutch eloquently puts it, 
power can be understood as "the ability to talk instead of 
listen, the ability to afford not to learn (cited in May, 
1992, p.341)."
241 Even in perfectly horizontal structures, power 
relationships, can of course, come to dominate the process at the 
expense of learning relationships, especially during periods of 
crisis. However, the recognition of mutual interdependence is 
more likely within horizontal networks which is a crucial first 
condition for learning, making learning much more likely within 
horizontal networks.
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Nottingham networks are more vertically shaped given the 
dominance of central government departments. The growing 
concentration of resources in the centre has kept local 
authorities locked into these constraining relationships as 
their dependence on central resources continues to increase, 
thus the balance of power has moved increasingly toward the 
central government, with negative or distortive effects on 
local network building and policy learning. Rather than 
learning from its past experiences, Nottingham's policies and 
institutional relations concerning the textile industry 
declined from innovative and ambitious to the bare minimum 
using ineffective policy tools. Alternatively, Prato is marked 
by horizontally structured networks between levels of 
government and public and private actors. The range of policy 
tools and initiatives expands and adapts to changing 
conditions while, crucially intergovernmental relations have 
been used to support and strengthen local functional networks, 
even help them adapt to changing conditions, while, in 
Nottingham, the strength of the central-local axis, inhibits 
their development. Although the Prato policy process was often 
slowed, halted or redirected by the internal power struggles 
among the actors, the repeated attempts by the local 
authorities to create and maintain a multifaceted dialogue, 
and the region's support of those efforts, has indeed born 
fruit with a wide range of policy initiatives, better 
developed and wider local networks, and clear evidence of 
economic renewal.
In sum, the structural aspects of networks offer a better
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explanation of network learning capacity than did the more 
descriptive categories of territorial scope and dominant 
actor. Although density appears to be coterminous with an 
intraregional functional network in our case studies, the 
creation of, at least project specific intraregional 
functional networks for certain individual policies in 
Nottingham suggests that the main hypothesis, that 
intraregional functional networks promote learning, should be 
revised somewhat. Rather dense networks better sustain a 
learning environment. Territorial scope and dominant actor may 
influence the degree to which density develops, but it is 
density and lack of centralization which provide the backbone 
of learning networks.
III. GENERAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY AND POLICY
This final section outlines the general theoretical and policy 
implications which emerge from this research. On the 
theoretical side, the growing recognition across disciplines 
of networks as increasingly common organizational forms of 
governance, which have emerged in response to resource 
dispersal, uncertain and unstable environmental conditions, 
and increasing constraints on any agent's ability to achieve 
its goals individually, must prompt us to ask if concepts such 
as autonomy or even sovereignty are an arrogance of an earlier 
era? As the European Union may indeed have initially been a 
way to renew the nation-state by giving each nation partial 
influence on the actions of others and merging the resources
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of all states in domestic, European and international arenas, 
so do networks increase the action capacity of subnational 
authorities by linking them into a larger pool of resources 
and expanding their influence over a range of other actors' 
activities. In almost no cases do we see a local authority 
going it alone, but always in cooperation with other actors. 
Although the growing need to build networks indicates a loss 
of autonomy on the part of local authorities, the evidence 
presented here suggests that this loss is compensated by a 
gain in action capacity and, paradoxically, in the overall 
enhancement of subnational authorities' role in the 
development process.
The dispersal of development resources between tiers of 
government and between public and private sectors demands an 
agent which can integrate those resources, especially the 
growing rate of funding sources. Subnational authorities are 
the one of the few actors with the requisite legitimacy242 to 
oversee the use of public resources, thus making them critical 
partners in development activities. In sum, although networks 
do represent a loss of resources, especially the autonomy of 
individual agents, they also provide those agents with the 
means to accomplish objectives, albeit through collective 
methods and activities.
Second, the emphasis on networks as a form of collective 
governance, in which autonomy is a function of collective 
rather than individual action, also calls into question the
242 The legitimacy of such actors as Quangos, which can also 
assume this role, is a fairly substantial question and beyond the 
scope of this thesis.
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state/market dichotomy and their respective theoretical 
frameworks which are still used in powerful circles to explain 
outcomes and design policy, especially economic policy. 
Networks, as structural realities, represent intermediary 
institutions; instruments which can mediate the effects of 
state and market activity and thus provide a partial 
explanation of uneven development. The common reification 
(arguably deification) of the State and the market as 
omnipresent and omnipotent actors obscures the activities of 
subnational actors, which we have shown can mediate those 
forces, to varying degrees and thereby partially alter them to 
suit local conditions.
Economic development, therefore, is not just a function 
of either state or market activity but is, instead, a socially 
and institutionally embedded process. The development debate, 
heretofore divided between left (which stressed state 
governance of the economy) and the right (which emphasized 
governance by a self-regulating market), has only recently 
come to recognize that these forces are shaped by local and 
regional conditions; a crucial factor when trying to explain 
uneven development within nation-states. These are neither new 
nor revolutionary ideas, but represent a rediscovery of 
earlier insights advanced by Polanyi (1944); an important 
rediscovery because it suggests that regions do, indeed, 
matter. I will return to this point further down.
In terms of policy, this research offers several 
insights. First, the evidence suggests that the denser or 
thicker the regional institutional infrastructure, the better
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able it is to respond collectively to economic challenge, 
although this process is by no means easy nor is success 
guaranteed. The research also suggests, however, that even in 
the absence of strong subnational institutions, local 
initiatives can have some small effect, if policy ambitions 
does not exceed governance capacity and that policy is 
appropriate to local conditions. This suggests, however, that 
self-learning is a fundamental component of the overall 
learning process.
More specifically, this indicates that policy-copying is 
indeed a dangerous undertaking if done in ignorance of 
potential differences in governance structures and 
institutional capacity. Emulation first requires reflection 
and consideration, it should not be pursued lightly or 
whimsically.
Finally, this thesis does provide support for a mixed 
model of development. Although it clearly suggests that 
endogenous capacity is a crucial component of local 
development, in both cases, innovative capacity was enhanced 
by reaching out for external resources that could be brought 
to the area by non-local firms and other actors; suggesting 
once again that regions are becoming increasingly important 
actors in many arenas of interaction.
In both cases the activities of the region was a crucial 
force; in Prato the region served as animateur of development 
and local networks, in Nottingham, dominated by a central 
government region, it was a hindrance. More precisely, the 
degree of regional support of local efforts was an influential
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variable for promoting local learning and institutional 
capacity.
The Maastricht Treaty has enhanced European support for 
the regions both economically through a doubling of the 
Structural Funds, and politically through the Committee of 
Regions. This growth of European support (which its a clear 
bias toward directly, elected regions) and the concurrent 
erosion of central government's regional development function 
(Leonardi and Garmise, 1992), coupled with evidence of 
economic decentralization and the localization of economic 
activity, further stressing the embeddedness and instituted 
nature of economic processes, all point to the increasing 
importance of the region as a key locus of economic 
governance. A Europe of the Regions? Perhaps!
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Department of Government 
LOCAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY STUDY 
Interview Schedule 
Associations
Interview No.___
Objective: I am interested in studying the role partnerships play
in the process by which local industrial policy is made and 
implemented. You and your organization have been identified as 
significant actors in this process. I would like to talk with you 
about local policy toward the textile and clothing industry and the 
role you have taken in its development. Since interviews are being 
carried out in two countries with a variety of different 
organizations, I will follow an interview schedule to guarantee I 
cover all topics in a quick and efficient manner.
PART I: GOALS, PURPOSES, AND INTERESTS
A. I would like to start by asking you a few general questions 
about your organization.
1. How would you describe the main activities and functions of 
your organization?
2. When was your organization established?
3. What is the membership of your organization?
4. How many people does your organization employ? (nationally, 
regionally, and locally)
5. How many offices do you have in Nottingham,
Nottinghamshire, and the East Midlands to serve your 
members?
6. What services do you offer your members?
7. Does your organization receive any financial support from 
the City or County Council? Any commercial contracts?
8. Are there any City or County Councillors on your Board of 
Directors? if yes, specify name and Committee
PART IIs LOCAL INITIATIVES
A, I am going to give you a list of all local initiatives taken by 
the City and County councils. For each policy, could you tell me if 
you participated, how you participated and who asked you to 
participate, and if you were instrumental in gaining the 
participation of others?
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1 Lace Market Strategy
2• Fashion Centre
3. Stitching Up Your Future
4. Dying and finishing Initiative
5. Textile Training Centre (Clothing and Knitwear 
Industry Training Centre)_____________________
6. Fashion Designer Studios/Enterprise Workshop
7. Clothing Operatives training scheme
8. Textile workshops: Specify
9. Enterprising Nottinghamshire
10. Work and Technology Project
11. Textile and Clothing Seminars
12. A Common Agenda
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13. Trade Missions and Export Seminars
14. Nottinghamshire Training Opportunity
15. Textile Careers Roadshow
16. Business Support, specify
17. other training, specify
18. other, specify
Other initiatives toward the industry not generated 
by the local government. Please specify_____________
B. In general, do you feel that you have some degree of influence
on the policy process? _______________  How much?
 a good deal
 some
 very little
none
C. In general why did you participate in local initiatives? What 
results were you hoping to achieve?
D. In general, how would you assess your relationship with the:
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Nottingham City Council?
Nottinghamshire County Council?
2. Do you have regular and routine contact with the City 
Council?________Which Departments?____________________
a) How often?
________ weekly
________ monthly
________ every few months
b)What form does that contact take?
 formal meetings: specify_______________
________ informal settings such as lunch
________ phone contacts
________ social events
________ letters/correspondence
3. Taking into account all the contacts with the City
Council, what percentage of the total time do you meet
with councillors?______%
with officers? __  %
4. Do you have regular and routine contact with the County 
Council?______Which Departments?_________________________
a) How often?
________ weekly
________ monthly
________ every few months
b)What form does that contact take?
 ______ formal meetings: specify__________________
________ informal settings such as lunch
________ phone contacts
________ social events
________ letters/correspondence
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c)Taking into account all the contacts with the County 
Council, what percentage of the total time do you meet
with councillors?______%
with officers? %
PART III. ASSOCIATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS
A) I am going to give you a list of all associations and 
organizations that have had some involvement in initiatives toward 
the textile industry. Could you tell me with which groups you 
regularly have contact with and undertake joint projects with?
Business Associations
1. Lace Market Manufacturers Associations
2. Knitting Industries Federation
3. CBI
4. Nottinghamshire Chamber of Commerce and Industry
5. Lace Market Retailers
6. Business in the Community
 7. Other, specify
Training Organizations
8. KLITRA
9. CAPITB
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10. North Nottinghamshire TEC
11. Greater Nottingham TEC
12. Textile Group Training (TGT)
13. Other, specify
Trade Unions
14. KFAT
15. GMB
16. TUC
17. Other, specify
Education Institutions 
 18. Nottingham Polytechnic
19. University of Nottingham
20. Clarendon College of Continuing Education
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21. West Nottinghamshire College
22. Other, specify
Public/Private Organizations 
 23. Lace Market Development Corporation
24. Nottingham Development Enterprise
25. Fashion Centre
26. Nottinghamshire Business Venture
27. First Enterprise
28. Nottingham Task Force
29. British Coal Enterprise
30. Other, specify
Private Sector
 31. Individual Textile and Clothing Businesses,
specify,__________________________________________
 32. Property Developers, specify_________________
 33. Consultants, specify_________________________
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34. Banks, specify
 35. Other, specify____________
Voluntary Sector
 36. St. Ann's Training Workshop
 37. Nottingham Textile Society^
 38. Other, specify____________
Other
 39. Specify___________________
2) Are you or any one in you organization a member or on the 
board of Directors or Advisory Committee of any of these 
associations? Which ones?
3) Do any of these organizations or their leadership hold 
membership or have representatives on your organizations' s 
board of directors or advisory committee?
4) Of all these groups, which do you feel stand out as 
especially influential and consequential for the 
formulation and implementation of local projects 
and policies toward the industry?____________________
PART IV s THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
A.) 1. Do you have regular and routine contact with any of the 
regional offices of central government departments? Which ones?
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a) How often?
________weekly
________monthly
________every few months
b)What form does that contact take?
________formal meetings s specify_____________ _ _
________ informal settings such as lunch; specify
________ phone contacts
________ social events
________ letters/correspondence
c)What percentage of that time concerns issues of 
importance to the textile industry?__________ %
2. Has the central government been generally supportive 
of local initatives toward the industry?____________
3. Is your organization active in the national policy 
process on issues of concern to the textile and 
clothing industry? if yes, how?
PART V: EUROPE
I will give you a list of European programs and initiatives. 
Could you please tell me if you participated in any of these 
programmes or programme bids, how you participated, who asked 
you to participate, and if you asked any other organization to 
participate.
1. REMTEX
2. RETEX
3. COMETT
4. BRITE
5. East Midlands Regional Operational Programme 
(EMROP)______________________________________
6. NOW
7. LEDA (Local Economic Development Action)
8. Business and Innovation Centre (BIC)
9. European Information Centre_________
10. EUROPARTENARIAT_____________________
11. EUROFORM
12. RECHAR
13. PERIFERA
14. Other Structural Fund supported programs 
(ESF,ERDF),specify______________________
15. Other, specify
B)l. Do you have any other links in Europe?
_____ 1.Business/Commercial
 2.Associational networks
 3.Social
 4.Brussels Office
 5.Other, specify_______________________
2. Have you used these links to support Nottingham/ 
Nottinghamshire's attempts to win EC funding? How?
3. How important are European Links? What advantages do they 
bring? Are they becoming more important?____________________
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PART Vis CONCLUSIONS
A)What have been the overall effects of local initiatives 
toward the industry? To what degree do they meet local 
needs?   _________________________________
B)What have been the major obstacles?
C)What still needs to be done?
Address:
London School of Economics 
Department of Government 
Government Research Division, L301 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AN
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Department of Government 
LOCAL INDUSTRIAL POLICY STUDY 
Interview Schedule 
Public Authorities
Interview No.___
Objective: I am interested in studying the role partnerships play
in the process by which local industrial policy is made and 
implemented. You and your organization have been identified as 
significant actors in this process. I would like to talk with you 
about local policy toward the textile and clothing industry and the 
role you have taken in its development. Since interviews are being 
carried out in two countries with a variety of different 
organizations, I will follow an interview schedule to guarantee I 
cover all topics in a quick and efficient manner.
PART I: GOALS, PURPOSES, AND INTERESTS
A. I would like to start by asking you a few general questions 
about your Committee/Department?.
1 • How would you describe the main activities and functions of 
your Department/Committee?
2. How many people does your department employ?
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3. Taking into account all the economic development 
initiatives you pursue, what percentage of your activity is 
devoted to the textile sector? ._____%
4. Why did you choose to assist, in particular,
the textile and clothing industry? What goals do you seek 
to achieve?
5. What type of opposition do you face in the pursuance of 
this development strategy?
PART II. ASSOCIATIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS
A) I am going to give you a list of all associations and 
organizations that have had some involvement in initiatives toward 
the textile industry. For each organization, could you tell me 
which ones you regularly have contact with, consult with both 
generally and specifically toward the sector, and were involved in 
the the main programs toward the textile industry and why were they 
chosen? (Citys Lace Market Strategy, original fashion centre, 
training and education initiatives, County: Work and Technology
program, training and education initatives, Enterprising 
Nottinghamshire)
Business Associations
 ____1. Lace Market Manufacturers Associations_______
2. Knitting Industries Federation
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3, CBI
4. Nottinghamshire Chamber of Commerce and Industry
5. Lace Market Retailers
6. Business in the Community
 7. Other, specify
Training Organizations
8. KLITRA
9. CAPITB
10. North Nottinghamshire TEC
11. Greater Nottingham TEC
12. Textile Group Training (TGT)
13. Other, specify
Trade Unions
14. KFAT
15. GMB
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16. TUC
17. Other/ specify
Education Institutions 
 18. Nottingham Polytechnic
19. University of Nottingham
20. Clarendon College of Continuing Education
21. West Nottinghamshire College
22. Other/ specify
Public/Private Organizations 
 23. Lace Market Development Corporation
24. Nottingham Development Enterprise
25. Fashion Centre
26. Nottinghamshire Business Venture
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27. First Enterprise
28. Nottingham Task Force
29. British Coal Enterprise
30. Other, specify
Private Sector
 31. Individual Textile and Clothing Businesses,
specify,_____________________________________________
 32. Property Developers, specify____________________
 33. Consultants, specify____________________________
 34. Banks, specify__________________________________
 35. Other, specify__________________________________
Voluntary Sector
 36. St. Ann's Training Workshop_________________________
 37. Nottingham Textile Society______________________
 38. Other, specify__________________________________
Other
 39. Specify_________________________________________
2) Are you or any one on the Council a member or on the 
board of Directors or Advisory Committee of any of 
these associations? Which ones?
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3) Of all these groups, which do you feel stand out as 
especially influential and consequential for the 
formulation and implementation of local projects 
and policies toward the industry?_____________________
PART III. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
A.) 1. Do you have regular and routine contact with any of the 
regional offices of central government departments? Which ones?
a) How often?
________ weekly
________ monthly
________ every few months
b)What form does that contact take? 
 formal meetings: specify^
informal settings such as lunch; specify_ 
[phone contacts 
social events 
[letters/correspondence
c)What percentage of that time concerns issues of 
importance to the textile industry?__________ %
2. Has the central government been generally supportive 
of local initatives toward the industry?____________
3. The central government provides many funds for local 
initiatives. What effect does this have on policy 
choices?
B) How would you assess your relationship with the other Council, 
both generally and in this particular policy field?
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2. With which departments/Committees in the other Council do 
you have regular and routine contact?_____________
a) How often?
________ weekly
________ monthly
________ every few months
b)What form does that contact take?
________ formal meetings: specify__________________
________ informal settings such as lunch
________ phone contacts
________ social events
________ letters/correspondence
3. Taking into account all the contacts with the other
Council, what percentage of the total time do you meet
with councillors?______%
with officers? %
PART III: EUROPE
A. I will give you a list of European programs and initiatives.
1.From which of these initiatives have you received financial 
support? Which did you bid for unsuccessfully?
2.For each policy, could you tell me what organizations 
supported your bid or participated in the policy 
implementation, how they participated (managerial, financial 
or information/advice), how their participation was gained, 
and why were these groups chosen?
 1. REMTEX________________________________________
_____2. RETEX_________________________________________
 3. COMETT
4. BRITE________________________________________
5. East Midlands Regional Operational Programme 
(EMROP)______________________________________
6. NOW
7. LEDA (Local Economic Development Action)
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8. Business and Innovation Centre (BIC)_____
9. European Information Centre______________
10. EUROPARTENARIAT___________________________
11. EUROFORM__________________________________
12. RECHAR____________________________________
13. PERIFERA__________________________________
14. Other Structural Fund supported programs 
(ESF,ERDF),specify________________________
 15. Other, specify________________________________
3. Have any of these organizations used there independent 
European links to support your attempts to win EC funding? 
How?
4. Which organizations were asked to participate in the 
setting up a Brussels Office?
5. How important are European Links? What advantages do they 
bring? Are they becoming more important?___________________
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PART VI: CONCLUSIONS
A)What have been the overall effects of local initiatives 
toward the industry? To what degree do they meet local 
needs?
B)What have been the major obstacles?
C)What still needs to be done?
Address:
London School of Economics 
Department of Government 
Government Research Division, L301 
Houghton Street 
London WC2A 2AN
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